1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
21 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
23 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
24 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
26 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
27 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
28 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 #include <linux/init.h>
33 #include <asm/atomic.h>
34 #include <asm/types.h>
36 #include <linux/module.h>
37 #include <linux/mount.h>
38 #include <linux/socket.h>
39 #include <linux/audit.h>
40 #include <linux/personality.h>
41 #include <linux/time.h>
42 #include <asm/unistd.h>
45 1 = put_count checking
46 2 = verbose put_count checking
50 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
51 extern int audit_enabled;
53 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
54 * for saving names from getname(). */
55 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
57 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
58 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
60 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
62 /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
63 a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
64 the syscall filter. */
66 AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
67 * No syscall-specific audit records can
69 AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
70 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
71 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
73 AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
74 * and always fill it in at syscall
75 * entry time. This makes a full
76 * syscall record available if some
77 * other part of the kernel decides it
78 * should be recorded. */
79 AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
80 * always fill it in at syscall entry
81 * time, and always write out the audit
82 * record at syscall exit time. */
85 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
86 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
87 * pointers at syscall exit time).
89 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
100 struct audit_aux_data {
101 struct audit_aux_data *next;
105 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
107 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
108 struct audit_aux_data d;
110 unsigned long qbytes;
116 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
117 struct audit_aux_data d;
119 unsigned long args[0];
122 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
123 struct audit_aux_data d;
128 struct audit_aux_data_path {
129 struct audit_aux_data d;
130 struct dentry *dentry;
131 struct vfsmount *mnt;
134 /* The per-task audit context. */
135 struct audit_context {
136 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
137 enum audit_state state;
138 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
139 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
140 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
141 int major; /* syscall number */
142 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
143 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
144 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
145 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
147 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
148 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
149 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
151 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
153 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
154 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
155 unsigned long personality;
165 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
166 * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
167 * syscall exit time. */
168 static LIST_HEAD(audit_tsklist);
169 static LIST_HEAD(audit_entlist);
170 static LIST_HEAD(audit_extlist);
173 struct list_head list;
175 struct audit_rule rule;
178 extern int audit_pid;
180 /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
181 * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
182 static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
186 if (a->flags != b->flags)
189 if (a->action != b->action)
192 if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
195 for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
196 if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
197 || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
201 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
202 if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
208 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
209 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
210 * audit_netlink_sem. */
211 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
212 struct list_head *list)
214 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_PREPEND) {
215 entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_PREPEND;
216 list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
218 list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
223 static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
225 struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
229 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
230 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
231 * audit_netlink_sem. */
232 static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
233 struct list_head *list)
235 struct audit_entry *e;
237 /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
238 * deletion routine. */
239 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
240 if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
241 list_del_rcu(&e->list);
242 call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
246 return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */
249 /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during
251 static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
255 if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
256 && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
257 && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
259 if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
263 d->action = s->action;
264 d->field_count = s->field_count;
265 for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
266 d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
267 d->values[i] = s->values[i];
269 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
273 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
277 struct audit_entry *entry;
282 /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
283 always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
284 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_tsklist, list)
285 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
286 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
287 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_entlist, list)
288 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
289 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
290 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_extlist, list)
291 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
292 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
293 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
296 if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
298 if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
302 flags = entry->rule.flags;
303 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
304 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_tsklist);
305 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
306 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_entlist);
307 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
308 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_extlist);
309 audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
310 "auid %u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
313 flags =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags;
314 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
315 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_tsklist);
316 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
317 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_entlist);
318 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
319 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_extlist);
320 audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
321 "auid %u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
330 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
332 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
333 struct audit_rule *rule,
334 struct audit_context *ctx,
335 enum audit_state *state)
339 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
340 u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
341 u32 value = rule->values[i];
346 result = (tsk->pid == value);
349 result = (tsk->uid == value);
352 result = (tsk->euid == value);
355 result = (tsk->suid == value);
358 result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
361 result = (tsk->gid == value);
364 result = (tsk->egid == value);
367 result = (tsk->sgid == value);
370 result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
373 result = (tsk->personality == value);
377 result = (ctx->arch == value);
381 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
382 result = (ctx->return_code == value);
385 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
386 result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
390 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
391 if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
400 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
401 if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
410 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
411 if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
421 result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
428 result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
432 if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
437 switch (rule->action) {
438 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
439 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
440 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
445 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
446 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
447 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
449 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
451 struct audit_entry *e;
452 enum audit_state state;
455 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) {
456 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
462 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
465 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
466 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
467 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
468 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
470 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
471 struct audit_context *ctx,
472 struct list_head *list)
474 struct audit_entry *e;
475 enum audit_state state;
476 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
477 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
480 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
481 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
482 && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
488 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
491 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
492 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
496 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
498 if (likely(!context))
500 context->return_valid = return_valid;
501 context->return_code = return_code;
503 if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
504 enum audit_state state;
505 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_extlist);
506 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
507 context->auditable = 1;
510 context->pid = tsk->pid;
511 context->uid = tsk->uid;
512 context->gid = tsk->gid;
513 context->euid = tsk->euid;
514 context->suid = tsk->suid;
515 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
516 context->egid = tsk->egid;
517 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
518 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
519 context->personality = tsk->personality;
520 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
524 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
529 if (context->auditable
530 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
531 printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
532 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
533 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
535 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
536 context->name_count, context->put_count,
538 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
539 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
540 context->names[i].name,
541 context->names[i].name);
547 context->put_count = 0;
548 context->ino_count = 0;
551 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
552 if (context->names[i].name)
553 __putname(context->names[i].name);
554 context->name_count = 0;
557 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
559 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
561 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
562 if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
563 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
567 context->aux = aux->next;
572 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
573 enum audit_state state)
575 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
577 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
578 context->state = state;
579 context->loginuid = loginuid;
582 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
584 struct audit_context *context;
586 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
588 audit_zero_context(context, state);
592 /* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
593 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
594 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
596 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
598 struct audit_context *context;
599 enum audit_state state;
601 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
602 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
604 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
605 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
608 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
609 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
613 /* Preserve login uid */
614 context->loginuid = -1;
615 if (current->audit_context)
616 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
618 tsk->audit_context = context;
619 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
623 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
625 struct audit_context *previous;
629 previous = context->previous;
630 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
632 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
633 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
634 context->serial, context->major,
635 context->name_count, count);
637 audit_free_names(context);
638 audit_free_aux(context);
643 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
646 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
648 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
649 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
650 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
652 get_task_comm(name, current);
653 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=%s", name);
658 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
661 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
663 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
664 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
665 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
670 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
673 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
676 struct audit_buffer *ab;
678 ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
680 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
681 audit_log_format(ab, "syscall=%d", context->major);
682 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
683 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
684 audit_log_format(ab, " arch=%x", context->arch);
685 if (context->return_valid)
686 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
687 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
688 context->return_code);
690 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
691 " pid=%d loginuid=%d uid=%d gid=%d"
692 " euid=%d suid=%d fsuid=%d"
693 " egid=%d sgid=%d fsgid=%d",
703 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
704 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
705 audit_log_task_info(ab);
707 while (context->aux) {
708 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
712 ab = audit_log_start(context, aux->type);
714 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
718 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
720 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%d igid=%d mode=%x",
721 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
724 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
726 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
727 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
728 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
729 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
732 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
733 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
735 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
736 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
739 case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
740 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
741 audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
749 context->aux = aux->next;
753 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
754 ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_PATH);
756 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
757 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
758 if (context->names[i].name) {
759 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
760 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
762 if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
763 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
764 " ouid=%d ogid=%d rdev=%02x:%02x",
765 context->names[i].ino,
766 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
767 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
768 context->names[i].mode,
769 context->names[i].uid,
770 context->names[i].gid,
771 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
772 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
777 /* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
778 * __put_task_struct. */
779 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
781 struct audit_context *context;
784 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
787 if (likely(!context))
790 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
791 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */
792 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid)
793 audit_log_exit(context);
795 audit_free_context(context);
798 /* Compute a serial number for the audit record. Audit records are
799 * written to user-space as soon as they are generated, so a complete
800 * audit record may be written in several pieces. The timestamp of the
801 * record and this serial number are used by the user-space tools to
802 * determine which pieces belong to the same audit record. The
803 * (timestamp,serial) tuple is unique for each syscall and is live from
804 * syscall entry to syscall exit.
806 * Atomic values are only guaranteed to be 24-bit, so we count down.
808 * NOTE: Another possibility is to store the formatted records off the
809 * audit context (for those records that have a context), and emit them
810 * all at syscall exit. However, this could delay the reporting of
811 * significant errors until syscall exit (or never, if the system
813 static inline unsigned int audit_serial(void)
815 static atomic_t serial = ATOMIC_INIT(0xffffff);
819 a = atomic_read(&serial);
820 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&serial))
821 atomic_set(&serial, 0xffffff);
822 b = atomic_read(&serial);
823 } while (b != a - 1);
828 /* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
829 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
830 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
831 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
832 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
833 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
835 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
836 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
837 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
839 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
840 enum audit_state state;
844 /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
845 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
846 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
847 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
848 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
852 * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
854 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
855 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
857 if (context->in_syscall) {
858 struct audit_context *newctx;
860 #if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
861 /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
862 if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
867 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
868 " entering syscall=%d\n",
869 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
871 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
873 newctx->previous = context;
875 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
877 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
878 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
879 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
880 * to abandon auditing. */
881 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
884 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
889 context->arch = arch;
890 context->major = major;
891 context->argv[0] = a1;
892 context->argv[1] = a2;
893 context->argv[2] = a3;
894 context->argv[3] = a4;
896 state = context->state;
897 if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
898 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_entlist);
899 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
902 context->serial = audit_serial();
903 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
904 context->in_syscall = 1;
905 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
908 /* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
909 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
910 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
911 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
912 * free the names stored from getname(). */
913 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
915 struct audit_context *context;
917 get_task_struct(tsk);
919 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
922 /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
923 * called __put_task_struct. */
924 if (likely(!context))
927 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid)
928 audit_log_exit(context);
930 context->in_syscall = 0;
931 context->auditable = 0;
933 if (context->previous) {
934 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
935 context->previous = NULL;
936 audit_free_context(context);
937 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
939 audit_free_names(context);
940 audit_free_aux(context);
941 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
942 tsk->audit_context = context;
944 put_task_struct(tsk);
947 /* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
948 void audit_getname(const char *name)
950 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
952 if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
955 if (!context->in_syscall) {
957 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
958 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
963 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
964 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
965 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
966 ++context->name_count;
969 /* Intercept a putname request. Called from
970 * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
971 * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
973 void audit_putname(const char *name)
975 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
978 if (!context->in_syscall) {
980 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
981 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
982 if (context->name_count) {
984 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
985 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
986 context->names[i].name,
987 context->names[i].name);
994 ++context->put_count;
995 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
996 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
997 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1000 context->serial, context->major,
1001 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1002 context->put_count);
1009 /* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
1010 * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
1011 void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
1014 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1016 if (!context->in_syscall)
1018 if (context->name_count
1019 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1020 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1021 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1022 else if (context->name_count > 1
1023 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1024 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1025 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1027 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1028 * associated name? */
1029 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
1031 idx = context->name_count++;
1032 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1034 ++context->ino_count;
1037 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
1038 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1039 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
1040 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
1041 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
1042 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1045 int audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1046 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1049 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1050 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1051 *serial = ctx->serial;
1058 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1060 if (task->audit_context) {
1061 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1063 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1065 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1066 "old loginuid=%u new loginuid=%u",
1067 task->pid, task->uid,
1068 task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
1071 task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
1076 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1078 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1081 int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1083 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1084 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1086 if (likely(!context))
1089 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
1093 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1098 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1099 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1100 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1104 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1106 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1107 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1109 if (likely(!context))
1112 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1117 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1119 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1120 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1121 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1125 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1127 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1128 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1130 if (likely(!context))
1133 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1138 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1140 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1141 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1142 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1146 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
1148 struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
1149 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1151 if (likely(!context))
1154 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1158 ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
1159 ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
1161 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
1162 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1163 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1167 void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1169 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1170 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1172 if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->pid == audit_pid)) {
1173 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
1174 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1175 audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
1177 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1179 audit_sig_uid = current->uid;