2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
19 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
20 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
23 #include <linux/module.h>
24 #include <linux/init.h>
25 #include <linux/kernel.h>
26 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
27 #include <linux/errno.h>
28 #include <linux/sched.h>
29 #include <linux/security.h>
30 #include <linux/xattr.h>
31 #include <linux/capability.h>
32 #include <linux/unistd.h>
34 #include <linux/mman.h>
35 #include <linux/slab.h>
36 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
37 #include <linux/swap.h>
38 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/namei.h>
43 #include <linux/mount.h>
44 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/dccp.h>
62 #include <linux/quota.h>
63 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
65 #include <linux/parser.h>
66 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
68 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
69 #include <linux/personality.h>
70 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
71 #include <linux/audit.h>
72 #include <linux/string.h>
73 #include <linux/selinux.h>
74 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include "selinux_netlabel.h"
82 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
83 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
85 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
86 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
87 extern int selinux_compat_net;
89 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
90 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
92 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
94 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
97 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
101 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
103 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
105 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
108 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
110 int selinux_enabled = 1;
113 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
114 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
116 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
117 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
118 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
119 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
120 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
122 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
123 before the policy was loaded. */
124 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
125 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
127 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
129 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
130 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
131 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
137 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
141 if (!buffer || !size)
142 goto getsecurity_exit;
146 goto getsecurity_exit;
148 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
155 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
157 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
159 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
161 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
166 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
167 task->security = tsec;
172 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
174 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
175 task->security = NULL;
179 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
181 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
182 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
184 isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
188 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
189 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
190 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
192 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
193 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
194 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
195 inode->i_security = isec;
200 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
203 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
205 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
206 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
207 list_del_init(&isec->list);
208 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
210 inode->i_security = NULL;
211 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
214 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
216 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
217 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
219 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
226 file->f_security = fsec;
231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
234 file->f_security = NULL;
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
246 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
281 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sk->sk_security = ssec;
285 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
290 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
292 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
294 sk->sk_security = NULL;
298 /* The security server must be initialized before
299 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
300 extern int ss_initialized;
302 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
304 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
306 "uses transition SIDs",
308 "uses genfs_contexts",
309 "not configured for labeling",
310 "uses mountpoint labeling",
313 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
315 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
317 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
327 static match_table_t tokens = {
328 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
329 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
330 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
331 {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
334 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
336 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
337 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
338 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
342 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
343 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
347 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
348 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
352 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
353 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
354 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
357 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
358 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
362 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
363 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
367 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
369 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
370 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
373 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
374 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
375 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
380 name = sb->s_type->name;
382 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
384 /* NFS we understand. */
385 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
386 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
388 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
392 context = d->context;
399 /* Standard string-based options. */
400 char *p, *options = data;
402 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
404 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
409 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
413 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
415 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
418 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
429 if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
431 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
434 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
441 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
444 case Opt_rootcontext:
445 if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
447 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
450 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
457 seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
461 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
463 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
464 "defcontext option is invalid "
465 "for this filesystem type\n");
468 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
470 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
473 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
480 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
485 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
496 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
498 rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
500 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
501 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
502 fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
506 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
514 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
515 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
516 * the superblock context if not already set.
519 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
521 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
522 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
523 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
528 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
533 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
537 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
539 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
543 struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
544 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
545 rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
547 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
548 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
549 rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
553 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
558 isec->initialized = 1;
562 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
564 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
565 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
566 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
570 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
573 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
577 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
591 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
593 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
594 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
595 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
598 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
599 if (sbsec->initialized)
602 if (!ss_initialized) {
603 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
604 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
605 server is ready to handle calls. */
606 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
607 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
608 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
609 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
613 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
614 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
616 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
617 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
621 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
625 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
626 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
627 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
628 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
629 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
630 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
631 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
632 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
633 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
637 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
638 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
639 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
640 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
641 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
642 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
644 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
645 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
646 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
651 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
654 sbsec->initialized = 1;
656 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
657 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
658 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
661 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
662 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
663 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
666 /* Initialize the root inode. */
667 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
669 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
670 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
671 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
673 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
675 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
676 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
677 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
678 struct inode_security_struct, list);
679 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
680 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
681 inode = igrab(inode);
683 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
687 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
688 list_del_init(&isec->list);
691 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
693 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
697 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
699 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
701 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
703 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
705 return SECCLASS_FILE;
707 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
711 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
713 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
717 return SECCLASS_FILE;
720 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
722 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
725 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
727 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
730 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
737 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
739 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
746 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
747 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
749 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
751 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
752 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
754 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
756 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
758 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
764 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
765 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
766 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
767 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
768 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
770 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
772 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
773 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
774 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
776 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
778 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
779 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
780 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
781 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
782 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
784 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
787 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
789 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
791 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
794 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
797 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
798 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
803 char *buffer, *path, *end;
805 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
815 while (de && de != de->parent) {
816 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
820 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
825 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
826 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
830 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
838 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
839 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
841 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
842 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
844 struct dentry *dentry;
845 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
846 char *context = NULL;
850 if (isec->initialized)
853 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
854 if (isec->initialized)
857 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
858 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
859 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
860 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
861 server is ready to handle calls. */
862 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
863 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
864 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
865 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
869 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
870 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
871 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
872 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
876 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
877 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
879 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
880 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
882 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
883 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
887 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
892 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
893 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
899 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
902 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
903 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
911 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
917 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
923 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
924 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
925 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
926 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
930 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
931 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
934 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
937 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
938 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
939 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
940 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
942 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
950 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
951 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
953 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
954 /* Default to the fs SID. */
955 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
957 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
958 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
959 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
967 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
968 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
971 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
972 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
975 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
977 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
978 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
989 isec->initialized = 1;
992 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
994 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
995 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
999 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1000 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1006 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1007 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1010 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1011 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1014 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1015 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1018 /* All other signals. */
1019 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1026 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1027 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1028 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1029 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1032 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1034 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1035 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1036 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1037 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1040 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1041 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1044 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1045 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1047 tsec = tsk->security;
1049 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
1053 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1054 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
1057 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1058 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1061 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1063 tsec = tsk->security;
1065 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1066 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1069 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1070 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1071 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1072 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1073 struct inode *inode,
1075 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1077 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1078 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1079 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1081 tsec = tsk->security;
1082 isec = inode->i_security;
1086 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1087 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1090 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1093 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1094 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1095 pathname if needed. */
1096 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1097 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1098 struct dentry *dentry,
1101 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1102 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1103 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1105 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1106 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1109 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1110 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1111 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1112 check a particular permission to the file.
1113 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1114 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1115 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1116 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1117 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1121 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1122 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1123 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1124 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1125 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1126 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1129 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1131 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1133 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1134 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1142 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1144 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1149 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1150 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1151 struct dentry *dentry,
1154 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1155 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1156 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1158 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1161 tsec = current->security;
1162 dsec = dir->i_security;
1163 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1165 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1166 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1168 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1169 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1174 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1175 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1177 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1183 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1187 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1188 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1189 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1192 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1193 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1194 struct task_struct *ctx)
1196 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1198 tsec = ctx->security;
1200 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1204 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1207 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1208 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1209 struct dentry *dentry,
1213 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1214 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1215 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1219 tsec = current->security;
1220 dsec = dir->i_security;
1221 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1223 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1224 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1227 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1228 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1243 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1247 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1251 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1252 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1253 struct inode *new_dir,
1254 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1256 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1257 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1258 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1260 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1263 tsec = current->security;
1264 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1265 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1266 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1267 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1269 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1271 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1272 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1273 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1276 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1277 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1280 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1281 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1282 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1287 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1288 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1289 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1290 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1291 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1294 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1295 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1296 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1297 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1299 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1307 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1308 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1309 struct super_block *sb,
1311 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1313 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1314 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1316 tsec = tsk->security;
1317 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1318 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1322 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1323 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1327 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1328 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1329 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1330 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1333 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1335 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1339 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1341 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1343 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1350 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1351 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1355 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1357 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1358 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1367 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1369 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1371 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1372 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1375 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1379 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1380 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1381 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1382 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1386 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1387 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1391 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1395 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1398 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1399 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1403 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1407 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1410 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1411 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1413 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1416 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1420 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1424 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1427 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1431 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1435 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1439 tsec = current->security;
1441 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1442 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1444 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1445 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1448 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1449 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1451 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1452 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1460 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1461 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1467 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1480 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1482 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1487 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1489 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1492 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1498 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1500 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1503 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1507 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1512 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1513 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1514 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1516 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1517 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1518 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1519 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1521 case 0: /* Close log */
1522 case 1: /* Open log */
1523 case 2: /* Read from log */
1524 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1525 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1527 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1534 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1535 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1536 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1538 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1539 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1540 * the capability is granted.
1542 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1543 * processes that allocate mappings.
1545 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1547 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1548 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1550 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1552 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1553 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1554 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1560 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1563 /* binprm security operations */
1565 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1567 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1569 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1574 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1577 bprm->security = bsec;
1581 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1583 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1584 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1585 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1586 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1588 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1591 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1595 bsec = bprm->security;
1600 tsec = current->security;
1601 isec = inode->i_security;
1603 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1604 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1606 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1607 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1608 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1609 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1611 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1612 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1613 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1616 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1617 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1618 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1623 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1624 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1625 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1627 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1630 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1631 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1632 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1636 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1637 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1638 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1642 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1643 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1647 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1648 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1650 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1658 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1660 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1664 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1666 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1669 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1670 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1671 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1672 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1673 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1675 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1678 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1681 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1683 kfree(bprm->security);
1684 bprm->security = NULL;
1687 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1688 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1690 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1691 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1693 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1694 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1695 struct tty_struct *tty;
1696 struct fdtable *fdt;
1699 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1700 tty = current->signal->tty;
1703 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1705 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1706 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1707 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1708 file may belong to another process and we are only
1709 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1710 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1711 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1712 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1713 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1714 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1715 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1720 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1722 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1724 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1726 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1728 unsigned long set, i;
1733 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1734 if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
1736 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1739 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1740 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1745 if (file_has_perm(current,
1747 file_to_av(file))) {
1749 fd = get_unused_fd();
1759 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1760 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
1767 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1772 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1775 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1778 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1780 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1781 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1785 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1787 tsec = current->security;
1789 bsec = bprm->security;
1792 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1794 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1795 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1796 unchanged and kill. */
1797 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1798 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1799 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1806 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1807 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1808 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1809 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1810 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1822 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1824 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1826 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1827 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1828 struct itimerval itimer;
1829 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1832 tsec = current->security;
1833 bsec = bprm->security;
1836 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1839 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1842 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1843 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1845 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1846 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1847 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1848 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1849 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1850 will be checked against the new SID. */
1851 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1852 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1854 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1855 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1856 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1857 flush_signals(current);
1858 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1859 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1860 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
1861 recalc_sigpending();
1862 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1865 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1866 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1867 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1868 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1869 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1870 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1871 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1872 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1873 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1875 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1876 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1878 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1879 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1880 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1881 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1883 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1885 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1888 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1892 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1893 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1894 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1897 /* superblock security operations */
1899 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1901 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1904 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1906 superblock_free_security(sb);
1909 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1914 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1917 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1919 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1920 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1921 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1922 match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
1925 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1932 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1936 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
1939 int current_size = 0;
1948 while (current_size < len) {
1958 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1960 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1961 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1962 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1968 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1969 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1970 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1974 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1982 in_save = in_end = orig;
1986 open_quote = !open_quote;
1987 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
1989 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1991 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1992 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1994 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1996 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1998 } while (*in_end++);
2000 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2001 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2006 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2008 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2011 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2015 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2016 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
2017 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2020 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2022 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2024 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2025 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2026 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2029 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
2030 struct nameidata *nd,
2032 unsigned long flags,
2037 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
2041 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2042 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
2043 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2045 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
2049 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2053 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2057 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2058 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2061 /* inode security operations */
2063 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2065 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2068 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2070 inode_free_security(inode);
2073 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2074 char **name, void **value,
2077 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2078 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2079 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2082 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2084 tsec = current->security;
2085 dsec = dir->i_security;
2086 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2088 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2089 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2091 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2092 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2095 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2096 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2099 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2104 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2105 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2106 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2107 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2109 isec->initialized = 1;
2112 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2116 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2123 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2135 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2137 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2140 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2144 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2147 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2150 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2154 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2157 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2160 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2162 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2165 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2167 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2170 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2172 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2175 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2179 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2183 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2186 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2187 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2189 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2192 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2194 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2197 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2201 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2204 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2207 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2208 struct nameidata *nd)
2212 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2217 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2221 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2222 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2225 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2229 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2233 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2236 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2237 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2238 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2240 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2243 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2245 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2248 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2250 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2251 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2252 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2253 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2254 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2258 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2259 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2260 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2261 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2262 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2263 Restrict to administrator. */
2267 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2268 ordinary setattr permission. */
2269 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2272 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2273 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2276 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2279 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2280 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2282 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2283 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2287 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2291 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2292 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2296 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2301 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2303 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2304 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2308 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2309 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2311 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2312 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2316 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2317 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2321 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2323 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2324 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2332 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2334 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2337 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2339 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2342 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2344 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2345 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2346 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2347 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2348 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2349 Restrict to administrator. */
2353 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2354 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2355 permission for removexattr. */
2356 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2359 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2360 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2364 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2366 return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2370 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2371 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2372 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2374 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2376 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2378 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2380 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2383 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2386 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2387 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2389 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2393 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2396 if (!value || !size)
2399 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2407 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2409 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2410 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2411 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2415 /* file security operations */
2417 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2420 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2423 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2427 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2428 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2431 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2432 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2436 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2439 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2441 return file_alloc_security(file);
2444 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2446 file_free_security(file);
2449 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2461 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2463 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2464 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2467 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2469 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2470 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2473 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2477 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2482 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2485 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2486 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2489 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2495 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2497 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2498 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2500 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2501 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2502 * This has an additional check.
2504 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2511 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2512 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2514 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2515 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2518 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2519 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2521 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2526 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2527 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2531 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2535 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2538 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2539 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2542 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2543 unsigned long reqprot,
2548 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2552 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2555 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2556 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2558 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2559 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2560 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2562 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2563 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2564 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2565 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2566 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2568 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2569 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2570 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2571 * modified content. This typically should only
2572 * occur for text relocations.
2574 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2582 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2585 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2587 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2590 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2597 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2602 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2603 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2612 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2613 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2618 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2623 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2627 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2634 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2636 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2637 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2639 tsec = current->security;
2640 fsec = file->f_security;
2641 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2646 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2647 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2651 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2652 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2654 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2655 file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2657 tsec = tsk->security;
2658 fsec = file->f_security;
2661 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2663 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2665 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2666 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2669 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2671 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2674 /* task security operations */
2676 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2680 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2684 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2687 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2689 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2692 tsec1 = current->security;
2694 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2697 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2699 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2700 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2702 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
2703 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2704 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2705 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
2706 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
2708 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2709 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2710 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2711 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2716 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2718 task_free_security(tsk);
2721 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2723 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2724 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2725 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2726 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2727 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2732 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2734 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2737 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2739 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2743 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2745 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2748 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2750 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2753 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2755 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2758 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2760 selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
2763 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2765 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2769 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2773 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2777 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2780 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2782 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2785 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2787 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2790 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2792 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2795 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2799 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2800 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2801 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2802 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2803 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2804 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2809 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2811 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2814 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2816 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2819 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2821 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2824 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2829 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2831 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
2835 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2839 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2841 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2844 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2846 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2850 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2856 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2857 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2858 the state of the current process. */
2862 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2866 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2868 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2871 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2873 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2875 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2878 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2879 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2883 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2884 struct inode *inode)
2886 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2887 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2889 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2890 isec->initialized = 1;
2894 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2895 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
2896 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
2898 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2899 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2901 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2902 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2906 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2907 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2910 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2911 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2915 *proto = ih->protocol;
2917 switch (ih->protocol) {
2919 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2921 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2925 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2929 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2930 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2935 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2937 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2941 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2945 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2946 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2950 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
2951 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
2953 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2957 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
2961 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
2962 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
2973 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2975 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2976 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
2977 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
2980 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2981 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2983 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2984 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2988 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2989 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2992 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2993 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2994 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3003 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3005 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3009 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3010 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3015 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3017 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3021 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3022 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3026 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3027 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3029 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3033 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3034 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3038 /* includes fragments */
3048 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3049 char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto)
3053 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3055 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3059 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3060 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3063 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3065 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3069 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3070 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3080 /* socket security operations */
3081 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3084 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3085 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3086 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3089 tsec = task->security;
3090 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3092 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3095 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3096 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3097 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3103 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3104 int protocol, int kern)
3107 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3113 tsec = current->security;
3114 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3115 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3116 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3117 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3123 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3124 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3127 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3128 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3129 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3132 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3134 tsec = current->security;
3135 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3136 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3137 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3138 isec->initialized = 1;
3141 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3142 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3143 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3149 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3150 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3151 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3152 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
3153 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
3155 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3160 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3165 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3166 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3167 * check the first address now.
3169 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3170 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3172 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3173 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3174 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3175 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3176 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3177 unsigned short snum;
3178 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3179 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3181 tsec = current->security;
3182 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3184 if (family == PF_INET) {
3185 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3186 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3187 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3188 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3190 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3191 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3192 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3193 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3196 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3197 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3198 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3199 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3202 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3203 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3204 ad.u.net.family = family;
3205 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3207 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3212 switch(isec->sclass) {
3213 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3214 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3217 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3218 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3221 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3222 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3226 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3230 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3234 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3235 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3236 ad.u.net.family = family;
3238 if (family == PF_INET)
3239 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3241 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3243 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3244 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3252 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3254 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3257 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3262 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3264 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3265 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3266 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3267 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3268 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3269 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3270 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3271 unsigned short snum;
3274 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3275 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3276 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3278 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3280 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3281 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3283 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3286 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3287 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3291 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3292 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3294 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3295 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3296 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3297 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3306 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3308 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3311 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3314 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3315 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3317 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3321 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3323 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3324 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3325 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3326 newisec->initialized = 1;
3331 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3336 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3340 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3343 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3344 int size, int flags)
3346 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3349 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3351 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3354 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3356 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3359 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3363 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3367 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3370 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3373 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3376 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3378 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3381 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3382 struct socket *other,
3385 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3386 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3387 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3388 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3391 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3395 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3396 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3398 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3399 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3401 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3403 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3407 /* connecting socket */
3408 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3409 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3411 /* server child socket */
3412 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3413 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3414 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3419 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3420 struct socket *other)
3422 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3423 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3424 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3427 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3428 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3430 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3431 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3433 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3434 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3441 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3442 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3445 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3446 struct socket *sock;
3450 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3451 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3453 struct inode *inode;
3454 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3456 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3457 isec = inode->i_security;
3458 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3459 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3462 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3469 err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3473 switch (sock_class) {
3474 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3475 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3476 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3477 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3480 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3481 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3482 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3483 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3486 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3487 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3488 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3489 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3493 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3494 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3498 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3502 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3506 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3513 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3514 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3519 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3520 sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3527 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3532 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3533 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3535 family = sk->sk_family;
3536 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3539 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3540 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3543 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3544 ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3545 ad.u.net.family = family;
3547 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
3551 if (selinux_compat_net)
3552 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
3555 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3560 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
3564 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3569 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3570 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3575 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3576 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3577 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
3579 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3581 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
3582 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3583 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3584 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3586 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3591 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3596 if (scontext_len > len) {
3601 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3605 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3613 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3615 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3618 if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3619 selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
3621 security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb,
3622 SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
3625 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3627 *secid = peer_secid;
3632 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3634 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3637 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3639 sk_free_security(sk);
3642 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
3644 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
3645 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
3647 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
3648 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3650 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec);
3653 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
3656 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3658 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3660 *secid = sksec->sid;
3664 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
3666 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
3667 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3669 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
3670 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3671 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
3673 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
3676 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3677 struct request_sock *req)
3679 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3684 security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid);
3685 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
3686 req->secid = sksec->sid;
3687 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3691 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
3695 req->secid = newsid;
3696 req->peer_secid = peersid;
3700 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
3701 const struct request_sock *req)
3703 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
3705 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
3706 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
3707 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
3708 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
3709 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
3710 time it will have been created and available. */
3712 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
3713 * thread with access to newsksec */
3714 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
3717 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
3718 struct sk_buff *skb)
3720 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3722 security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid);
3725 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
3728 fl->secid = req->secid;
3731 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3735 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3736 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3737 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3739 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3743 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3745 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3747 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3748 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3749 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3750 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3751 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3752 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3762 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3767 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3769 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
3770 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3771 u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3774 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3775 struct socket *sock;
3776 struct inode *inode;
3777 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3779 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3783 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3787 isec = inode->i_security;
3789 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3793 switch (isec->sclass) {
3794 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3795 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3796 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3797 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3800 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3801 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3802 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3803 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3806 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3807 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
3808 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
3809 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3813 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3814 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3818 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3822 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3826 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3833 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3836 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
3841 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3848 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3849 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3850 const struct net_device *in,
3851 const struct net_device *out,
3852 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3858 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3859 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3860 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3861 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3868 sksec = sk->sk_security;
3870 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3871 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3872 ad.u.net.family = family;
3874 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
3878 if (selinux_compat_net)
3879 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
3880 family, addrp, len);
3882 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3888 err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto);
3890 return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3893 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3894 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3895 const struct net_device *in,
3896 const struct net_device *out,
3897 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3899 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3902 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3904 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3905 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3906 const struct net_device *in,
3907 const struct net_device *out,
3908 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3910 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3915 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3917 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3921 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3925 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3926 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3931 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
3934 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3936 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
3940 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
3941 ad.u.cap = capability;
3943 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
3944 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
3947 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3948 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3951 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3952 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3954 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3958 isec->sclass = sclass;
3959 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3960 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3961 perm->security = isec;
3966 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3968 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3969 perm->security = NULL;
3973 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3975 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3977 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3982 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3983 msg->security = msec;
3988 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3990 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3992 msg->security = NULL;
3996 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3999 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4000 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4001 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4003 tsec = current->security;
4004 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4006 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4007 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4009 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4012 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4014 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4017 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4019 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4022 /* message queue security operations */
4023 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4025 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4026 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4027 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4030 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4034 tsec = current->security;
4035 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4037 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4038 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4040 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4043 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4049 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4051 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4054 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4056 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4057 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4058 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4060 tsec = current->security;
4061 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4063 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4064 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4066 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4067 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4070 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4078 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4079 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4082 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4085 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4088 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4094 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4098 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4100 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4101 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4102 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4103 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4106 tsec = current->security;
4107 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4108 msec = msg->security;
4111 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4113 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4115 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4116 * message queue this message will be stored in
4118 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4126 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4127 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4129 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4130 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4133 /* Can this process send the message */
4134 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4135 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4137 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4138 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4139 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4144 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4145 struct task_struct *target,
4146 long type, int mode)
4148 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4149 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4150 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4151 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4154 tsec = target->security;
4155 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4156 msec = msg->security;
4158 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4159 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4161 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4162 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4164 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4165 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4169 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4170 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4172 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4173 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4174 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4177 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4181 tsec = current->security;
4182 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4184 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4185 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4187 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4190 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4196 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4198 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4201 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4203 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4204 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4205 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4207 tsec = current->security;
4208 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4210 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4211 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4213 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4214 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4217 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4218 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4226 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4227 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4230 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4233 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4240 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4246 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4250 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4251 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4256 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4260 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4263 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4265 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4268 /* Semaphore security operations */
4269 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4271 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4272 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4273 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4276 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4280 tsec = current->security;
4281 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4283 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4284 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4286 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4289 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4295 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4297 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4300 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4302 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4303 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4304 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4306 tsec = current->security;
4307 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4309 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4310 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4312 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4313 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4316 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4317 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4325 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4326 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4330 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4341 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4344 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4348 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4354 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4358 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4359 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4364 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4368 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4371 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4377 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4379 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4384 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4387 /* module stacking operations */
4388 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4390 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4391 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4392 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4396 secondary_ops = ops;
4398 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4405 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4407 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4408 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4409 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4413 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4418 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4421 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4424 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4425 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4427 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4432 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4439 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4441 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4443 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4444 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4445 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4446 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4447 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4448 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4449 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4450 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4457 return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
4460 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4461 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4463 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4469 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4470 security attributes. */
4475 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4476 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4477 * above restriction is ever removed.
4479 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4480 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4481 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4482 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4483 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4484 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
4485 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4486 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
4487 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4488 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4494 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4495 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4496 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4500 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4505 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4506 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4507 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4508 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4509 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4510 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4512 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4513 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4514 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4515 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4516 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
4517 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
4520 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
4521 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4522 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
4523 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4524 struct av_decision avd;
4529 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4530 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4531 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4532 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4533 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4534 do_each_thread(g, t)
4535 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4536 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4539 while_each_thread(g, t);
4540 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4543 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4544 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4545 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4549 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4550 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4552 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4553 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4555 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4559 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4560 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4574 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4576 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
4579 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4587 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4588 unsigned long flags)
4590 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4591 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4593 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4598 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
4599 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4601 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4607 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4609 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4615 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4616 struct task_struct *ctx,
4620 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4621 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4623 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4625 tsec = ctx->security;
4626 ksec = key->security;
4628 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
4629 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
4630 appear to be created. */
4634 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
4635 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
4640 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4641 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4642 .capget = selinux_capget,
4643 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4644 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4645 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4646 .capable = selinux_capable,
4647 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4648 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4649 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4650 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4652 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4653 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4655 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4656 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4657 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4658 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4659 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4660 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4661 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4663 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4664 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4665 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4666 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4667 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4668 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4669 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4671 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4672 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4673 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4674 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4675 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4676 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4677 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4678 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4679 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4680 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4681 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4682 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4683 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4684 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4685 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4686 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4687 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4688 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4689 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4690 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4691 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4692 .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4693 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4694 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4695 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4697 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4698 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4699 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4700 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4701 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4702 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4703 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4704 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4705 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4706 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4707 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4709 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4710 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4711 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4712 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4713 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4714 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4715 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4716 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4717 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4718 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
4719 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4720 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4721 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
4722 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
4723 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4724 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4725 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4726 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
4727 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4728 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4729 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4730 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4731 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4733 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4735 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4736 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4738 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4739 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4740 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4741 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4742 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4743 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4745 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4746 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4747 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4748 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4749 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4751 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4752 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4753 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4754 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4755 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4757 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4758 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4760 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4762 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4763 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4765 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
4766 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
4768 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4769 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4771 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4772 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4773 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4774 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4775 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4776 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4777 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4778 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4779 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4780 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4781 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4782 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4783 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4784 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4785 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4786 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4787 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4788 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4789 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
4790 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
4791 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
4792 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
4793 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
4794 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
4795 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
4797 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4798 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4799 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4800 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4801 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
4802 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4803 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4804 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
4805 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4806 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
4807 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
4811 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
4812 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
4813 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
4817 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4819 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4821 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4822 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4826 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4828 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4829 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4830 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4831 tsec = current->security;
4832 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4834 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4835 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4836 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
4839 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4841 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4842 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4843 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4845 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4846 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4848 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4852 /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
4853 selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
4854 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4855 selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
4856 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4862 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4864 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4866 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4867 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4868 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4869 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4871 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4872 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4873 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4874 struct superblock_security_struct,
4876 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4878 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4879 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4880 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4882 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4884 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4885 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4886 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4889 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4890 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4893 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4894 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4895 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4897 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4899 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4900 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4901 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4903 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4904 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4907 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4909 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4910 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4911 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4913 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4914 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4919 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4923 if (!selinux_enabled)
4926 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4928 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4930 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4932 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4934 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4936 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4944 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4946 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4947 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4949 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4951 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4952 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4953 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4958 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4960 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4961 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4964 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4966 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4967 int selinux_disable(void)
4969 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4970 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4972 if (ss_initialized) {
4973 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4977 if (selinux_disabled) {
4978 /* Only do this once. */
4982 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4984 selinux_disabled = 1;
4985 selinux_enabled = 0;
4987 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4988 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4990 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4991 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4993 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */