2 * I'm tired of doing "vsnprintf()" etc just to open a
3 * file, so here's a "return static buffer with printf"
6 * It's obviously not thread-safe. Sue me. But it's quite
7 * useful for doing things like
9 * f = open(mkpath("%s/%s.git", base, name), O_RDONLY);
11 * which is what it's designed for.
16 static char bad_path[] = "/bad-path/";
18 static char *get_pathname(void)
20 static char pathname_array[4][PATH_MAX];
22 return pathname_array[3 & ++index];
25 static char *cleanup_path(char *path)
28 if (!memcmp(path, "./", 2)) {
36 char *mksnpath(char *buf, size_t n, const char *fmt, ...)
42 len = vsnprintf(buf, n, fmt, args);
45 strlcpy(buf, bad_path, n);
48 return cleanup_path(buf);
51 static char *git_vsnpath(char *buf, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list args)
53 const char *git_dir = get_git_dir();
56 len = strlen(git_dir);
59 memcpy(buf, git_dir, len);
60 if (len && !is_dir_sep(git_dir[len-1]))
62 len += vsnprintf(buf + len, n - len, fmt, args);
65 return cleanup_path(buf);
67 strlcpy(buf, bad_path, n);
71 char *git_snpath(char *buf, size_t n, const char *fmt, ...)
75 (void)git_vsnpath(buf, n, fmt, args);
80 char *git_pathdup(const char *fmt, ...)
85 (void)git_vsnpath(path, sizeof(path), fmt, args);
90 char *mkpath(const char *fmt, ...)
94 char *pathname = get_pathname();
97 len = vsnprintf(pathname, PATH_MAX, fmt, args);
101 return cleanup_path(pathname);
104 char *git_path(const char *fmt, ...)
106 const char *git_dir = get_git_dir();
107 char *pathname = get_pathname();
111 len = strlen(git_dir);
112 if (len > PATH_MAX-100)
114 memcpy(pathname, git_dir, len);
115 if (len && git_dir[len-1] != '/')
116 pathname[len++] = '/';
118 len += vsnprintf(pathname + len, PATH_MAX - len, fmt, args);
122 return cleanup_path(pathname);
125 char *git_path_submodule(const char *path, const char *fmt, ...)
127 char *pathname = get_pathname();
128 struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
134 if (len > PATH_MAX-100)
137 strbuf_addstr(&buf, path);
138 if (len && path[len-1] != '/')
139 strbuf_addch(&buf, '/');
140 strbuf_addstr(&buf, ".git");
142 git_dir = read_gitfile_gently(buf.buf);
145 strbuf_addstr(&buf, git_dir);
147 strbuf_addch(&buf, '/');
149 if (buf.len >= PATH_MAX)
151 memcpy(pathname, buf.buf, buf.len + 1);
153 strbuf_release(&buf);
154 len = strlen(pathname);
157 len += vsnprintf(pathname + len, PATH_MAX - len, fmt, args);
161 return cleanup_path(pathname);
164 /* git_mkstemp() - create tmp file honoring TMPDIR variable */
165 int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template)
170 tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
173 n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template);
175 errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
178 return mkstemp(path);
181 /* git_mkstemps() - create tmp file with suffix honoring TMPDIR variable. */
182 int git_mkstemps(char *path, size_t len, const char *template, int suffix_len)
187 tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
190 n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template);
192 errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
195 return mkstemps(path, suffix_len);
198 /* Adapted from libiberty's mkstemp.c. */
201 #define TMP_MAX 16384
203 int git_mkstemps_mode(char *pattern, int suffix_len, int mode)
205 static const char letters[] =
206 "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
207 "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
209 static const int num_letters = 62;
216 len = strlen(pattern);
218 if (len < 6 + suffix_len) {
223 if (strncmp(&pattern[len - 6 - suffix_len], "XXXXXX", 6)) {
229 * Replace pattern's XXXXXX characters with randomness.
230 * Try TMP_MAX different filenames.
232 gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
233 value = ((size_t)(tv.tv_usec << 16)) ^ tv.tv_sec ^ getpid();
234 template = &pattern[len - 6 - suffix_len];
235 for (count = 0; count < TMP_MAX; ++count) {
237 /* Fill in the random bits. */
238 template[0] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
239 template[1] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
240 template[2] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
241 template[3] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
242 template[4] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
243 template[5] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters;
245 fd = open(pattern, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_RDWR, mode);
249 * Fatal error (EPERM, ENOSPC etc).
250 * It doesn't make sense to loop.
255 * This is a random value. It is only necessary that
256 * the next TMP_MAX values generated by adding 7777 to
257 * VALUE are different with (module 2^32).
261 /* We return the null string if we can't find a unique file name. */
266 int git_mkstemp_mode(char *pattern, int mode)
268 /* mkstemp is just mkstemps with no suffix */
269 return git_mkstemps_mode(pattern, 0, mode);
272 int gitmkstemps(char *pattern, int suffix_len)
274 return git_mkstemps_mode(pattern, suffix_len, 0600);
277 int validate_headref(const char *path)
280 char *buf, buffer[256];
281 unsigned char sha1[20];
285 if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
288 /* Make sure it is a "refs/.." symlink */
289 if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
290 len = readlink(path, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
291 if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buffer, 5))
297 * Anything else, just open it and try to see if it is a symbolic ref.
299 fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
302 len = read_in_full(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
306 * Is it a symbolic ref?
310 if (!memcmp("ref:", buffer, 4)) {
313 while (len && isspace(*buf))
315 if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buf, 5))
320 * Is this a detached HEAD?
322 if (!get_sha1_hex(buffer, sha1))
328 static struct passwd *getpw_str(const char *username, size_t len)
331 char *username_z = xmalloc(len + 1);
332 memcpy(username_z, username, len);
333 username_z[len] = '\0';
334 pw = getpwnam(username_z);
340 * Return a string with ~ and ~user expanded via getpw*. If buf != NULL,
341 * then it is a newly allocated string. Returns NULL on getpw failure or
344 char *expand_user_path(const char *path)
346 struct strbuf user_path = STRBUF_INIT;
347 const char *first_slash = strchrnul(path, '/');
348 const char *to_copy = path;
352 if (path[0] == '~') {
353 const char *username = path + 1;
354 size_t username_len = first_slash - username;
355 if (username_len == 0) {
356 const char *home = getenv("HOME");
357 strbuf_add(&user_path, home, strlen(home));
359 struct passwd *pw = getpw_str(username, username_len);
362 strbuf_add(&user_path, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
364 to_copy = first_slash;
366 strbuf_add(&user_path, to_copy, strlen(to_copy));
367 return strbuf_detach(&user_path, NULL);
369 strbuf_release(&user_path);
374 * First, one directory to try is determined by the following algorithm.
376 * (0) If "strict" is given, the path is used as given and no DWIM is
378 * (1) "~/path" to mean path under the running user's home directory;
379 * (2) "~user/path" to mean path under named user's home directory;
380 * (3) "relative/path" to mean cwd relative directory; or
381 * (4) "/absolute/path" to mean absolute directory.
383 * Unless "strict" is given, we try access() for existence of "%s.git/.git",
384 * "%s/.git", "%s.git", "%s" in this order. The first one that exists is
387 * Second, we try chdir() to that. Upon failure, we return NULL.
389 * Then, we try if the current directory is a valid git repository.
390 * Upon failure, we return NULL.
392 * If all goes well, we return the directory we used to chdir() (but
393 * before ~user is expanded), avoiding getcwd() resolving symbolic
394 * links. User relative paths are also returned as they are given,
395 * except DWIM suffixing.
397 char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict)
399 static char used_path[PATH_MAX];
400 static char validated_path[PATH_MAX];
406 static const char *suffix[] = {
407 ".git/.git", "/.git", ".git", "", NULL,
409 int len = strlen(path);
411 while ((1 < len) && (path[len-1] == '/')) {
417 if (path[0] == '~') {
418 char *newpath = expand_user_path(path);
419 if (!newpath || (PATH_MAX - 10 < strlen(newpath))) {
424 * Copy back into the static buffer. A pity
425 * since newpath was not bounded, but other
426 * branches of the if are limited by PATH_MAX
429 strcpy(used_path, newpath); free(newpath);
430 strcpy(validated_path, path);
433 else if (PATH_MAX - 10 < len)
436 path = strcpy(used_path, path);
437 strcpy(validated_path, path);
440 for (i = 0; suffix[i]; i++) {
441 strcpy(path + len, suffix[i]);
442 if (!access(path, F_OK)) {
443 strcat(validated_path, suffix[i]);
447 if (!suffix[i] || chdir(path))
449 path = validated_path;
451 else if (chdir(path))
454 if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
455 validate_headref("HEAD") == 0) {
457 check_repository_format();
464 int set_shared_perm(const char *path, int mode)
467 int tweak, shared, orig_mode;
469 if (!shared_repository) {
471 return chmod(path, mode & ~S_IFMT);
475 if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
481 if (shared_repository < 0)
482 shared = -shared_repository;
484 shared = shared_repository;
487 if (!(mode & S_IWUSR))
490 /* Copy read bits to execute bits */
491 tweak |= (tweak & 0444) >> 2;
492 if (shared_repository < 0)
493 mode = (mode & ~0777) | tweak;
498 /* Copy read bits to execute bits */
499 mode |= (shared & 0444) >> 2;
500 mode |= FORCE_DIR_SET_GID;
503 if (((shared_repository < 0
504 ? (orig_mode & (FORCE_DIR_SET_GID | 0777))
505 : (orig_mode & mode)) != mode) &&
506 chmod(path, (mode & ~S_IFMT)) < 0)
511 const char *make_relative_path(const char *abs, const char *base)
513 static char buf[PATH_MAX + 1];
516 if (!base || !base[0])
519 if (is_dir_sep(base[i])) {
520 if (!is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
522 while (is_dir_sep(base[i]))
524 while (is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
527 } else if (abs[j] != base[i]) {
534 /* "/foo" is a prefix of "/foo" */
536 /* "/foo" is not a prefix of "/foobar" */
537 !is_dir_sep(base[i-1]) && !is_dir_sep(abs[j])
540 while (is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
545 strcpy(buf, abs + j);
550 * It is okay if dst == src, but they should not overlap otherwise.
552 * Performs the following normalizations on src, storing the result in dst:
553 * - Ensures that components are separated by '/' (Windows only)
554 * - Squashes sequences of '/'.
555 * - Removes "." components.
556 * - Removes ".." components, and the components the precede them.
557 * Returns failure (non-zero) if a ".." component appears as first path
558 * component anytime during the normalization. Otherwise, returns success (0).
560 * Note that this function is purely textual. It does not follow symlinks,
561 * verify the existence of the path, or make any system calls.
563 int normalize_path_copy(char *dst, const char *src)
567 if (has_dos_drive_prefix(src)) {
573 if (is_dir_sep(*src)) {
575 while (is_dir_sep(*src))
583 * A path component that begins with . could be
585 * (1) "." and ends -- ignore and terminate.
586 * (2) "./" -- ignore them, eat slash and continue.
587 * (3) ".." and ends -- strip one and terminate.
588 * (4) "../" -- strip one, eat slash and continue.
594 } else if (is_dir_sep(src[1])) {
597 while (is_dir_sep(*src))
600 } else if (src[1] == '.') {
605 } else if (is_dir_sep(src[2])) {
608 while (is_dir_sep(*src))
615 /* copy up to the next '/', and eat all '/' */
616 while ((c = *src++) != '\0' && !is_dir_sep(c))
620 while (is_dir_sep(c))
629 * dst0..dst is prefix portion, and dst[-1] is '/';
632 dst--; /* go to trailing '/' */
635 /* Windows: dst[-1] cannot be backslash anymore */
636 while (dst0 < dst && dst[-1] != '/')
644 * path = Canonical absolute path
645 * prefix_list = Colon-separated list of absolute paths
647 * Determines, for each path in prefix_list, whether the "prefix" really
648 * is an ancestor directory of path. Returns the length of the longest
649 * ancestor directory, excluding any trailing slashes, or -1 if no prefix
650 * is an ancestor. (Note that this means 0 is returned if prefix_list is
651 * "/".) "/foo" is not considered an ancestor of "/foobar". Directories
652 * are not considered to be their own ancestors. path must be in a
653 * canonical form: empty components, or "." or ".." components are not
654 * allowed. prefix_list may be null, which is like "".
656 int longest_ancestor_length(const char *path, const char *prefix_list)
658 char buf[PATH_MAX+1];
659 const char *ceil, *colon;
660 int len, max_len = -1;
662 if (prefix_list == NULL || !strcmp(path, "/"))
665 for (colon = ceil = prefix_list; *colon; ceil = colon+1) {
666 for (colon = ceil; *colon && *colon != PATH_SEP; colon++);
668 if (len == 0 || len > PATH_MAX || !is_absolute_path(ceil))
670 strlcpy(buf, ceil, len+1);
671 if (normalize_path_copy(buf, buf) < 0)
674 if (len > 0 && buf[len-1] == '/')
677 if (!strncmp(path, buf, len) &&
687 /* strip arbitrary amount of directory separators at end of path */
688 static inline int chomp_trailing_dir_sep(const char *path, int len)
690 while (len && is_dir_sep(path[len - 1]))
696 * If path ends with suffix (complete path components), returns the
697 * part before suffix (sans trailing directory separators).
698 * Otherwise returns NULL.
700 char *strip_path_suffix(const char *path, const char *suffix)
702 int path_len = strlen(path), suffix_len = strlen(suffix);
708 if (is_dir_sep(path[path_len - 1])) {
709 if (!is_dir_sep(suffix[suffix_len - 1]))
711 path_len = chomp_trailing_dir_sep(path, path_len);
712 suffix_len = chomp_trailing_dir_sep(suffix, suffix_len);
714 else if (path[--path_len] != suffix[--suffix_len])
718 if (path_len && !is_dir_sep(path[path_len - 1]))
720 return xstrndup(path, chomp_trailing_dir_sep(path, path_len));
723 int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *p)
728 * This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA
729 * done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo()
730 * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalization.
732 * sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to
733 * be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening
736 if (!p || (*p != '/' && *p != '~'))
746 else if (ch == '/') {
748 /* reject //, /./ and /../ */
753 if (0 < ndot && ndot < 3)
754 /* reject /.$ and /..$ */
763 else if (ch == '/') {
770 int offset_1st_component(const char *path)
772 if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path))
773 return 2 + is_dir_sep(path[2]);
774 return is_dir_sep(path[0]);