From ba05b907e3563f9aa25a4322abd9ab2d5b56b36b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "http://oneingray.myopenid.com/" Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2010 15:58:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] More wishlist items for the `xslt` plugin. --- doc/plugins/contrib/xslt/discussion.mdwn | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+) diff --git a/doc/plugins/contrib/xslt/discussion.mdwn b/doc/plugins/contrib/xslt/discussion.mdwn index 9cda02f88..72cce083c 100644 --- a/doc/plugins/contrib/xslt/discussion.mdwn +++ b/doc/plugins/contrib/xslt/discussion.mdwn @@ -20,3 +20,30 @@ possible. Can it also read other arbitrary files, run other programs, etc? > For the second point, I think the main concern would be resource usage. XSLT is a pretty limited language; it can read other XML files, but it can't run other programs so far as I know. > -- [[KathrynAndersen]] + +>> XSLT is, indeed, a Turing-complete programming language. + However, [XML::LibXSLT][] provides a set of functions to help + to minimize the damage that may be caused by running a random + program. + +>> In particular, `max_depth ()` allows for the maximum + recursion depth to be set, while + `read_file ()`, `write_file ()`, `create_dir ()`, + `read_net ()` and `write_net ()` + are the callbacks that allow any of the possible file + operations to be denied. + +>> To be honest, I'd prefer for the `read_file ()` callback to + only grant access to the files below the Ikiwiki source + directory, and for all the `write_`… and + …`_net` callbacks to deny the access unconditionally. + +>> One more wishlist item: allow the set of locations to take + `.xsl` files from to be preconfigured, so that, e. g., + one could allow (preasumably trusted) system stylesheets, + while disallowing any stylesheets that are placed on the Wiki + itself. + +>> — Ivan Shmakov, 2010-03-28Z. + +[XML::LibXSLT]: http://search.cpan.org/~PAJAS/XML-LibXSLT/LibXSLT.pm -- 2.32.0.93.g670b81a890