4 * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
7 #include <linux/module.h>
9 #include <linux/utsname.h>
10 #include <linux/mman.h>
11 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
12 #include <linux/notifier.h>
13 #include <linux/reboot.h>
14 #include <linux/prctl.h>
15 #include <linux/highuid.h>
17 #include <linux/resource.h>
18 #include <linux/kernel.h>
19 #include <linux/kexec.h>
20 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
21 #include <linux/capability.h>
22 #include <linux/device.h>
23 #include <linux/key.h>
24 #include <linux/times.h>
25 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
26 #include <linux/security.h>
27 #include <linux/dcookies.h>
28 #include <linux/suspend.h>
29 #include <linux/tty.h>
30 #include <linux/signal.h>
31 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
32 #include <linux/getcpu.h>
33 #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
34 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
35 #include <linux/cpu.h>
36 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
38 #include <linux/compat.h>
39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
40 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
41 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
43 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
45 #include <asm/unistd.h>
47 #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
48 # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
50 #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
51 # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
54 # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
57 # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
60 # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
63 # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
66 # define GET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
69 # define SET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
72 # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
75 # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
79 * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
80 * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
83 int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID;
84 int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID;
87 EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid);
88 EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid);
92 * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
93 * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
96 int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
97 int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
99 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid);
100 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid);
103 * this indicates whether you can reboot with ctrl-alt-del: the default is yes
108 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cad_pid);
111 * If set, this is used for preparing the system to power off.
114 void (*pm_power_off_prepare)(void);
117 * set the priority of a task
118 * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
120 static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
122 const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
125 if (pcred->uid != cred->euid &&
126 pcred->euid != cred->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
130 if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) {
134 no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
141 set_user_nice(p, niceval);
146 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval)
148 struct task_struct *g, *p;
149 struct user_struct *user;
150 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
154 if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
157 /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */
164 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
168 p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
172 error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
176 pgrp = find_vpid(who);
178 pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
179 do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
180 error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
181 } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
184 user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user;
187 else if ((who != cred->uid) &&
188 !(user = find_user(who)))
189 goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */
192 if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who)
193 error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
194 while_each_thread(g, p);
195 if (who != cred->uid)
196 free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */
200 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
206 * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
207 * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that
208 * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)
209 * to stay compatible.
211 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who)
213 struct task_struct *g, *p;
214 struct user_struct *user;
215 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
216 long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
219 if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
222 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
226 p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
230 niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
231 if (niceval > retval)
237 pgrp = find_vpid(who);
239 pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
240 do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
241 niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
242 if (niceval > retval)
244 } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
247 user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user;
250 else if ((who != cred->uid) &&
251 !(user = find_user(who)))
252 goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */
255 if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who) {
256 niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
257 if (niceval > retval)
260 while_each_thread(g, p);
261 if (who != cred->uid)
262 free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */
266 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
272 * emergency_restart - reboot the system
274 * Without shutting down any hardware or taking any locks
275 * reboot the system. This is called when we know we are in
276 * trouble so this is our best effort to reboot. This is
277 * safe to call in interrupt context.
279 void emergency_restart(void)
281 machine_emergency_restart();
283 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(emergency_restart);
285 void kernel_restart_prepare(char *cmd)
287 blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, cmd);
288 system_state = SYSTEM_RESTART;
294 * kernel_restart - reboot the system
295 * @cmd: pointer to buffer containing command to execute for restart
298 * Shutdown everything and perform a clean reboot.
299 * This is not safe to call in interrupt context.
301 void kernel_restart(char *cmd)
303 kernel_restart_prepare(cmd);
305 printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system.\n");
307 printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system with command '%s'.\n", cmd);
308 machine_restart(cmd);
310 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_restart);
312 static void kernel_shutdown_prepare(enum system_states state)
314 blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list,
315 (state == SYSTEM_HALT)?SYS_HALT:SYS_POWER_OFF, NULL);
316 system_state = state;
320 * kernel_halt - halt the system
322 * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system halt.
324 void kernel_halt(void)
326 kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_HALT);
328 printk(KERN_EMERG "System halted.\n");
332 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_halt);
335 * kernel_power_off - power_off the system
337 * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system power_off.
339 void kernel_power_off(void)
341 kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_POWER_OFF);
342 if (pm_power_off_prepare)
343 pm_power_off_prepare();
344 disable_nonboot_cpus();
346 printk(KERN_EMERG "Power down.\n");
349 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_power_off);
351 * Reboot system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it,
352 * and even root needs to set up some magic numbers in the registers
353 * so that some mistake won't make this reboot the whole machine.
354 * You can also set the meaning of the ctrl-alt-del-key here.
356 * reboot doesn't sync: do that yourself before calling this.
358 SYSCALL_DEFINE4(reboot, int, magic1, int, magic2, unsigned int, cmd,
363 /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
364 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
367 /* For safety, we require "magic" arguments. */
368 if (magic1 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1 ||
369 (magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2 &&
370 magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2A &&
371 magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2B &&
372 magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2C))
375 /* Instead of trying to make the power_off code look like
376 * halt when pm_power_off is not set do it the easy way.
378 if ((cmd == LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF) && !pm_power_off)
379 cmd = LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT;
383 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART:
384 kernel_restart(NULL);
387 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON:
391 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_OFF:
395 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT:
401 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF:
407 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2:
408 if (strncpy_from_user(&buffer[0], arg, sizeof(buffer) - 1) < 0) {
412 buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0';
414 kernel_restart(buffer);
418 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC:
421 ret = kernel_kexec();
427 #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
428 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_SW_SUSPEND:
430 int ret = hibernate();
444 static void deferred_cad(struct work_struct *dummy)
446 kernel_restart(NULL);
450 * This function gets called by ctrl-alt-del - ie the keyboard interrupt.
451 * As it's called within an interrupt, it may NOT sync: the only choice
452 * is whether to reboot at once, or just ignore the ctrl-alt-del.
454 void ctrl_alt_del(void)
456 static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work, deferred_cad);
459 schedule_work(&cad_work);
461 kill_cad_pid(SIGINT, 1);
465 * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
466 * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
468 * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
469 * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
471 * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
472 * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
473 * a security audit over a program.
475 * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
476 * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be
477 * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
479 * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
480 * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
482 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
484 const struct cred *old;
488 new = prepare_creds();
491 old = current_cred();
493 retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
498 if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
499 if (old->gid == rgid ||
506 if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
507 if (old->gid == egid ||
516 if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
517 (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid))
518 new->sgid = new->egid;
519 new->fsgid = new->egid;
521 return commit_creds(new);
529 * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS
531 * SMP: Same implicit races as above.
533 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
535 const struct cred *old;
539 new = prepare_creds();
542 old = current_cred();
544 retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
549 if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
550 new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid;
551 else if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->sgid)
552 new->egid = new->fsgid = gid;
556 return commit_creds(new);
564 * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID
566 static int set_user(struct cred *new)
568 struct user_struct *new_user;
570 new_user = alloc_uid(current_user_ns(), new->uid);
574 if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >=
575 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur &&
576 new_user != INIT_USER) {
582 new->user = new_user;
587 * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
588 * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
590 * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
591 * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
593 * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
594 * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
595 * a security audit over a program.
597 * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
598 * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be
599 * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
601 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
603 const struct cred *old;
607 new = prepare_creds();
610 old = current_cred();
612 retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
617 if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
619 if (old->uid != ruid &&
621 !capable(CAP_SETUID))
625 if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
627 if (old->uid != euid &&
630 !capable(CAP_SETUID))
635 if (new->uid != old->uid && set_user(new) < 0)
638 if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
639 (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid))
640 new->suid = new->euid;
641 new->fsuid = new->euid;
643 retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
647 return commit_creds(new);
655 * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS
657 * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
658 * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal
659 * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
660 * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people
661 * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
662 * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
663 * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.
665 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
667 const struct cred *old;
671 new = prepare_creds();
674 old = current_cred();
676 retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
681 if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
682 new->suid = new->uid = uid;
683 if (uid != old->uid && set_user(new) < 0) {
687 } else if (uid != old->uid && uid != new->suid) {
691 new->fsuid = new->euid = uid;
693 retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
697 return commit_creds(new);
706 * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
707 * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
709 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
711 const struct cred *old;
715 new = prepare_creds();
719 retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
722 old = current_cred();
725 if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
726 if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && ruid != old->uid &&
727 ruid != old->euid && ruid != old->suid)
729 if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid &&
730 euid != old->euid && euid != old->suid)
732 if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && suid != old->uid &&
733 suid != old->euid && suid != old->suid)
738 if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
740 if (ruid != old->uid && set_user(new) < 0)
743 if (euid != (uid_t) -1)
745 if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
747 new->fsuid = new->euid;
749 retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
753 return commit_creds(new);
760 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruid, uid_t __user *, euid, uid_t __user *, suid)
762 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
765 if (!(retval = put_user(cred->uid, ruid)) &&
766 !(retval = put_user(cred->euid, euid)))
767 retval = put_user(cred->suid, suid);
773 * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
775 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
777 const struct cred *old;
781 new = prepare_creds();
784 old = current_cred();
786 retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES);
791 if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
792 if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && rgid != old->gid &&
793 rgid != old->egid && rgid != old->sgid)
795 if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid &&
796 egid != old->egid && egid != old->sgid)
798 if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && sgid != old->gid &&
799 sgid != old->egid && sgid != old->sgid)
803 if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
805 if (egid != (gid_t) -1)
807 if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
809 new->fsgid = new->egid;
811 return commit_creds(new);
818 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgid, gid_t __user *, egid, gid_t __user *, sgid)
820 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
823 if (!(retval = put_user(cred->gid, rgid)) &&
824 !(retval = put_user(cred->egid, egid)))
825 retval = put_user(cred->sgid, sgid);
832 * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
833 * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
834 * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
835 * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
837 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
839 const struct cred *old;
843 new = prepare_creds();
845 return current_fsuid();
846 old = current_cred();
847 old_fsuid = old->fsuid;
849 if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS) < 0)
852 if (uid == old->uid || uid == old->euid ||
853 uid == old->suid || uid == old->fsuid ||
854 capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
855 if (uid != old_fsuid) {
857 if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
872 * Samma på svenska..
874 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
876 const struct cred *old;
880 new = prepare_creds();
882 return current_fsgid();
883 old = current_cred();
884 old_fsgid = old->fsgid;
886 if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
889 if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->egid ||
890 gid == old->sgid || gid == old->fsgid ||
891 capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
892 if (gid != old_fsgid) {
907 void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms)
909 struct task_cputime cputime;
910 cputime_t cutime, cstime;
912 thread_group_cputime(current, &cputime);
913 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
914 cutime = current->signal->cutime;
915 cstime = current->signal->cstime;
916 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
917 tms->tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(cputime.utime);
918 tms->tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(cputime.stime);
919 tms->tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime);
920 tms->tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime);
923 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf)
929 if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
932 force_successful_syscall_return();
933 return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
937 * This needs some heavy checking ...
938 * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
939 * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
941 * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
942 * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
943 * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91
945 * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX.
948 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid)
950 struct task_struct *p;
951 struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
956 pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader);
962 /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock
963 * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
965 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
968 p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
973 if (!thread_group_leader(p))
976 if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) {
978 if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader))
985 if (p != group_leader)
990 if (p->signal->leader)
995 struct task_struct *g;
997 pgrp = find_vpid(pgid);
998 g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID);
999 if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader))
1003 err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid);
1007 if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp) {
1008 change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp);
1009 set_task_pgrp(p, pid_nr(pgrp));
1014 /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */
1015 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1019 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid)
1021 struct task_struct *p;
1027 grp = task_pgrp(current);
1030 p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
1037 retval = security_task_getpgid(p);
1041 retval = pid_vnr(grp);
1047 #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP
1049 SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp)
1051 return sys_getpgid(0);
1056 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid)
1058 struct task_struct *p;
1064 sid = task_session(current);
1067 p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
1070 sid = task_session(p);
1074 retval = security_task_getsid(p);
1078 retval = pid_vnr(sid);
1084 SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid)
1086 struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
1087 struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader);
1088 pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid);
1091 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1092 /* Fail if I am already a session leader */
1093 if (group_leader->signal->leader)
1096 /* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the
1097 * proposed session id.
1099 if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID))
1102 group_leader->signal->leader = 1;
1103 __set_special_pids(sid);
1105 proc_clear_tty(group_leader);
1109 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1114 * Supplementary group IDs
1117 /* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */
1118 struct group_info init_groups = { .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2) };
1120 struct group_info *groups_alloc(int gidsetsize)
1122 struct group_info *group_info;
1126 nblocks = (gidsetsize + NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK - 1) / NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
1127 /* Make sure we always allocate at least one indirect block pointer */
1128 nblocks = nblocks ? : 1;
1129 group_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*group_info) + nblocks*sizeof(gid_t *), GFP_USER);
1132 group_info->ngroups = gidsetsize;
1133 group_info->nblocks = nblocks;
1134 atomic_set(&group_info->usage, 1);
1136 if (gidsetsize <= NGROUPS_SMALL)
1137 group_info->blocks[0] = group_info->small_block;
1139 for (i = 0; i < nblocks; i++) {
1141 b = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_USER);
1143 goto out_undo_partial_alloc;
1144 group_info->blocks[i] = b;
1149 out_undo_partial_alloc:
1151 free_page((unsigned long)group_info->blocks[i]);
1157 EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_alloc);
1159 void groups_free(struct group_info *group_info)
1161 if (group_info->blocks[0] != group_info->small_block) {
1163 for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++)
1164 free_page((unsigned long)group_info->blocks[i]);
1169 EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_free);
1171 /* export the group_info to a user-space array */
1172 static int groups_to_user(gid_t __user *grouplist,
1173 const struct group_info *group_info)
1176 unsigned int count = group_info->ngroups;
1178 for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) {
1179 unsigned int cp_count = min(NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count);
1180 unsigned int len = cp_count * sizeof(*grouplist);
1182 if (copy_to_user(grouplist, group_info->blocks[i], len))
1185 grouplist += NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
1191 /* fill a group_info from a user-space array - it must be allocated already */
1192 static int groups_from_user(struct group_info *group_info,
1193 gid_t __user *grouplist)
1196 unsigned int count = group_info->ngroups;
1198 for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) {
1199 unsigned int cp_count = min(NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count);
1200 unsigned int len = cp_count * sizeof(*grouplist);
1202 if (copy_from_user(group_info->blocks[i], grouplist, len))
1205 grouplist += NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
1211 /* a simple Shell sort */
1212 static void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info)
1214 int base, max, stride;
1215 int gidsetsize = group_info->ngroups;
1217 for (stride = 1; stride < gidsetsize; stride = 3 * stride + 1)
1222 max = gidsetsize - stride;
1223 for (base = 0; base < max; base++) {
1225 int right = left + stride;
1226 gid_t tmp = GROUP_AT(group_info, right);
1228 while (left >= 0 && GROUP_AT(group_info, left) > tmp) {
1229 GROUP_AT(group_info, right) =
1230 GROUP_AT(group_info, left);
1234 GROUP_AT(group_info, right) = tmp;
1240 /* a simple bsearch */
1241 int groups_search(const struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp)
1243 unsigned int left, right;
1249 right = group_info->ngroups;
1250 while (left < right) {
1251 unsigned int mid = (left+right)/2;
1252 int cmp = grp - GROUP_AT(group_info, mid);
1264 * set_groups - Change a group subscription in a set of credentials
1265 * @new: The newly prepared set of credentials to alter
1266 * @group_info: The group list to install
1268 * Validate a group subscription and, if valid, insert it into a set
1271 int set_groups(struct cred *new, struct group_info *group_info)
1275 retval = security_task_setgroups(group_info);
1279 put_group_info(new->group_info);
1280 groups_sort(group_info);
1281 get_group_info(group_info);
1282 new->group_info = group_info;
1286 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_groups);
1289 * set_current_groups - Change current's group subscription
1290 * @group_info: The group list to impose
1292 * Validate a group subscription and, if valid, impose it upon current's task
1295 int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info)
1300 new = prepare_creds();
1304 ret = set_groups(new, group_info);
1310 return commit_creds(new);
1313 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_current_groups);
1315 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist)
1317 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1323 /* no need to grab task_lock here; it cannot change */
1324 i = cred->group_info->ngroups;
1326 if (i > gidsetsize) {
1330 if (groups_to_user(grouplist, cred->group_info)) {
1340 * SMP: Our groups are copy-on-write. We can set them safely
1341 * without another task interfering.
1344 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist)
1346 struct group_info *group_info;
1349 if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
1351 if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
1354 group_info = groups_alloc(gidsetsize);
1357 retval = groups_from_user(group_info, grouplist);
1359 put_group_info(group_info);
1363 retval = set_current_groups(group_info);
1364 put_group_info(group_info);
1370 * Check whether we're fsgid/egid or in the supplemental group..
1372 int in_group_p(gid_t grp)
1374 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1377 if (grp != cred->fsgid)
1378 retval = groups_search(cred->group_info, grp);
1382 EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_group_p);
1384 int in_egroup_p(gid_t grp)
1386 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1389 if (grp != cred->egid)
1390 retval = groups_search(cred->group_info, grp);
1394 EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_egroup_p);
1396 DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem);
1398 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name)
1402 down_read(&uts_sem);
1403 if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof *name))
1409 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
1412 char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
1414 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
1416 if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
1418 down_write(&uts_sem);
1420 if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
1421 struct new_utsname *u = utsname();
1423 memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len);
1424 memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len);
1431 #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME
1433 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
1436 struct new_utsname *u;
1440 down_read(&uts_sem);
1442 i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename);
1446 if (copy_to_user(name, u->nodename, i))
1455 * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling
1458 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len)
1461 char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
1463 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
1465 if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
1468 down_write(&uts_sem);
1470 if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
1471 struct new_utsname *u = utsname();
1473 memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len);
1474 memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len);
1481 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
1483 if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
1486 struct rlimit value;
1487 task_lock(current->group_leader);
1488 value = current->signal->rlim[resource];
1489 task_unlock(current->group_leader);
1490 return copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
1494 #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
1497 * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps.
1500 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
1501 struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
1504 if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
1507 task_lock(current->group_leader);
1508 x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
1509 task_unlock(current->group_leader);
1510 if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
1511 x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
1512 if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
1513 x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
1514 return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0;
1519 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
1521 struct rlimit new_rlim, *old_rlim;
1524 if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
1526 if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
1528 old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
1529 if ((new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max) &&
1530 !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
1533 if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE) {
1534 if (new_rlim.rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY)
1535 new_rlim.rlim_max = sysctl_nr_open;
1536 if (new_rlim.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
1537 new_rlim.rlim_cur = sysctl_nr_open;
1538 if (new_rlim.rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open)
1542 if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > new_rlim.rlim_max)
1545 retval = security_task_setrlimit(resource, &new_rlim);
1549 if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim.rlim_cur == 0) {
1551 * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU
1552 * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was
1553 * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second
1556 new_rlim.rlim_cur = 1;
1559 task_lock(current->group_leader);
1560 *old_rlim = new_rlim;
1561 task_unlock(current->group_leader);
1563 if (resource != RLIMIT_CPU)
1567 * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error
1568 * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a
1569 * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of
1570 * applications, so we live with it
1572 if (new_rlim.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
1575 update_rlimit_cpu(new_rlim.rlim_cur);
1581 * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct,
1582 * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After
1583 * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would
1584 * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information
1585 * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not
1586 * measuring them yet).
1588 * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have
1589 * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word
1590 * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't
1591 * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading
1592 * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those
1593 * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a
1594 * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping.
1597 * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH
1598 * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded
1599 * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with
1601 * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and
1602 * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one
1603 * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else
1604 * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the
1605 * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just
1606 * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock.
1607 * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal
1608 * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal->
1609 * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple.
1613 static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r)
1615 r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw;
1616 r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw;
1617 r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt;
1618 r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt;
1619 r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t);
1620 r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t);
1623 static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r)
1625 struct task_struct *t;
1626 unsigned long flags;
1627 cputime_t utime, stime;
1628 struct task_cputime cputime;
1630 memset((char *) r, 0, sizeof *r);
1631 utime = stime = cputime_zero;
1633 if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) {
1634 utime = task_utime(current);
1635 stime = task_stime(current);
1636 accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r);
1640 if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags))
1645 case RUSAGE_CHILDREN:
1646 utime = p->signal->cutime;
1647 stime = p->signal->cstime;
1648 r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw;
1649 r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw;
1650 r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt;
1651 r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt;
1652 r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock;
1653 r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock;
1655 if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
1659 thread_group_cputime(p, &cputime);
1660 utime = cputime_add(utime, cputime.utime);
1661 stime = cputime_add(stime, cputime.stime);
1662 r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw;
1663 r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw;
1664 r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt;
1665 r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt;
1666 r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock;
1667 r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock;
1670 accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r);
1678 unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
1681 cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime);
1682 cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime);
1685 int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru)
1688 k_getrusage(p, who, &r);
1689 return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
1692 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru)
1694 if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN &&
1695 who != RUSAGE_THREAD)
1697 return getrusage(current, who, ru);
1700 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask)
1702 mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
1706 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
1707 unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
1709 struct task_struct *me = current;
1710 unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)];
1713 error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
1714 if (error != -ENOSYS)
1719 case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
1720 if (!valid_signal(arg2)) {
1724 me->pdeath_signal = arg2;
1727 case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
1728 error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2);
1730 case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
1731 error = get_dumpable(me->mm);
1733 case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
1734 if (arg2 < 0 || arg2 > 1) {
1738 set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
1742 case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
1743 error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
1745 case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
1746 error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
1749 error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
1752 error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
1755 error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
1758 error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
1761 error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL;
1764 if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL)
1771 comm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0;
1772 if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2,
1773 sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0)
1775 set_task_comm(me, comm);
1778 get_task_comm(comm, me);
1779 if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm,
1784 error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
1787 error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
1790 case PR_GET_SECCOMP:
1791 error = prctl_get_seccomp();
1793 case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
1794 error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2);
1797 error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
1800 error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
1802 case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK:
1803 error = current->timer_slack_ns;
1805 case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK:
1807 current->timer_slack_ns =
1808 current->default_timer_slack_ns;
1810 current->timer_slack_ns = arg2;
1820 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep,
1821 struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused)
1824 int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
1826 err |= put_user(cpu, cpup);
1828 err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep);
1829 return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
1832 char poweroff_cmd[POWEROFF_CMD_PATH_LEN] = "/sbin/poweroff";
1834 static void argv_cleanup(char **argv, char **envp)
1840 * orderly_poweroff - Trigger an orderly system poweroff
1841 * @force: force poweroff if command execution fails
1843 * This may be called from any context to trigger a system shutdown.
1844 * If the orderly shutdown fails, it will force an immediate shutdown.
1846 int orderly_poweroff(bool force)
1849 char **argv = argv_split(GFP_ATOMIC, poweroff_cmd, &argc);
1850 static char *envp[] = {
1852 "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin",
1856 struct subprocess_info *info;
1859 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s failed to allocate memory for \"%s\"\n",
1860 __func__, poweroff_cmd);
1864 info = call_usermodehelper_setup(argv[0], argv, envp, GFP_ATOMIC);
1870 call_usermodehelper_setcleanup(info, argv_cleanup);
1872 ret = call_usermodehelper_exec(info, UMH_NO_WAIT);
1876 printk(KERN_WARNING "Failed to start orderly shutdown: "
1877 "forcing the issue\n");
1879 /* I guess this should try to kick off some daemon to
1880 sync and poweroff asap. Or not even bother syncing
1881 if we're doing an emergency shutdown? */
1888 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(orderly_poweroff);