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   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
   7  *            Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
   8  *            Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
   9  *            James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  10  *
  11  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  13  *                                         Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
  14  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  15  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  16  *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  17  *              Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  18  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  19  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
  20  *
  21  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  22  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  23  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  24  */
  25
  26 #include <linux/init.h>
  27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
  29 #include <linux/errno.h>
  30 #include <linux/sched.h>
  31 #include <linux/security.h>
  32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  33 #include <linux/capability.h>
  34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  35 #include <linux/mm.h>
  36 #include <linux/mman.h>
  37 #include <linux/slab.h>
  38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  39 #include <linux/swap.h>
  40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  42 #include <linux/file.h>
  43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
  44 #include <linux/namei.h>
  45 #include <linux/mount.h>
  46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  49 #include <linux/tty.h>
  50 #include <net/icmp.h>
  51 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for local_port_range[] */
  52 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
  54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
  55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
  58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  60 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  63 #include <linux/udp.h>
  64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
  65 #include <linux/quota.h>
  66 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  67 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  68 #include <linux/parser.h>
  69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  70 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  72 #include <linux/personality.h>
  73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  74 #include <linux/audit.h>
  75 #include <linux/string.h>
  76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
  77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
  79
  80 #include "avc.h"
  81 #include "objsec.h"
  82 #include "netif.h"
  83 #include "netnode.h"
  84 #include "netport.h"
  85 #include "xfrm.h"
  86 #include "netlabel.h"
  87 #include "audit.h"
  88
  89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
  90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
  91
  92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
  93
  94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
  95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
  96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
  97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
  98
  99 /* SECMARK reference count */
 100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 101
 102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 103 int selinux_enforcing;
 104
 105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 106 {
 107         unsigned long enforcing;
 108         if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
 109                 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 110         return 1;
 111 }
 112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
 113 #endif
 114
 115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 117
 118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 119 {
 120         unsigned long enabled;
 121         if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
 122                 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 123         return 1;
 124 }
 125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 126 #else
 127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 128 #endif
 129
 130
 131 /*
 132  * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
 133  * just to allow the use of the capability module.
 134  */
 135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
 136
 137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
 138    before the policy was loaded. */
 139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 141
 142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 143
 144 /**
 145  * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
 146  *
 147  * Description:
 148  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
 149  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
 150  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
 151  * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
 152  *
 153  */
 154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 155 {
 156         return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
 157 }
 158
 159 /*
 160  * initialise the security for the init task
 161  */
 162 static void cred_init_security(void)
 163 {
 164         struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
 165         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 166
 167         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 168         if (!tsec)
 169                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
 170
 171         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 172         cred->security = tsec;
 173 }
 174
 175 /*
 176  * get the security ID of a set of credentials
 177  */
 178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
 179 {
 180         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 181
 182         tsec = cred->security;
 183         return tsec->sid;
 184 }
 185
 186 /*
 187  * get the objective security ID of a task
 188  */
 189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
 190 {
 191         u32 sid;
 192
 193         rcu_read_lock();
 194         sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
 195         rcu_read_unlock();
 196         return sid;
 197 }
 198
 199 /*
 200  * get the subjective security ID of the current task
 201  */
 202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
 203 {
 204         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
 205
 206         return tsec->sid;
 207 }
 208
 209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 210
 211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 212 {
 213         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 214         u32 sid = current_sid();
 215
 216         isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
 217         if (!isec)
 218                 return -ENOMEM;
 219
 220         mutex_init(&isec->lock);
 221         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 222         isec->inode = inode;
 223         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 224         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
 225         isec->task_sid = sid;
 226         inode->i_security = isec;
 227
 228         return 0;
 229 }
 230
 231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 232 {
 233         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 234         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 235
 236         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 237         if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
 238                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 239         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 240
 241         inode->i_security = NULL;
 242         kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 243 }
 244
 245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 246 {
 247         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 248         u32 sid = current_sid();
 249
 250         fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 251         if (!fsec)
 252                 return -ENOMEM;
 253
 254         fsec->sid = sid;
 255         fsec->fown_sid = sid;
 256         file->f_security = fsec;
 257
 258         return 0;
 259 }
 260
 261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 262 {
 263         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 264         file->f_security = NULL;
 265         kfree(fsec);
 266 }
 267
 268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 269 {
 270         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 271
 272         sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 273         if (!sbsec)
 274                 return -ENOMEM;
 275
 276         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 277         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
 278         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 279         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 280         sbsec->sb = sb;
 281         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 282         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 283         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 284         sb->s_security = sbsec;
 285
 286         return 0;
 287 }
 288
 289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 290 {
 291         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 292
 293         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 294         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 295                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
 296         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 297
 298         sb->s_security = NULL;
 299         kfree(sbsec);
 300 }
 301
 302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 303 {
 304         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 305
 306         ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
 307         if (!ssec)
 308                 return -ENOMEM;
 309
 310         ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 311         ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 312         sk->sk_security = ssec;
 313
 314         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
 315
 316         return 0;
 317 }
 318
 319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 320 {
 321         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
 322
 323         sk->sk_security = NULL;
 324         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
 325         kfree(ssec);
 326 }
 327
 328 /* The security server must be initialized before
 329    any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
 330 extern int ss_initialized;
 331
 332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
 333
 334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
 335         "uses xattr",
 336         "uses transition SIDs",
 337         "uses task SIDs",
 338         "uses genfs_contexts",
 339         "not configured for labeling",
 340         "uses mountpoint labeling",
 341 };
 342
 343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 344
 345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
 346 {
 347         return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 348 }
 349
 350 enum {
 351         Opt_error = -1,
 352         Opt_context = 1,
 353         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 354         Opt_defcontext = 3,
 355         Opt_rootcontext = 4,
 356         Opt_labelsupport = 5,
 357 };
 358
 359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
 360         {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 361         {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 362         {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 363         {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 364         {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
 365         {Opt_error, NULL},
 366 };
 367
 368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 369
 370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 371                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 372                         const struct cred *cred)
 373 {
 374         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 375         int rc;
 376
 377         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 378                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 379         if (rc)
 380                 return rc;
 381
 382         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 383                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 384         return rc;
 385 }
 386
 387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 388                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 389                         const struct cred *cred)
 390 {
 391         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 392         int rc;
 393         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 394                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 395         if (rc)
 396                 return rc;
 397
 398         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 399                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 400         return rc;
 401 }
 402
 403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 404 {
 405         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 406         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 407         struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
 408         int rc = 0;
 409
 410         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 411                 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 412                    error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 413                    the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 414                    the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 415                    assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 416                 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 417                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
 418                                "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 419                         rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 420                         goto out;
 421                 }
 422                 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 423                 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 424                         if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 425                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 426                                        "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 427                                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 428                         else
 429                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 430                                        "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
 431                                        sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 432                         goto out;
 433                 }
 434         }
 435
 436         sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
 437
 438         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 439                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
 440                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 441         else
 442                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
 443                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 444                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 445
 446         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
 447             sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
 448             sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
 449             sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 450                 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 451
 452         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 453         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 454
 455         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 456            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 457            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 458            populates itself. */
 459         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 460 next_inode:
 461         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 462                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 463                                 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
 464                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 465                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 466                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 467                 inode = igrab(inode);
 468                 if (inode) {
 469                         if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
 470                                 inode_doinit(inode);
 471                         iput(inode);
 472                 }
 473                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 474                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 475                 goto next_inode;
 476         }
 477         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 478 out:
 479         return rc;
 480 }
 481
 482 /*
 483  * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
 484  * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
 485  * mount options, or whatever.
 486  */
 487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 488                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 489 {
 490         int rc = 0, i;
 491         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 492         char *context = NULL;
 493         u32 len;
 494         char tmp;
 495
 496         security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
 497
 498         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 499                 return -EINVAL;
 500
 501         if (!ss_initialized)
 502                 return -EINVAL;
 503
 504         tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 505         /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
 506         for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
 507                 if (tmp & 0x01)
 508                         opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 509                 tmp >>= 1;
 510         }
 511         /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
 512         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
 513                 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 514
 515         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 516         if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
 517                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 518                 goto out_free;
 519         }
 520
 521         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 522         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 523                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 524                 goto out_free;
 525         }
 526
 527         i = 0;
 528         if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
 529                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
 530                 if (rc)
 531                         goto out_free;
 532                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 533                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 534         }
 535         if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
 536                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
 537                 if (rc)
 538                         goto out_free;
 539                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 540                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 541         }
 542         if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
 543                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
 544                 if (rc)
 545                         goto out_free;
 546                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 547                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 548         }
 549         if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
 550                 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 551                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
 552
 553                 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
 554                 if (rc)
 555                         goto out_free;
 556                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 557                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 558         }
 559         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
 560                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
 561                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 562         }
 563
 564         BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
 565
 566         return 0;
 567
 568 out_free:
 569         security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
 570         return rc;
 571 }
 572
 573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 574                       u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 575 {
 576         char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 577
 578         /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
 579         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 580                 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
 581                     (old_sid != new_sid))
 582                         return 1;
 583
 584         /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
 585          * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
 586          */
 587         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 588                 if (mnt_flags & flag)
 589                         return 1;
 590         return 0;
 591 }
 592
 593 /*
 594  * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
 595  * labeling information.
 596  */
 597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 598                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 599 {
 600         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 601         int rc = 0, i;
 602         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 603         const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
 604         struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 605         struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
 606         u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
 607         u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 608         char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
 609         int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
 610         int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
 611
 612         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 613
 614         if (!ss_initialized) {
 615                 if (!num_opts) {
 616                         /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 617                            after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 618                            server is ready to handle calls. */
 619                         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 620                         if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 621                                 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 622                         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 623                         goto out;
 624                 }
 625                 rc = -EINVAL;
 626                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
 627                         "before the security server is initialized\n");
 628                 goto out;
 629         }
 630
 631         /*
 632          * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
 633          * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
 634          * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
 635          * we need to skip the double mount verification.
 636          *
 637          * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
 638          * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
 639          * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
 640          * will be used for both mounts)
 641          */
 642         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
 643             && (num_opts == 0))
 644                 goto out;
 645
 646         /*
 647          * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
 648          * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
 649          * than once with different security options.
 650          */
 651         for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
 652                 u32 sid;
 653
 654                 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
 655                         continue;
 656                 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
 657                                              strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
 658                 if (rc) {
 659                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 660                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 661                                mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
 662                         goto out;
 663                 }
 664                 switch (flags[i]) {
 665                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
 666                         fscontext_sid = sid;
 667
 668                         if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
 669                                         fscontext_sid))
 670                                 goto out_double_mount;
 671
 672                         sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 673                         break;
 674                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
 675                         context_sid = sid;
 676
 677                         if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
 678                                         context_sid))
 679                                 goto out_double_mount;
 680
 681                         sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
 682                         break;
 683                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
 684                         rootcontext_sid = sid;
 685
 686                         if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
 687                                         rootcontext_sid))
 688                                 goto out_double_mount;
 689
 690                         sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 691
 692                         break;
 693                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
 694                         defcontext_sid = sid;
 695
 696                         if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
 697                                         defcontext_sid))
 698                                 goto out_double_mount;
 699
 700                         sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 701
 702                         break;
 703                 default:
 704                         rc = -EINVAL;
 705                         goto out;
 706                 }
 707         }
 708
 709         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 710                 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
 711                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
 712                         goto out_double_mount;
 713                 rc = 0;
 714                 goto out;
 715         }
 716
 717         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 718                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
 719
 720         /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
 721         rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 722         if (rc) {
 723                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 724                        __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 725                 goto out;
 726         }
 727
 728         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 729         if (fscontext_sid) {
 730                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
 731                 if (rc)
 732                         goto out;
 733
 734                 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
 735         }
 736
 737         /*
 738          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 739          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 740          * the superblock context if not already set.
 741          */
 742         if (context_sid) {
 743                 if (!fscontext_sid) {
 744                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 745                                                           cred);
 746                         if (rc)
 747                                 goto out;
 748                         sbsec->sid = context_sid;
 749                 } else {
 750                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 751                                                              cred);
 752                         if (rc)
 753                                 goto out;
 754                 }
 755                 if (!rootcontext_sid)
 756                         rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
 757
 758                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
 759                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 760         }
 761
 762         if (rootcontext_sid) {
 763                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
 764                                                      cred);
 765                 if (rc)
 766                         goto out;
 767
 768                 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
 769                 root_isec->initialized = 1;
 770         }
 771
 772         if (defcontext_sid) {
 773                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 774                         rc = -EINVAL;
 775                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
 776                                "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
 777                         goto out;
 778                 }
 779
 780                 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
 781                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
 782                                                              sbsec, cred);
 783                         if (rc)
 784                                 goto out;
 785                 }
 786
 787                 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
 788         }
 789
 790         rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
 791 out:
 792         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 793         return rc;
 794 out_double_mount:
 795         rc = -EINVAL;
 796         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
 797                "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
 798         goto out;
 799 }
 800
 801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 802                                         struct super_block *newsb)
 803 {
 804         const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
 805         struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
 806
 807         int set_fscontext =     (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
 808         int set_context =       (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
 809         int set_rootcontext =   (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
 810
 811         /*
 812          * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 813          * mount options.  thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
 814          * with it later
 815          */
 816         if (!ss_initialized) {
 817                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 818                 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
 819                         list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 820                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 821                 return;
 822         }
 823
 824         /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
 825         BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 826
 827         /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
 828         if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 829                 return;
 830
 831         mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
 832
 833         newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
 834
 835         newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
 836         newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
 837         newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
 838
 839         if (set_context) {
 840                 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 841
 842                 if (!set_fscontext)
 843                         newsbsec->sid = sid;
 844                 if (!set_rootcontext) {
 845                         struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 846                         struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 847                         newisec->sid = sid;
 848                 }
 849                 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 850         }
 851         if (set_rootcontext) {
 852                 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
 853                 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
 854                 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 855                 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 856
 857                 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
 858         }
 859
 860         sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
 861         mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
 862 }
 863
 864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
 865                                   struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 866 {
 867         char *p;
 868         char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
 869         char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
 870         int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
 871
 872         opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
 873
 874         /* Standard string-based options. */
 875         while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
 876                 int token;
 877                 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 878
 879                 if (!*p)
 880                         continue;
 881
 882                 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
 883
 884                 switch (token) {
 885                 case Opt_context:
 886                         if (context || defcontext) {
 887                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 888                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 889                                 goto out_err;
 890                         }
 891                         context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 892                         if (!context) {
 893                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 894                                 goto out_err;
 895                         }
 896                         break;
 897
 898                 case Opt_fscontext:
 899                         if (fscontext) {
 900                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 901                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 902                                 goto out_err;
 903                         }
 904                         fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 905                         if (!fscontext) {
 906                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 907                                 goto out_err;
 908                         }
 909                         break;
 910
 911                 case Opt_rootcontext:
 912                         if (rootcontext) {
 913                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 914                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 915                                 goto out_err;
 916                         }
 917                         rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 918                         if (!rootcontext) {
 919                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 920                                 goto out_err;
 921                         }
 922                         break;
 923
 924                 case Opt_defcontext:
 925                         if (context || defcontext) {
 926                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 927                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 928                                 goto out_err;
 929                         }
 930                         defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 931                         if (!defcontext) {
 932                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 933                                 goto out_err;
 934                         }
 935                         break;
 936                 case Opt_labelsupport:
 937                         break;
 938                 default:
 939                         rc = -EINVAL;
 940                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
 941                         goto out_err;
 942
 943                 }
 944         }
 945
 946         rc = -ENOMEM;
 947         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 948         if (!opts->mnt_opts)
 949                 goto out_err;
 950
 951         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 952         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 953                 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
 954                 goto out_err;
 955         }
 956
 957         if (fscontext) {
 958                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
 959                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 960         }
 961         if (context) {
 962                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
 963                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 964         }
 965         if (rootcontext) {
 966                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
 967                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 968         }
 969         if (defcontext) {
 970                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
 971                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 972         }
 973
 974         opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
 975         return 0;
 976
 977 out_err:
 978         kfree(context);
 979         kfree(defcontext);
 980         kfree(fscontext);
 981         kfree(rootcontext);
 982         return rc;
 983 }
 984 /*
 985  * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
 986  */
 987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 988 {
 989         int rc = 0;
 990         char *options = data;
 991         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
 992
 993         security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
 994
 995         if (!data)
 996                 goto out;
 997
 998         BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
 999
1000         rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1001         if (rc)
1002                 goto out_err;
1003
1004 out:
1005         rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1006
1007 out_err:
1008         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1009         return rc;
1010 }
1011
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013                                struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1014 {
1015         int i;
1016         char *prefix;
1017
1018         for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1019                 char *has_comma;
1020
1021                 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022                         has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1023                 else
1024                         has_comma = NULL;
1025
1026                 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1027                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1028                         prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1029                         break;
1030                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1031                         prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1032                         break;
1033                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034                         prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1035                         break;
1036                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037                         prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1038                         break;
1039                 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1040                         seq_putc(m, ',');
1041                         seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1042                         continue;
1043                 default:
1044                         BUG();
1045                 };
1046                 /* we need a comma before each option */
1047                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1048                 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1049                 if (has_comma)
1050                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1051                 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1052                 if (has_comma)
1053                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1054         }
1055 }
1056
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1058 {
1059         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1060         int rc;
1061
1062         rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1063         if (rc) {
1064                 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1065                 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1066                         rc = 0;
1067                 return rc;
1068         }
1069
1070         selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1071
1072         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1073
1074         return rc;
1075 }
1076
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1078 {
1079         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1080         case S_IFSOCK:
1081                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1082         case S_IFLNK:
1083                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1084         case S_IFREG:
1085                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1086         case S_IFBLK:
1087                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1088         case S_IFDIR:
1089                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1090         case S_IFCHR:
1091                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1092         case S_IFIFO:
1093                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1094
1095         }
1096
1097         return SECCLASS_FILE;
1098 }
1099
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1101 {
1102         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1103 }
1104
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1106 {
1107         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1108 }
1109
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1111 {
1112         switch (family) {
1113         case PF_UNIX:
1114                 switch (type) {
1115                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1116                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1118                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1119                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1120                 }
1121                 break;
1122         case PF_INET:
1123         case PF_INET6:
1124                 switch (type) {
1125                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1126                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1128                         else
1129                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1130                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1131                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1133                         else
1134                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1135                 case SOCK_DCCP:
1136                         return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1137                 default:
1138                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1139                 }
1140                 break;
1141         case PF_NETLINK:
1142                 switch (protocol) {
1143                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1144                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145                 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147                 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1149                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1150                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1151                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1152                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1155                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1156                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157                 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1163                 default:
1164                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1165                 }
1166         case PF_PACKET:
1167                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1168         case PF_KEY:
1169                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1170         case PF_APPLETALK:
1171                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1172         }
1173
1174         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1175 }
1176
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1179                                 u16 tclass,
1180                                 u32 *sid)
1181 {
1182         int buflen, rc;
1183         char *buffer, *path, *end;
1184
1185         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1186         if (!buffer)
1187                 return -ENOMEM;
1188
1189         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1190         end = buffer+buflen;
1191         *--end = '\0';
1192         buflen--;
1193         path = end-1;
1194         *path = '/';
1195         while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196                 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1197                 if (buflen < 0)
1198                         break;
1199                 end -= de->namelen;
1200                 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1201                 *--end = '/';
1202                 path = end;
1203                 de = de->parent;
1204         }
1205         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1207         return rc;
1208 }
1209 #else
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1211                                 u16 tclass,
1212                                 u32 *sid)
1213 {
1214         return -EINVAL;
1215 }
1216 #endif
1217
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1220 {
1221         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1223         u32 sid;
1224         struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226         char *context = NULL;
1227         unsigned len = 0;
1228         int rc = 0;
1229
1230         if (isec->initialized)
1231                 goto out;
1232
1233         mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234         if (isec->initialized)
1235                 goto out_unlock;
1236
1237         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241                    server is ready to handle calls. */
1242                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1246                 goto out_unlock;
1247         }
1248
1249         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252                         isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1253                         break;
1254                 }
1255
1256                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1258                 if (opt_dentry) {
1259                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1261                 } else {
1262                         /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1264                 }
1265                 if (!dentry) {
1266                         /*
1267                          * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1268                          * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
1269                          * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1270                          * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
1271                          * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1272                          * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1273                          * be used again by userspace.
1274                          */
1275                         goto out_unlock;
1276                 }
1277
1278                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1279                 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1280                 if (!context) {
1281                         rc = -ENOMEM;
1282                         dput(dentry);
1283                         goto out_unlock;
1284                 }
1285                 context[len] = '\0';
1286                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1287                                            context, len);
1288                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1289                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
1290                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1291                                                    NULL, 0);
1292                         if (rc < 0) {
1293                                 dput(dentry);
1294                                 goto out_unlock;
1295                         }
1296                         kfree(context);
1297                         len = rc;
1298                         context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1299                         if (!context) {
1300                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1301                                 dput(dentry);
1302                                 goto out_unlock;
1303                         }
1304                         context[len] = '\0';
1305                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1306                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1307                                                    context, len);
1308                 }
1309                 dput(dentry);
1310                 if (rc < 0) {
1311                         if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1312                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned "
1313                                        "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1314                                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1315                                 kfree(context);
1316                                 goto out_unlock;
1317                         }
1318                         /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1319                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1320                         rc = 0;
1321                 } else {
1322                         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1323                                                              sbsec->def_sid,
1324                                                              GFP_NOFS);
1325                         if (rc) {
1326                                 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1327                                 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1328
1329                                 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1330                                         if (printk_ratelimit())
1331                                                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1332                                                         "context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1333                                                         "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1334                                 } else {
1335                                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
1336                                                "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1337                                                __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1338                                 }
1339                                 kfree(context);
1340                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1341                                 rc = 0;
1342                                 break;
1343                         }
1344                 }
1345                 kfree(context);
1346                 isec->sid = sid;
1347                 break;
1348         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1349                 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1350                 break;
1351         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1352                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1353                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1354
1355                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1356                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1357                 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1358                                              sbsec->sid,
1359                                              isec->sclass,
1360                                              &sid);
1361                 if (rc)
1362                         goto out_unlock;
1363                 isec->sid = sid;
1364                 break;
1365         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1366                 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1367                 break;
1368         default:
1369                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1370                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1371
1372                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1373                         struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1374                         if (proci->pde) {
1375                                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1376                                 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1377                                                           isec->sclass,
1378                                                           &sid);
1379                                 if (rc)
1380                                         goto out_unlock;
1381                                 isec->sid = sid;
1382                         }
1383                 }
1384                 break;
1385         }
1386
1387         isec->initialized = 1;
1388
1389 out_unlock:
1390         mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1391 out:
1392         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1393                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1394         return rc;
1395 }
1396
1397 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1398 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1399 {
1400         u32 perm = 0;
1401
1402         switch (sig) {
1403         case SIGCHLD:
1404                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1405                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1406                 break;
1407         case SIGKILL:
1408                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1409                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1410                 break;
1411         case SIGSTOP:
1412                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1413                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1414                 break;
1415         default:
1416                 /* All other signals. */
1417                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1418                 break;
1419         }
1420
1421         return perm;
1422 }
1423
1424 /*
1425  * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1426  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1427  */
1428 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1429                          const struct cred *target,
1430                          u32 perms)
1431 {
1432         u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1433
1434         return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1435 }
1436
1437 /*
1438  * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1439  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1440  * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1441  * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1442  */
1443 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1444                          const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1445                          u32 perms)
1446 {
1447         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1448         u32 sid1, sid2;
1449
1450         rcu_read_lock();
1451         __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security;  sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1452         __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security;  sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1453         rcu_read_unlock();
1454         return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1455 }
1456
1457 /*
1458  * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1459  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1460  * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1461  * - this uses current's subjective creds
1462  */
1463 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1464                             u32 perms)
1465 {
1466         u32 sid, tsid;
1467
1468         sid = current_sid();
1469         tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1470         return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1471 }
1472
1473 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1474 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1475 #endif
1476
1477 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1478 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1479                                const struct cred *cred,
1480                                int cap, int audit)
1481 {
1482         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1483         struct av_decision avd;
1484         u16 sclass;
1485         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1486         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1487         int rc;
1488
1489         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1490         ad.tsk = tsk;
1491         ad.u.cap = cap;
1492
1493         switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1494         case 0:
1495                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1496                 break;
1497         case 1:
1498                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1499                 break;
1500         default:
1501                 printk(KERN_ERR
1502                        "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1503                 BUG();
1504         }
1505
1506         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1507         if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1508                 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1509         return rc;
1510 }
1511
1512 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1513 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1514                            u32 perms)
1515 {
1516         u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1517
1518         return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1519                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1520 }
1521
1522 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1523    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1524    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1525 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1526                           struct inode *inode,
1527                           u32 perms,
1528                           struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1529 {
1530         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1531         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1532         u32 sid;
1533
1534         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1535                 return 0;
1536
1537         sid = cred_sid(cred);
1538         isec = inode->i_security;
1539
1540         if (!adp) {
1541                 adp = &ad;
1542                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1543                 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1544         }
1545
1546         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1547 }
1548
1549 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1550    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1551    pathname if needed. */
1552 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1553                                   struct vfsmount *mnt,
1554                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1555                                   u32 av)
1556 {
1557         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1558         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1559
1560         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1561         ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1562         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1563         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1564 }
1565
1566 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1567    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1568    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1569    check a particular permission to the file.
1570    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1571    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1572    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1573    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1574 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1575                          struct file *file,
1576                          u32 av)
1577 {
1578         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1579         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1580         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1581         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1582         int rc;
1583
1584         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1585         ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1586
1587         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1588                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1589                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1590                                   FD__USE,
1591                                   &ad);
1592                 if (rc)
1593                         goto out;
1594         }
1595
1596         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1597         rc = 0;
1598         if (av)
1599                 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1600
1601 out:
1602         return rc;
1603 }
1604
1605 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1606 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1607                       struct dentry *dentry,
1608                       u16 tclass)
1609 {
1610         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1611         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1612         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1613         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1614         u32 sid, newsid;
1615         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1616         int rc;
1617
1618         dsec = dir->i_security;
1619         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1620
1621         sid = tsec->sid;
1622         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1623
1624         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1625         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1626
1627         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1628                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1629                           &ad);
1630         if (rc)
1631                 return rc;
1632
1633         if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1634                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1635                 if (rc)
1636                         return rc;
1637         }
1638
1639         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1640         if (rc)
1641                 return rc;
1642
1643         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1644                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1645                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1646 }
1647
1648 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1649 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1650                           struct task_struct *ctx)
1651 {
1652         u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1653
1654         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1655 }
1656
1657 #define MAY_LINK        0
1658 #define MAY_UNLINK      1
1659 #define MAY_RMDIR       2
1660
1661 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1662 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1663                     struct dentry *dentry,
1664                     int kind)
1665
1666 {
1667         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1668         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1669         u32 sid = current_sid();
1670         u32 av;
1671         int rc;
1672
1673         dsec = dir->i_security;
1674         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1675
1676         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1677         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1678
1679         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1680         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1681         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1682         if (rc)
1683                 return rc;
1684
1685         switch (kind) {
1686         case MAY_LINK:
1687                 av = FILE__LINK;
1688                 break;
1689         case MAY_UNLINK:
1690                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1691                 break;
1692         case MAY_RMDIR:
1693                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1694                 break;
1695         default:
1696                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
1697                         __func__, kind);
1698                 return 0;
1699         }
1700
1701         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1702         return rc;
1703 }
1704
1705 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1706                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1707                              struct inode *new_dir,
1708                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1709 {
1710         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1711         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1712         u32 sid = current_sid();
1713         u32 av;
1714         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1715         int rc;
1716
1717         old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1718         old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1719         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1720         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1721
1722         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1723
1724         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1725         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1726                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1727         if (rc)
1728                 return rc;
1729         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1730                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1731         if (rc)
1732                 return rc;
1733         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1734                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1735                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1736                 if (rc)
1737                         return rc;
1738         }
1739
1740         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1741         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1742         if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1743                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1744         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1745         if (rc)
1746                 return rc;
1747         if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1748                 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1749                 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1750                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1751                                   new_isec->sclass,
1752                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1753                 if (rc)
1754                         return rc;
1755         }
1756
1757         return 0;
1758 }
1759
1760 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1761 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1762                                struct super_block *sb,
1763                                u32 perms,
1764                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1765 {
1766         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1767         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1768
1769         sbsec = sb->s_security;
1770         return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1771 }
1772
1773 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1774 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1775 {
1776         u32 av = 0;
1777
1778         if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1779                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1780                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1781                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1782                         av |= FILE__READ;
1783
1784                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1785                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1786                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1787                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1788
1789         } else {
1790                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1791                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1792                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1793                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1794                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1795                         av |= DIR__READ;
1796         }
1797
1798         return av;
1799 }
1800
1801 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1802 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1803 {
1804         u32 av = 0;
1805
1806         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1807                 av |= FILE__READ;
1808         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1809                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1810                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1811                 else
1812                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1813         }
1814         if (!av) {
1815                 /*
1816                  * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1817                  */
1818                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1819         }
1820
1821         return av;
1822 }
1823
1824 /*
1825  * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1826  * open permission.
1827  */
1828 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1829 {
1830         u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1831
1832         if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1833                 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1834                 /*
1835                  * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1836                  */
1837                 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1838                         av |= FILE__OPEN;
1839                 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1840                         av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1841                 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1842                         av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1843                 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1844                         av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1845                 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1846                         av |= DIR__OPEN;
1847                 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
1848                         av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
1849                 else
1850                         printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1851                                 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1852         }
1853         return av;
1854 }
1855
1856 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1857
1858 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1859                                      unsigned int mode)
1860 {
1861         int rc;
1862
1863         rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1864         if (rc)
1865                 return rc;
1866
1867         if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1868                 u32 sid = current_sid();
1869                 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1870                 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1871         }
1872
1873         return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1874 }
1875
1876 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1877 {
1878         int rc;
1879
1880         rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1881         if (rc)
1882                 return rc;
1883
1884         return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1885 }
1886
1887 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1888                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1889 {
1890         int error;
1891
1892         error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1893         if (error)
1894                 return error;
1895
1896         return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1897 }
1898
1899 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1900                           const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1901                           const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1902                           const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1903 {
1904         int error;
1905
1906         error = cap_capset(new, old,
1907                                       effective, inheritable, permitted);
1908         if (error)
1909                 return error;
1910
1911         return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1912 }
1913
1914 /*
1915  * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1916  * which was removed).
1917  *
1918  * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1919  * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1920  * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
1921  * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1922  */
1923
1924 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1925                            int cap, int audit)
1926 {
1927         int rc;
1928
1929         rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1930         if (rc)
1931                 return rc;
1932
1933         return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1934 }
1935
1936 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1937 {
1938         int buflen, rc;
1939         char *buffer, *path, *end;
1940
1941         rc = -ENOMEM;
1942         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1943         if (!buffer)
1944                 goto out;
1945
1946         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1947         end = buffer+buflen;
1948         *--end = '\0';
1949         buflen--;
1950         path = end-1;
1951         *path = '/';
1952         while (table) {
1953                 const char *name = table->procname;
1954                 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1955                 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1956                 if (buflen < 0)
1957                         goto out_free;
1958                 end -= namelen;
1959                 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1960                 *--end = '/';
1961                 path = end;
1962                 table = table->parent;
1963         }
1964         buflen -= 4;
1965         if (buflen < 0)
1966                 goto out_free;
1967         end -= 4;
1968         memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1969         path = end;
1970         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1971 out_free:
1972         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1973 out:
1974         return rc;
1975 }
1976
1977 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1978 {
1979         int error = 0;
1980         u32 av;
1981         u32 tsid, sid;
1982         int rc;
1983
1984         rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1985         if (rc)
1986                 return rc;
1987
1988         sid = current_sid();
1989
1990         rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1991                                     SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1992         if (rc) {
1993                 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1994                 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1995         }
1996
1997         /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1998          * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1999         if (op == 001) {
2000                 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2001                                      SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
2002         } else {
2003                 av = 0;
2004                 if (op & 004)
2005                         av |= FILE__READ;
2006                 if (op & 002)
2007                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
2008                 if (av)
2009                         error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2010                                              SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2011         }
2012
2013         return error;
2014 }
2015
2016 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2017 {
2018         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2019         int rc = 0;
2020
2021         if (!sb)
2022                 return 0;
2023
2024         switch (cmds) {
2025         case Q_SYNC:
2026         case Q_QUOTAON:
2027         case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2028         case Q_SETINFO:
2029         case Q_SETQUOTA:
2030                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2031                 break;
2032         case Q_GETFMT:
2033         case Q_GETINFO:
2034         case Q_GETQUOTA:
2035                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2036                 break;
2037         default:
2038                 rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2039                 break;
2040         }
2041         return rc;
2042 }
2043
2044 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2045 {
2046         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2047
2048         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2049 }
2050
2051 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2052 {
2053         int rc;
2054
2055         rc = cap_syslog(type);
2056         if (rc)
2057                 return rc;
2058
2059         switch (type) {
2060         case 3:         /* Read last kernel messages */
2061         case 10:        /* Return size of the log buffer */
2062                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2063                 break;
2064         case 6:         /* Disable logging to console */
2065         case 7:         /* Enable logging to console */
2066         case 8:         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2067                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2068                 break;
2069         case 0:         /* Close log */
2070         case 1:         /* Open log */
2071         case 2:         /* Read from log */
2072         case 4:         /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2073         case 5:         /* Clear ring buffer */
2074         default:
2075                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2076                 break;
2077         }
2078         return rc;
2079 }
2080
2081 /*
2082  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2083  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2084  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2085  *
2086  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2087  * processes that allocate mappings.
2088  */
2089 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2090 {
2091         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2092
2093         rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2094                              SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2095         if (rc == 0)
2096                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2097
2098         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2099 }
2100
2101 /* binprm security operations */
2102
2103 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2104 {
2105         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2106         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2107         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2108         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2109         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2110         int rc;
2111
2112         rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2113         if (rc)
2114                 return rc;
2115
2116         /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2117          * the script interpreter */
2118         if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2119                 return 0;
2120
2121         old_tsec = current_security();
2122         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2123         isec = inode->i_security;
2124
2125         /* Default to the current task SID. */
2126         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2127         new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2128
2129         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2130         new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2131         new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2132         new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2133
2134         if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2135                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2136                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2137                 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2138         } else {
2139                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2140                 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2141                                              SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2142                 if (rc)
2143                         return rc;
2144         }
2145
2146         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2147         ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2148
2149         if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2150                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2151
2152         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2153                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2154                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2155                 if (rc)
2156                         return rc;
2157         } else {
2158                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2159                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2160                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2161                 if (rc)
2162                         return rc;
2163
2164                 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2165                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2166                 if (rc)
2167                         return rc;
2168
2169                 /* Check for shared state */
2170                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2171                         rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2172                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2173                                           NULL);
2174                         if (rc)
2175                                 return -EPERM;
2176                 }
2177
2178                 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2179                  * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2180                 if (bprm->unsafe &
2181                     (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2182                         struct task_struct *tracer;
2183                         struct task_security_struct *sec;
2184                         u32 ptsid = 0;
2185
2186                         rcu_read_lock();
2187                         tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2188                         if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2189                                 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2190                                 ptsid = sec->sid;
2191                         }
2192                         rcu_read_unlock();
2193
2194                         if (ptsid != 0) {
2195                                 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2196                                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2197                                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2198                                 if (rc)
2199                                         return -EPERM;
2200                         }
2201                 }
2202
2203                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2204                 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2205         }
2206
2207         return 0;
2208 }
2209
2210 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2211 {
2212         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2213         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2214         u32 sid, osid;
2215         int atsecure = 0;
2216
2217         sid = tsec->sid;
2218         osid = tsec->osid;
2219
2220         if (osid != sid) {
2221                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2222                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
2223                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2224                 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2225                                         SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2226                                         PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2227         }
2228
2229         return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2230 }
2231
2232 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2233 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2234
2235 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2236 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2237                                             struct files_struct *files)
2238 {
2239         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2240         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2241         struct tty_struct *tty;
2242         struct fdtable *fdt;
2243         long j = -1;
2244         int drop_tty = 0;
2245
2246         tty = get_current_tty();
2247         if (tty) {
2248                 file_list_lock();
2249                 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2250                         struct inode *inode;
2251
2252                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2253                            Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2254                            than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2255                            file may belong to another process and we are only
2256                            interested in the inode-based check here. */
2257                         file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2258                         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2259                         if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2260                                            FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2261                                 drop_tty = 1;
2262                         }
2263                 }
2264                 file_list_unlock();
2265                 tty_kref_put(tty);
2266         }
2267         /* Reset controlling tty. */
2268         if (drop_tty)
2269                 no_tty();
2270
2271         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2272
2273         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2274
2275         spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2276         for (;;) {
2277                 unsigned long set, i;
2278                 int fd;
2279
2280                 j++;
2281                 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2282                 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2283                 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2284                         break;
2285                 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2286                 if (!set)
2287                         continue;
2288                 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2289                 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2290                         if (set & 1) {
2291                                 file = fget(i);
2292                                 if (!file)
2293                                         continue;
2294                                 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2295                                                   file,
2296                                                   file_to_av(file))) {
2297                                         sys_close(i);
2298                                         fd = get_unused_fd();
2299                                         if (fd != i) {
2300                                                 if (fd >= 0)
2301                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
2302                                                 fput(file);
2303                                                 continue;
2304                                         }
2305                                         if (devnull) {
2306                                                 get_file(devnull);
2307                                         } else {
2308                                                 devnull = dentry_open(
2309                                                         dget(selinux_null),
2310                                                         mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2311                                                         O_RDWR, cred);
2312                                                 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2313                                                         devnull = NULL;
2314                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
2315                                                         fput(file);
2316                                                         continue;
2317                                                 }
2318                                         }
2319                                         fd_install(fd, devnull);
2320                                 }
2321                                 fput(file);
2322                         }
2323                 }
2324                 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2325
2326         }
2327         spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2328 }
2329
2330 /*
2331  * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2332  */
2333 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2334 {
2335         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2336         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2337         int rc, i;
2338
2339         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2340         if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2341                 return;
2342
2343         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2344         flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2345
2346         /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2347         current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2348
2349         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2350          * SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2351          * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2352          *
2353          * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2354          * controlled by the setrlimit check.  The inclusion of the init task's
2355          * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2356          * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2357          * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2358          */
2359         rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2360                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2361         if (rc) {
2362                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2363                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2364                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2365                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2366                 }
2367                 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2368         }
2369 }
2370
2371 /*
2372  * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2373  * due to exec
2374  */
2375 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2376 {
2377         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2378         struct itimerval itimer;
2379         struct sighand_struct *psig;
2380         u32 osid, sid;
2381         int rc, i;
2382         unsigned long flags;
2383
2384         osid = tsec->osid;
2385         sid = tsec->sid;
2386
2387         if (sid == osid)
2388                 return;
2389
2390         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2391          * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2392          * flush and unblock signals.
2393          *
2394          * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2395          * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2396          */
2397         rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2398         if (rc) {
2399                 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2400                 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2401                         do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2402                 flush_signals(current);
2403                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2404                 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2405                 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2406                 recalc_sigpending();
2407                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2408         }
2409
2410         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2411          * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2412         read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2413         psig = current->parent->sighand;
2414         spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2415         wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2416         spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2417         read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2418 }
2419
2420 /* superblock security operations */
2421
2422 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2423 {
2424         return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2425 }
2426
2427 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2428 {
2429         superblock_free_security(sb);
2430 }
2431
2432 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2433 {
2434         if (plen > olen)
2435                 return 0;
2436
2437         return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2438 }
2439
2440 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2441 {
2442         return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2443                 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2444                 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2445                 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2446                 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2447 }
2448
2449 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2450 {
2451         if (!*first) {
2452                 **to = ',';
2453                 *to += 1;
2454         } else
2455                 *first = 0;
2456         memcpy(*to, from, len);
2457         *to += len;
2458 }
2459
2460 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2461                                        int len)
2462 {
2463         int current_size = 0;
2464
2465         if (!*first) {
2466                 **to = '|';
2467                 *to += 1;
2468         } else
2469                 *first = 0;
2470
2471         while (current_size < len) {
2472                 if (*from != '"') {
2473                         **to = *from;
2474                         *to += 1;
2475                 }
2476                 from += 1;
2477                 current_size += 1;
2478         }
2479 }
2480
2481 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2482 {
2483         int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2484         char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2485         char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2486         int open_quote = 0;
2487
2488         in_curr = orig;
2489         sec_curr = copy;
2490
2491         nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2492         if (!nosec) {
2493                 rc = -ENOMEM;
2494                 goto out;
2495         }
2496
2497         nosec_save = nosec;
2498         fnosec = fsec = 1;
2499         in_save = in_end = orig;
2500
2501         do {
2502                 if (*in_end == '"')
2503                         open_quote = !open_quote;
2504                 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2505                                 *in_end == '\0') {
2506                         int len = in_end - in_curr;
2507
2508                         if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2509                                 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2510                         else
2511                                 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2512
2513                         in_curr = in_end + 1;
2514                 }
2515         } while (*in_end++);
2516
2517         strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2518         free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2519 out:
2520         return rc;
2521 }
2522
2523 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2524 {
2525         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2526         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2527         int rc;
2528
2529         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2530         if (rc)
2531                 return rc;
2532
2533         /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2534         if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2535                 return 0;
2536
2537         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2538         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2539         return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2540 }
2541
2542 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2543 {
2544         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2545         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2546
2547         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2548         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2549         return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2550 }
2551
2552 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2553                          struct path *path,
2554                          char *type,
2555                          unsigned long flags,
2556                          void *data)
2557 {
2558         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2559
2560         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2561                 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2562                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2563         else
2564                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2565                                        FILE__MOUNTON);
2566 }
2567
2568 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2569 {
2570         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2571
2572         return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2573                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2574 }
2575
2576 /* inode security operations */
2577
2578 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2579 {
2580         return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2581 }
2582
2583 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2584 {
2585         inode_free_security(inode);
2586 }
2587
2588 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2589                                        char **name, void **value,
2590                                        size_t *len)
2591 {
2592         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2593         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2594         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2595         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2596         u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2597         int rc;
2598         char *namep = NULL, *context;
2599
2600         dsec = dir->i_security;
2601         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2602
2603         sid = tsec->sid;
2604         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2605
2606         if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2607                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2608                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2609                                              &newsid);
2610                 if (rc) {
2611                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
2612                                "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2613                                "ino=%ld)\n",
2614                                __func__,
2615                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2616                         return rc;
2617                 }
2618         }
2619
2620         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2621         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2622                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2623                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2624                 isec->sid = newsid;
2625                 isec->initialized = 1;
2626         }
2627
2628         if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2629                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2630
2631         if (name) {
2632                 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2633                 if (!namep)
2634                         return -ENOMEM;
2635                 *name = namep;
2636         }
2637
2638         if (value && len) {
2639                 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2640                 if (rc) {
2641                         kfree(namep);
2642                         return rc;
2643                 }
2644                 *value = context;
2645                 *len = clen;
2646         }
2647
2648         return 0;
2649 }
2650
2651 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2652 {
2653         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2654 }
2655
2656 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2657 {
2658         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2659 }
2660
2661 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2662 {
2663         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2664 }
2665
2666 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2667 {
2668         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2669 }
2670
2671 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2672 {
2673         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2674 }
2675
2676 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2677 {
2678         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2679 }
2680
2681 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2682 {
2683         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2684 }
2685
2686 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2687                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2688 {
2689         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2690 }
2691
2692 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2693 {
2694         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2695
2696         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2697 }
2698
2699 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2700 {
2701         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2702
2703         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2704 }
2705
2706 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2707 {
2708         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2709
2710         if (!mask) {
2711                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2712                 return 0;
2713         }
2714
2715         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2716                               file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2717 }
2718
2719 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2720 {
2721         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2722
2723         if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2724                 return 0;
2725
2726         if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2727                                ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2728                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2729
2730         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2731 }
2732
2733 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2734 {
2735         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2736
2737         return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2738 }
2739
2740 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2741 {
2742         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2743
2744         if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2745                      sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2746                 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2747                         if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2748                                 return -EPERM;
2749                 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2750                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2751                            Restrict to administrator. */
2752                         return -EPERM;
2753                 }
2754         }
2755
2756         /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2757            ordinary setattr permission. */
2758         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2759 }
2760
2761 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2762                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2763 {
2764         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2765         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2766         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2767         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2768         u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2769         int rc = 0;
2770
2771         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2772                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2773
2774         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2775         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2776                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2777
2778         if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2779                 return -EPERM;
2780
2781         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2782         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2783
2784         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2785                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2786         if (rc)
2787                 return rc;
2788
2789         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2790         if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2791                 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2792                         return rc;
2793                 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2794         }
2795         if (rc)
2796                 return rc;
2797
2798         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2799                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2800         if (rc)
2801                 return rc;
2802
2803         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2804                                           isec->sclass);
2805         if (rc)
2806                 return rc;
2807
2808         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2809                             sbsec->sid,
2810                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2811                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2812                             &ad);
2813 }
2814
2815 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2816                                         const void *value, size_t size,
2817                                         int flags)
2818 {
2819         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2820         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2821         u32 newsid;
2822         int rc;
2823
2824         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2825                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2826                 return;
2827         }
2828
2829         rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2830         if (rc) {
2831                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
2832                        "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2833                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2834                 return;
2835         }
2836
2837         isec->sid = newsid;
2838         return;
2839 }
2840
2841 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2842 {
2843         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2844
2845         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2846 }
2847
2848 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2849 {
2850         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2851
2852         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2853 }
2854
2855 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2856 {
2857         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2858                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2859
2860         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2861            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2862         return -EACCES;
2863 }
2864
2865 /*
2866  * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2867  *
2868  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2869  */
2870 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2871 {
2872         u32 size;
2873         int error;
2874         char *context = NULL;
2875         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2876
2877         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2878                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2879
2880         /*
2881          * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2882          * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2883          * use the in-core value under current policy.
2884          * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2885          * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2886          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2887          * in-core context value, not a denial.
2888          */
2889         error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2890                                 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2891         if (!error)
2892                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2893                                                       &size);
2894         else
2895                 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2896         if (error)
2897                 return error;
2898         error = size;
2899         if (alloc) {
2900                 *buffer = context;
2901                 goto out_nofree;
2902         }
2903         kfree(context);
2904 out_nofree:
2905         return error;
2906 }
2907
2908 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2909                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2910 {
2911         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2912         u32 newsid;
2913         int rc;
2914
2915         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2916                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2917
2918         if (!value || !size)
2919                 return -EACCES;
2920
2921         rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2922         if (rc)
2923                 return rc;
2924
2925         isec->sid = newsid;
2926         return 0;
2927 }
2928
2929 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2930 {
2931         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2932         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2933                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2934         return len;
2935 }
2936
2937 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2938 {
2939         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2940         *secid = isec->sid;
2941 }
2942
2943 /* file security operations */
2944
2945 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2946 {
2947         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2948         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2949
2950         if (!mask) {
2951                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2952                 return 0;
2953         }
2954
2955         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2956         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2957                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2958
2959         return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2960                              file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2961 }
2962
2963 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2964 {
2965         if (!mask)
2966                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2967                 return 0;
2968
2969         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2970 }
2971
2972 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2973 {
2974         return file_alloc_security(file);
2975 }
2976
2977 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2978 {
2979         file_free_security(file);
2980 }
2981
2982 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2983                               unsigned long arg)
2984 {
2985         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2986         u32 av = 0;
2987
2988         if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2989                 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2990         if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2991                 av |= FILE__READ;
2992         if (!av)
2993                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2994
2995         return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2996 }
2997
2998 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2999 {
3000         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3001         int rc = 0;
3002
3003 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3004         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3005                 /*
3006                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3007                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3008                  * This has an additional check.
3009                  */
3010                 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3011                 if (rc)
3012                         goto error;
3013         }
3014 #endif
3015
3016         if (file) {
3017                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3018                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3019
3020                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3021                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3022                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
3023
3024                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3025                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3026
3027                 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3028         }
3029
3030 error:
3031         return rc;
3032 }
3033
3034 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3035                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3036                              unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3037 {
3038         int rc = 0;
3039         u32 sid = current_sid();
3040
3041         if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3042                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3043                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3044         if (rc || addr_only)
3045                 return rc;
3046
3047         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3048                 prot = reqprot;
3049
3050         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3051                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3052 }
3053
3054 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3055                                  unsigned long reqprot,
3056                                  unsigned long prot)
3057 {
3058         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3059
3060         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3061                 prot = reqprot;
3062
3063 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3064         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3065                 int rc = 0;
3066                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3067                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3068                         rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3069                 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3070                            vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3071                            vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3072                         rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3073                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3074                         /*
3075                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3076                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3077                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3078                          * modified content.  This typically should only
3079                          * occur for text relocations.
3080                          */
3081                         rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3082                 }
3083                 if (rc)
3084                         return rc;
3085         }
3086 #endif
3087
3088         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3089 }
3090
3091 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3092 {
3093         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3094
3095         return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3096 }
3097
3098 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3099                               unsigned long arg)
3100 {
3101         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3102         int err = 0;
3103
3104         switch (cmd) {
3105         case F_SETFL:
3106                 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3107                         err = -EINVAL;
3108                         break;
3109                 }
3110
3111                 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3112                         err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3113                         break;
3114                 }
3115                 /* fall through */
3116         case F_SETOWN:
3117         case F_SETSIG:
3118         case F_GETFL:
3119         case F_GETOWN:
3120         case F_GETSIG:
3121                 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3122                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3123                 break;
3124         case F_GETLK:
3125         case F_SETLK:
3126         case F_SETLKW:
3127 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3128         case F_GETLK64:
3129         case F_SETLK64:
3130         case F_SETLKW64:
3131 #endif
3132                 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3133                         err = -EINVAL;
3134                         break;
3135                 }
3136                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3137                 break;
3138         }
3139
3140         return err;
3141 }
3142
3143 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3144 {
3145         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3146
3147         fsec = file->f_security;
3148         fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3149
3150         return 0;
3151 }
3152
3153 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3154                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3155 {
3156         struct file *file;
3157         u32 sid = current_sid();
3158         u32 perm;
3159         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3160
3161         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3162         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3163
3164         fsec = file->f_security;
3165
3166         if (!signum)
3167                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3168         else
3169                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3170
3171         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3172                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3173 }
3174
3175 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3176 {
3177         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3178
3179         return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3180 }
3181
3182 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3183 {
3184         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3185         struct inode *inode;
3186         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3187
3188         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3189         fsec = file->f_security;
3190         isec = inode->i_security;
3191         /*
3192          * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3193          * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3194          * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3195          * Task label is already saved in the file security
3196          * struct as its SID.
3197          */
3198         fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3199         fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3200         /*
3201          * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3202          * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3203          * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3204          * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3205          * new inode label or new policy.
3206          * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3207          */
3208         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3209 }
3210
3211 /* task security operations */
3212
3213 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3214 {
3215         return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3216 }
3217
3218 /*
3219  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3220  */
3221 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3222 {
3223         struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3224         cred->security = NULL;
3225         kfree(tsec);
3226 }
3227
3228 /*
3229  * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3230  */
3231 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3232                                 gfp_t gfp)
3233 {
3234         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3235         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3236
3237         old_tsec = old->security;
3238
3239         tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3240         if (!tsec)
3241                 return -ENOMEM;
3242
3243         new->security = tsec;
3244         return 0;
3245 }
3246
3247 /*
3248  * set the security data for a kernel service
3249  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3250  */
3251 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3252 {
3253         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3254         u32 sid = current_sid();
3255         int ret;
3256
3257         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3258                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3259                            KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3260                            NULL);
3261         if (ret == 0) {
3262                 tsec->sid = secid;
3263                 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3264                 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3265                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3266         }
3267         return ret;
3268 }
3269
3270 /*
3271  * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3272  * objective context of the specified inode
3273  */
3274 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3275 {
3276         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3277         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3278         u32 sid = current_sid();
3279         int ret;
3280
3281         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3282                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3283                            KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3284                            NULL);
3285
3286         if (ret == 0)
3287                 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3288         return 0;
3289 }
3290
3291 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3292 {
3293         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3294 }
3295
3296 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3297 {
3298         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3299 }
3300
3301 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3302 {
3303         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3304 }
3305
3306 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3307 {
3308         *secid = task_sid(p);
3309 }
3310
3311 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3312 {
3313         int rc;
3314
3315         rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3316         if (rc)
3317                 return rc;
3318
3319         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3320 }
3321
3322 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3323 {
3324         int rc;
3325
3326         rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3327         if (rc)
3328                 return rc;
3329
3330         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3331 }
3332
3333 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3334 {
3335         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3336 }
3337
3338 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3339 {
3340         struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3341
3342         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3343            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3344            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3345            upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3346         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3347                 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3348
3349         return 0;
3350 }
3351
3352 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3353 {
3354         int rc;
3355
3356         rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3357         if (rc)
3358                 return rc;
3359
3360         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3361 }
3362
3363 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3364 {
3365         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3366 }
3367
3368 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3369 {
3370         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3371 }
3372
3373 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3374                                 int sig, u32 secid)
3375 {
3376         u32 perm;
3377         int rc;
3378
3379         if (!sig)
3380                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3381         else
3382                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3383         if (secid)
3384                 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3385                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3386         else
3387                 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3388         return rc;
3389 }
3390
3391 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3392 {
3393         return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3394 }
3395
3396 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3397                                   struct inode *inode)
3398 {
3399         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3400         u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3401
3402         isec->sid = sid;
3403         isec->initialized = 1;
3404 }
3405
3406 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3407 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3408                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3409 {
3410         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3411         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3412
3413         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3414         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3415         if (ih == NULL)
3416                 goto out;
3417
3418         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3419         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3420                 goto out;
3421
3422         ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3423         ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3424         ret = 0;
3425
3426         if (proto)
3427                 *proto = ih->protocol;
3428
3429         switch (ih->protocol) {
3430         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3431                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3432
3433                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3434                         break;
3435
3436                 offset += ihlen;
3437                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3438                 if (th == NULL)
3439                         break;
3440
3441                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3442                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3443                 break;
3444         }
3445
3446         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3447                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3448
3449                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3450                         break;
3451
3452                 offset += ihlen;
3453                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3454                 if (uh == NULL)
3455                         break;
3456
3457                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3458                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3459                 break;
3460         }
3461
3462         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3463                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3464
3465                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3466                         break;
3467
3468                 offset += ihlen;
3469                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3470                 if (dh == NULL)
3471                         break;
3472
3473                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3474                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3475                 break;
3476         }
3477
3478         default:
3479                 break;
3480         }
3481 out:
3482         return ret;
3483 }
3484
3485 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3486
3487 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3488 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3489                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3490 {
3491         u8 nexthdr;
3492         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3493         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3494
3495         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3496         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3497         if (ip6 == NULL)
3498                 goto out;
3499
3500         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3501         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3502         ret = 0;
3503
3504         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3505         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3506         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3507         if (offset < 0)
3508                 goto out;
3509
3510         if (proto)
3511                 *proto = nexthdr;
3512
3513         switch (nexthdr) {
3514         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3515                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3516
3517                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3518                 if (th == NULL)
3519                         break;
3520
3521                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3522                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3523                 break;
3524         }
3525
3526         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3527                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3528
3529                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3530                 if (uh == NULL)
3531                         break;
3532
3533                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3534                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3535                 break;
3536         }
3537
3538         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3539                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3540
3541                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3542                 if (dh == NULL)
3543                         break;
3544
3545                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3546                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3547                 break;
3548         }
3549
3550         /* includes fragments */
3551         default:
3552                 break;
3553         }
3554 out:
3555         return ret;
3556 }
3557
3558 #endif /* IPV6 */
3559
3560 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3561                              char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3562 {
3563         char *addrp;
3564         int ret;
3565
3566         switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3567         case PF_INET:
3568                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3569                 if (ret)
3570                         goto parse_error;
3571                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3572                                        &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3573                 goto okay;
3574
3575 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3576         case PF_INET6:
3577                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3578                 if (ret)
3579                         goto parse_error;
3580                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3581                                        &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3582                 goto okay;
3583 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3584         default:
3585                 addrp = NULL;
3586                 goto okay;
3587         }
3588
3589 parse_error:
3590         printk(KERN_WARNING
3591                "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3592                " unable to parse packet\n");
3593         return ret;
3594
3595 okay:
3596         if (_addrp)
3597                 *_addrp = addrp;
3598         return 0;
3599 }
3600
3601 /**
3602  * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3603  * @skb: the packet
3604  * @family: protocol family
3605  * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3606  *
3607  * Description:
3608  * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3609  * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3610  * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
3611  * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3612  * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3613  * peer labels.
3614  *
3615  */
3616 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3617 {
3618         int err;
3619         u32 xfrm_sid;
3620         u32 nlbl_sid;
3621         u32 nlbl_type;
3622
3623         selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3624         selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3625
3626         err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3627         if (unlikely(err)) {
3628                 printk(KERN_WARNING
3629                        "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3630                        " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3631                 return -EACCES;
3632         }
3633
3634         return 0;
3635 }
3636
3637 /* socket security operations */
3638 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3639                            u32 perms)
3640 {
3641         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3642         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3643         u32 sid;
3644         int err = 0;
3645
3646         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3647
3648         if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3649                 goto out;
3650         sid = task_sid(task);
3651
3652         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3653         ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3654         err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3655
3656 out:
3657         return err;
3658 }
3659
3660 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3661                                  int protocol, int kern)
3662 {
3663         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3664         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3665         u32 sid, newsid;
3666         u16 secclass;
3667         int err = 0;
3668
3669         if (kern)
3670                 goto out;
3671
3672         sid = tsec->sid;
3673         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3674
3675         secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3676         err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3677
3678 out:
3679         return err;
3680 }
3681
3682 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3683                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
3684 {
3685         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3686         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3687         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3688         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3689         u32 sid, newsid;
3690         int err = 0;
3691
3692         sid = tsec->sid;
3693         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3694
3695         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3696
3697         if (kern)
3698                 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3699         else if (newsid)
3700                 isec->sid = newsid;
3701         else
3702                 isec->sid = sid;
3703
3704         isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3705         isec->initialized = 1;
3706
3707         if (sock->sk) {
3708                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3709                 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3710                 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3711                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3712         }
3713
3714         return err;
3715 }
3716
3717 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3718    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3719    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3720
3721 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3722 {
3723         u16 family;
3724         int err;
3725
3726         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3727         if (err)
3728                 goto out;
3729
3730         /*
3731          * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3732          * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3733          * check the first address now.
3734          */
3735         family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3736         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3737                 char *addrp;
3738                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3739                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3740                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3741                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3742                 unsigned short snum;
3743                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3744                 u32 sid, node_perm;
3745
3746                 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3747
3748                 if (family == PF_INET) {
3749                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3750                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3751                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3752                 } else {
3753                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3754                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3755                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3756                 }
3757
3758                 if (snum) {
3759                         int low, high;
3760
3761                         inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3762
3763                         if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3764                                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3765                                                       snum, &sid);
3766                                 if (err)
3767                                         goto out;
3768                                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3769                                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3770                                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3771                                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3772                                                    isec->sclass,
3773                                                    SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3774                                 if (err)
3775                                         goto out;
3776                         }
3777                 }
3778
3779                 switch (isec->sclass) {
3780                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3781                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3782                         break;
3783
3784                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3785                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3786                         break;
3787
3788                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3789                         node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3790                         break;
3791
3792                 default:
3793                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3794                         break;
3795                 }
3796
3797                 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3798                 if (err)
3799                         goto out;
3800
3801                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3802                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3803                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3804
3805                 if (family == PF_INET)
3806                         ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3807                 else
3808                         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3809
3810                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3811                                    isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3812                 if (err)
3813                         goto out;
3814         }
3815 out:
3816         return err;
3817 }
3818
3819 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3820 {
3821         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3822         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3823         int err;
3824
3825         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3826         if (err)
3827                 return err;
3828
3829         /*
3830          * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3831          */
3832         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3833         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3834             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3835                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3836                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3837                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3838                 unsigned short snum;
3839                 u32 sid, perm;
3840
3841                 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3842                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3843                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3844                                 return -EINVAL;
3845                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3846                 } else {
3847                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3848                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3849                                 return -EINVAL;
3850                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3851                 }
3852
3853                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3854                 if (err)
3855                         goto out;
3856
3857                 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3858                        TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3859
3860                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3861                 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3862                 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3863                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3864                 if (err)
3865                         goto out;
3866         }
3867
3868         err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3869
3870 out:
3871         return err;
3872 }
3873
3874 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3875 {
3876         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3877 }
3878
3879 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3880 {
3881         int err;
3882         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3883         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3884
3885         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3886         if (err)
3887                 return err;
3888
3889         newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3890
3891         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3892         newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3893         newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3894         newisec->initialized = 1;
3895
3896         return 0;
3897 }
3898
3899 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3900                                   int size)
3901 {
3902         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3903 }
3904
3905 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3906                                   int size, int flags)
3907 {
3908         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3909 }
3910
3911 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3912 {
3913         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3914 }
3915
3916 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3917 {
3918         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3919 }
3920
3921 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3922 {
3923         int err;
3924
3925         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3926         if (err)
3927                 return err;
3928
3929         return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3930 }
3931
3932 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3933                                      int optname)
3934 {
3935         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3936 }
3937
3938 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3939 {
3940         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3941 }
3942
3943 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3944                                               struct socket *other,
3945                                               struct sock *newsk)
3946 {
3947         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3948         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3949         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3950         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3951         int err;
3952
3953         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3954         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3955
3956         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3957         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3958
3959         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3960                            isec->sclass,
3961                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3962         if (err)
3963                 return err;
3964
3965         /* connecting socket */
3966         ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3967         ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3968
3969         /* server child socket */
3970         ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3971         ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3972         err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3973
3974         return err;
3975 }
3976
3977 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3978                                         struct socket *other)
3979 {
3980         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3981         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3982         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3983         int err;
3984
3985         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3986         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3987
3988         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3989         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3990
3991         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3992                            isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3993         if (err)
3994                 return err;
3995
3996         return 0;
3997 }
3998
3999 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4000                                     u32 peer_sid,
4001                                     struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4002 {
4003         int err;
4004         u32 if_sid;
4005         u32 node_sid;
4006
4007         err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4008         if (err)
4009                 return err;
4010         err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4011                            SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4012         if (err)
4013                 return err;
4014
4015         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4016         if (err)
4017                 return err;
4018         return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4019                             SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4020 }
4021
4022 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4023                                                 struct sk_buff *skb,
4024                                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4025                                                 u16 family,
4026                                                 char *addrp)
4027 {
4028         int err;
4029         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4030         u16 sk_class;
4031         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4032         u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4033
4034         sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4035         sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4036
4037         switch (sk_class) {
4038         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4039                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4040                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4041                 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4042                 break;
4043         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4044                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4045                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4046                 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4047                 break;
4048         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4049                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4050                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4051                 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4052                 break;
4053         default:
4054                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4055                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4056                 recv_perm = 0;
4057                 break;
4058         }
4059
4060         err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4061         if (err)
4062                 return err;
4063         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4064         if (err)
4065                 return err;
4066
4067         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4068         if (err)
4069                 return err;
4070         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4071         if (err)
4072                 return err;
4073
4074         if (!recv_perm)
4075                 return 0;
4076         err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4077                               ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4078         if (unlikely(err)) {
4079                 printk(KERN_WARNING
4080                        "SELinux: failure in"
4081                        " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4082                        " network port label not found\n");
4083                 return err;
4084         }
4085         return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4086 }
4087
4088 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4089                                        u16 family)
4090 {
4091         int err = 0;
4092         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4093         u32 peer_sid;
4094         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4095         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4096         char *addrp;
4097
4098         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4099         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4100         ad.u.net.family = family;
4101         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4102         if (err)
4103                 return err;
4104
4105         if (selinux_compat_net)
4106                 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4107                                                            family, addrp);
4108         else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4109                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4110                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4111         if (err)
4112                 return err;
4113
4114         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4115                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4116                 if (err)
4117                         return err;
4118                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4119                                    SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4120                 if (err)
4121                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4122         } else {
4123                 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4124                 if (err)
4125                         return err;
4126                 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4127         }
4128
4129         return err;
4130 }
4131
4132 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4133 {
4134         int err;
4135         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4136         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4137         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4138         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4139         char *addrp;
4140         u8 secmark_active;
4141         u8 peerlbl_active;
4142
4143         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4144                 return 0;
4145
4146         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4147         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4148                 family = PF_INET;
4149
4150         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4151          * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4152          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4153          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4154         if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4155                 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4156
4157         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4158         peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4159         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4160                 return 0;
4161
4162         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4163         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4164         ad.u.net.family = family;
4165         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4166         if (err)
4167                 return err;
4168
4169         if (peerlbl_active) {
4170                 u32 peer_sid;
4171
4172                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4173                 if (err)
4174                         return err;
4175                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4176                                                peer_sid, &ad);
4177                 if (err) {
4178                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4179                         return err;
4180                 }
4181                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4182                                    PEER__RECV, &ad);
4183                 if (err)
4184                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4185         }
4186
4187         if (secmark_active) {
4188                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4189                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4190                 if (err)
4191                         return err;
4192         }
4193
4194         return err;
4195 }
4196
4197 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4198                                             int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4199 {
4200         int err = 0;
4201         char *scontext;
4202         u32 scontext_len;
4203         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4204         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4205         u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4206
4207         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4208
4209         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4210             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4211                 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4212                 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4213         }
4214         if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4215                 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
4216                 goto out;
4217         }
4218
4219         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4220
4221         if (err)
4222                 goto out;
4223
4224         if (scontext_len > len) {
4225                 err = -ERANGE;
4226                 goto out_len;
4227         }
4228
4229         if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4230                 err = -EFAULT;
4231
4232 out_len:
4233         if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4234                 err = -EFAULT;
4235
4236         kfree(scontext);
4237 out:
4238         return err;
4239 }
4240
4241 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4242 {
4243         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4244         u16 family;
4245
4246         if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4247                 family = PF_INET;
4248         else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4249                 family = PF_INET6;
4250         else if (sock)
4251                 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4252         else
4253                 goto out;
4254
4255         if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4256                 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4257         else if (skb)
4258                 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4259
4260 out:
4261         *secid = peer_secid;
4262         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4263                 return -EINVAL;
4264         return 0;
4265 }
4266
4267 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4268 {
4269         return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4270 }
4271
4272 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4273 {
4274         sk_free_security(sk);
4275 }
4276
4277 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4278 {
4279         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4280         struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4281
4282         newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4283         newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4284         newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4285
4286         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
4287 }
4288
4289 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4290 {
4291         if (!sk)
4292                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4293         else {
4294                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4295
4296                 *secid = sksec->sid;
4297         }
4298 }
4299
4300 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4301 {
4302         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4303         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4304
4305         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4306             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4307                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4308         sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4309 }
4310
4311 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4312                                      struct request_sock *req)
4313 {
4314         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4315         int err;
4316         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4317         u32 newsid;
4318         u32 peersid;
4319
4320         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4321         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4322                 family = PF_INET;
4323
4324         err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4325         if (err)
4326                 return err;
4327         if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4328                 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4329                 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4330         } else {
4331                 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4332                 if (err)
4333                         return err;
4334                 req->secid = newsid;
4335                 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4336         }
4337
4338         return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4339 }
4340
4341 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4342                                    const struct request_sock *req)
4343 {
4344         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4345
4346         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4347         newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4348         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4349            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4350            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4351            time it will have been created and available. */
4352
4353         /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4354          * thread with access to newsksec */
4355         selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4356 }
4357
4358 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4359 {
4360         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4361         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4362
4363         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4364         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4365                 family = PF_INET;
4366
4367         selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4368 }
4369
4370 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4371                                       struct flowi *fl)
4372 {
4373         fl->secid = req->secid;
4374 }
4375
4376 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4377 {
4378         int err = 0;
4379         u32 perm;
4380         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4381         struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4382         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4383
4384         if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4385                 err = -EINVAL;
4386                 goto out;
4387         }
4388         nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4389
4390         err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4391         if (err) {
4392                 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4393                         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4394                                   "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
4395                                   " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4396                                   nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4397                         if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4398                                 err = 0;
4399                 }
4400
4401                 /* Ignore */
4402                 if (err == -ENOENT)
4403                         err = 0;
4404                 goto out;
4405         }
4406
4407         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4408 out:
4409         return err;
4410 }
4411
4412 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4413
4414 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4415                                        u16 family)
4416 {
4417         int err;
4418         char *addrp;
4419         u32 peer_sid;
4420         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4421         u8 secmark_active;
4422         u8 netlbl_active;
4423         u8 peerlbl_active;
4424
4425         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4426                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4427
4428         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4429         netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4430         peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4431         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4432                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4433
4434         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4435                 return NF_DROP;
4436
4437         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4438         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4439         ad.u.net.family = family;
4440         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4441                 return NF_DROP;
4442
4443         if (peerlbl_active) {
4444                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4445                                                peer_sid, &ad);
4446                 if (err) {
4447                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4448                         return NF_DROP;
4449                 }
4450         }
4451
4452         if (secmark_active)
4453                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4454                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4455                         return NF_DROP;
4456
4457         if (netlbl_active)
4458                 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4459                  * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4460                  * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4461                  * protection */
4462                 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4463                         return NF_DROP;
4464
4465         return NF_ACCEPT;
4466 }
4467
4468 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4469                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4470                                          const struct net_device *in,
4471                                          const struct net_device *out,
4472                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4473 {
4474         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4475 }
4476
4477 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4478 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4479                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4480                                          const struct net_device *in,
4481                                          const struct net_device *out,
4482                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4483 {
4484         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4485 }
4486 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4487
4488 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4489                                       u16 family)
4490 {
4491         u32 sid;
4492
4493         if (!netlbl_enabled())
4494                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4495
4496         /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4497          * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4498          * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4499         if (skb->sk) {
4500                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4501                 sid = sksec->sid;
4502         } else
4503                 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4504         if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4505                 return NF_DROP;
4506
4507         return NF_ACCEPT;
4508 }
4509
4510 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4511                                         struct sk_buff *skb,
4512                                         const struct net_device *in,
4513                                         const struct net_device *out,
4514                                         int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4515 {
4516         return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4517 }
4518
4519 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4520                                                 int ifindex,
4521                                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4522                                                 u16 family, char *addrp)
4523 {
4524         int err;
4525         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4526         u16 sk_class;
4527         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4528         u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4529
4530         sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4531         sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4532
4533         switch (sk_class) {
4534         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4535                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4536                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4537                 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4538                 break;
4539         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4540                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4541                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4542                 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4543                 break;
4544         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4545                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4546                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4547                 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4548                 break;
4549         default:
4550                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4551                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4552                 send_perm = 0;
4553                 break;
4554         }
4555
4556         err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4557         if (err)
4558                 return err;
4559         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4560                 return err;
4561
4562         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4563         if (err)
4564                 return err;
4565         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4566         if (err)
4567                 return err;
4568
4569         if (send_perm != 0)
4570                 return 0;
4571
4572         err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4573                               ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4574         if (unlikely(err)) {
4575                 printk(KERN_WARNING
4576                        "SELinux: failure in"
4577                        " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4578                        " network port label not found\n");
4579                 return err;
4580         }
4581         return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4582 }
4583
4584 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4585                                                 int ifindex,
4586                                                 u16 family)
4587 {
4588         struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4589         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4590         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4591         char *addrp;
4592         u8 proto;
4593
4594         if (sk == NULL)
4595                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4596         sksec = sk->sk_security;
4597
4598         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4599         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4600         ad.u.net.family = family;
4601         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4602                 return NF_DROP;
4603
4604         if (selinux_compat_net) {
4605                 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4606                                                          &ad, family, addrp))
4607                         return NF_DROP;
4608         } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4609                 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4610                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4611                         return NF_DROP;
4612         }
4613
4614         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4615                 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4616                         return NF_DROP;
4617
4618         return NF_ACCEPT;
4619 }
4620
4621 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4622                                          u16 family)
4623 {
4624         u32 secmark_perm;
4625         u32 peer_sid;
4626         struct sock *sk;
4627         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4628         char *addrp;
4629         u8 secmark_active;
4630         u8 peerlbl_active;
4631
4632         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4633          * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4634          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4635          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4636         if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4637                 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4638 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4639         /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4640          * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4641          * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4642          * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4643          * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4644          *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4645         if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4646                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4647 #endif
4648         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4649         peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4650         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4651                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4652
4653         /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4654          * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4655          * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4656          * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4657         sk = skb->sk;
4658         if (sk == NULL) {
4659                 switch (family) {
4660                 case PF_INET:
4661                         if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4662                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4663                         else
4664                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4665                         break;
4666                 case PF_INET6:
4667                         if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4668                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4669                         else
4670                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4671                         break;
4672                 default:
4673                         return NF_DROP;
4674                 }
4675                 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4676                         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4677                                 return NF_DROP;
4678                 } else
4679                         peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4680         } else {
4681                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4682                 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4683                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4684         }
4685
4686         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4687         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4688         ad.u.net.family = family;
4689         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4690                 return NF_DROP;
4691
4692         if (secmark_active)
4693                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4694                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4695                         return NF_DROP;
4696
4697         if (peerlbl_active) {
4698                 u32 if_sid;
4699                 u32 node_sid;
4700
4701                 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4702                         return NF_DROP;
4703                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4704                                  SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4705                         return NF_DROP;
4706
4707                 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4708                         return NF_DROP;
4709                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4710                                  SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4711                         return NF_DROP;
4712         }
4713
4714         return NF_ACCEPT;
4715 }
4716
4717 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4718                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
4719                                            const struct net_device *in,
4720                                            const struct net_device *out,
4721                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4722 {
4723         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4724 }
4725
4726 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4727 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4728                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
4729                                            const struct net_device *in,
4730                                            const struct net_device *out,
4731                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4732 {
4733         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4734 }
4735 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4736
4737 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4738
4739 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4740 {
4741         int err;
4742
4743         err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4744         if (err)
4745                 return err;
4746
4747         if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4748                 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4749
4750         return err;
4751 }
4752
4753 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4754 {
4755         int err;
4756         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4757
4758         err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4759         if (err)
4760                 return err;
4761
4762         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4763         ad.u.cap = capability;
4764
4765         return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4766                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4767 }
4768
4769 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4770                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4771                               u16 sclass)
4772 {
4773         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4774         u32 sid;
4775
4776         isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4777         if (!isec)
4778                 return -ENOMEM;
4779
4780         sid = task_sid(task);
4781         isec->sclass = sclass;
4782         isec->sid = sid;
4783         perm->security = isec;
4784
4785         return 0;
4786 }
4787
4788 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4789 {
4790         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4791         perm->security = NULL;
4792         kfree(isec);
4793 }
4794
4795 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4796 {
4797         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4798
4799         msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4800         if (!msec)
4801                 return -ENOMEM;
4802
4803         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4804         msg->security = msec;
4805
4806         return 0;
4807 }
4808
4809 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4810 {
4811         struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4812
4813         msg->security = NULL;
4814         kfree(msec);
4815 }
4816
4817 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4818                         u32 perms)
4819 {
4820         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4821         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4822         u32 sid = current_sid();
4823
4824         isec = ipc_perms->security;
4825
4826         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4827         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4828
4829         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4830 }
4831
4832 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4833 {
4834         return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4835 }
4836
4837 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4838 {
4839         msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4840 }
4841
4842 /* message queue security operations */
4843 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4844 {
4845         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4846         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4847         u32 sid = current_sid();
4848         int rc;
4849
4850         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4851         if (rc)
4852                 return rc;
4853
4854         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4855
4856         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4857         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4858
4859         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4860                           MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4861         if (rc) {
4862                 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4863                 return rc;
4864         }
4865         return 0;
4866 }
4867
4868 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4869 {
4870         ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4871 }
4872
4873 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4874 {
4875         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4876         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4877         u32 sid = current_sid();
4878
4879         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4880
4881         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4882         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4883
4884         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4885                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4886 }
4887
4888 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4889 {
4890         int err;
4891         int perms;
4892
4893         switch (cmd) {
4894         case IPC_INFO:
4895         case MSG_INFO:
4896                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4897                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4898         case IPC_STAT:
4899         case MSG_STAT:
4900                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4901                 break;
4902         case IPC_SET:
4903                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4904                 break;
4905         case IPC_RMID:
4906                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4907                 break;
4908         default:
4909                 return 0;
4910         }
4911
4912         err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4913         return err;
4914 }
4915
4916 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4917 {
4918         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4919         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4920         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4921         u32 sid = current_sid();
4922         int rc;
4923
4924         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4925         msec = msg->security;
4926
4927         /*
4928          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4929          */
4930         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4931                 /*
4932                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
4933                  * message queue this message will be stored in
4934                  */
4935                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4936                                              &msec->sid);
4937                 if (rc)
4938                         return rc;
4939         }
4940
4941         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4942         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4943
4944         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4945         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4946                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4947         if (!rc)
4948                 /* Can this process send the message */
4949                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4950                                   MSG__SEND, &ad);
4951         if (!rc)
4952                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4953                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4954                                   MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4955
4956         return rc;
4957 }
4958
4959 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4960                                     struct task_struct *target,
4961                                     long type, int mode)
4962 {
4963         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4964         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4965         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4966         u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4967         int rc;
4968
4969         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4970         msec = msg->security;
4971
4972         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4973         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4974
4975         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4976                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4977         if (!rc)
4978                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4979                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4980         return rc;
4981 }
4982
4983 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4984 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4985 {
4986         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4987         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4988         u32 sid = current_sid();
4989         int rc;
4990
4991         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4992         if (rc)
4993                 return rc;
4994
4995         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4996
4997         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4998         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4999
5000         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5001                           SHM__CREATE, &ad);
5002         if (rc) {
5003                 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5004                 return rc;
5005         }
5006         return 0;
5007 }
5008
5009 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5010 {
5011         ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5012 }
5013
5014 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5015 {
5016         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5017         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5018         u32 sid = current_sid();
5019
5020         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5021
5022         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5023         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5024
5025         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5026                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5027 }
5028
5029 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5030 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5031 {
5032         int perms;
5033         int err;
5034
5035         switch (cmd) {
5036         case IPC_INFO:
5037         case SHM_INFO:
5038                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5039                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5040         case IPC_STAT:
5041         case SHM_STAT:
5042                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5043                 break;
5044         case IPC_SET:
5045                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5046                 break;
5047         case SHM_LOCK:
5048         case SHM_UNLOCK:
5049                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5050                 break;
5051         case IPC_RMID:
5052                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5053                 break;
5054         default:
5055                 return 0;
5056         }
5057
5058         err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5059         return err;
5060 }
5061
5062 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5063                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5064 {
5065         u32 perms;
5066
5067         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5068                 perms = SHM__READ;
5069         else
5070                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5071
5072         return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5073 }
5074
5075 /* Semaphore security operations */
5076 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5077 {
5078         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5079         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5080         u32 sid = current_sid();
5081         int rc;
5082
5083         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5084         if (rc)
5085                 return rc;
5086
5087         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5088
5089         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5090         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5091
5092         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5093                           SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5094         if (rc) {
5095                 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5096                 return rc;
5097         }
5098         return 0;
5099 }
5100
5101 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5102 {
5103         ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5104 }
5105
5106 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5107 {
5108         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5109         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5110         u32 sid = current_sid();
5111
5112         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5113
5114         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5115         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5116
5117         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5118                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5119 }
5120
5121 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5122 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5123 {
5124         int err;
5125         u32 perms;
5126
5127         switch (cmd) {
5128         case IPC_INFO:
5129         case SEM_INFO:
5130                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5131                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5132         case GETPID:
5133         case GETNCNT:
5134         case GETZCNT:
5135                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5136                 break;
5137         case GETVAL:
5138         case GETALL:
5139                 perms = SEM__READ;
5140                 break;
5141         case SETVAL:
5142         case SETALL:
5143                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5144                 break;
5145         case IPC_RMID:
5146                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5147                 break;
5148         case IPC_SET:
5149                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5150                 break;
5151         case IPC_STAT:
5152         case SEM_STAT:
5153                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5154                 break;
5155         default:
5156                 return 0;
5157         }
5158
5159         err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5160         return err;
5161 }
5162
5163 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5164                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5165 {
5166         u32 perms;
5167
5168         if (alter)
5169                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5170         else
5171                 perms = SEM__READ;
5172
5173         return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5174 }
5175
5176 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5177 {
5178         u32 av = 0;
5179
5180         av = 0;
5181         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5182                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5183         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5184                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5185
5186         if (av == 0)
5187                 return 0;
5188
5189         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5190 }
5191
5192 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5193 {
5194         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5195         *secid = isec->sid;
5196 }
5197
5198 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5199 {
5200         if (inode)
5201                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5202 }
5203
5204 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5205                                char *name, char **value)
5206 {
5207         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5208         u32 sid;
5209         int error;
5210         unsigned len;
5211
5212         if (current != p) {
5213                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5214                 if (error)
5215                         return error;
5216         }
5217
5218         rcu_read_lock();
5219         __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5220
5221         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5222                 sid = __tsec->sid;
5223         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5224                 sid = __tsec->osid;
5225         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5226                 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5227         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5228                 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5229         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5230                 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5231         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5232                 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5233         else
5234                 goto invalid;
5235         rcu_read_unlock();
5236
5237         if (!sid)
5238                 return 0;
5239
5240         error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5241         if (error)
5242                 return error;
5243         return len;
5244
5245 invalid:
5246         rcu_read_unlock();
5247         return -EINVAL;
5248 }
5249
5250 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5251                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5252 {
5253         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5254         struct task_struct *tracer;
5255         struct cred *new;
5256         u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5257         int error;
5258         char *str = value;
5259
5260         if (current != p) {
5261                 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5262                    security attributes. */
5263                 return -EACCES;
5264         }
5265
5266         /*
5267          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5268          * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5269          * above restriction is ever removed.
5270          */
5271         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5272                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5273         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5274                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5275         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5276                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5277         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5278                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5279         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5280                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5281         else
5282                 error = -EINVAL;
5283         if (error)
5284                 return error;
5285
5286         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5287         if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5288                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5289                         str[size-1] = 0;
5290                         size--;
5291                 }
5292                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5293                 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5294                         if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5295                                 return error;
5296                         error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5297                                                               &sid);
5298                 }
5299                 if (error)
5300                         return error;
5301         }
5302
5303         new = prepare_creds();
5304         if (!new)
5305                 return -ENOMEM;
5306
5307         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5308            performed during the actual operation (execve,
5309            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5310            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5311            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5312            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5313         tsec = new->security;
5314         if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5315                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5316         } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5317                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5318         } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5319                 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5320                 if (error)
5321                         goto abort_change;
5322                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5323         } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5324                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5325         } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5326                 error = -EINVAL;
5327                 if (sid == 0)
5328                         goto abort_change;
5329
5330                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5331                 error = -EPERM;
5332                 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5333                         error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5334                         if (error)
5335                                 goto abort_change;
5336                 }
5337
5338                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5339                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5340                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5341                 if (error)
5342                         goto abort_change;
5343
5344                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5345                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5346                 ptsid = 0;
5347                 task_lock(p);
5348                 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5349                 if (tracer)
5350                         ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5351                 task_unlock(p);
5352
5353                 if (tracer) {
5354                         error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5355                                              PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5356                         if (error)
5357                                 goto abort_change;
5358                 }
5359
5360                 tsec->sid = sid;
5361         } else {
5362                 error = -EINVAL;
5363                 goto abort_change;
5364         }
5365
5366         commit_creds(new);
5367         return size;
5368
5369 abort_change:
5370         abort_creds(new);
5371         return error;
5372 }
5373
5374 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5375 {
5376         return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5377 }
5378
5379 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5380 {
5381         return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5382 }
5383
5384 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5385 {
5386         kfree(secdata);
5387 }
5388
5389 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5390
5391 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5392                              unsigned long flags)
5393 {
5394         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5395         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5396
5397         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5398         if (!ksec)
5399                 return -ENOMEM;
5400
5401         tsec = cred->security;
5402         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5403                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5404         else
5405                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5406
5407         k->security = ksec;
5408         return 0;
5409 }
5410
5411 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5412 {
5413         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5414
5415         k->security = NULL;
5416         kfree(ksec);
5417 }
5418
5419 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5420                                   const struct cred *cred,
5421                                   key_perm_t perm)
5422 {
5423         struct key *key;
5424         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5425         u32 sid;
5426
5427         /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5428            permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5429            appear to be created. */
5430         if (perm == 0)
5431                 return 0;
5432
5433         sid = cred_sid(cred);
5434
5435         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5436         ksec = key->security;
5437
5438         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5439 }
5440
5441 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5442 {
5443         struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5444         char *context = NULL;
5445         unsigned len;
5446         int rc;
5447
5448         rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5449         if (!rc)
5450                 rc = len;
5451         *_buffer = context;
5452         return rc;
5453 }
5454
5455 #endif
5456
5457 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5458         .name =                         "selinux",
5459
5460         .ptrace_may_access =            selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5461         .ptrace_traceme =               selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5462         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
5463         .capset =                       selinux_capset,
5464         .sysctl =                       selinux_sysctl,
5465         .capable =                      selinux_capable,
5466         .quotactl =                     selinux_quotactl,
5467         .quota_on =                     selinux_quota_on,
5468         .syslog =                       selinux_syslog,
5469         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5470
5471         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
5472         .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
5473
5474         .bprm_set_creds =               selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5475         .bprm_committing_creds =        selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5476         .bprm_committed_creds =         selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5477         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5478
5479         .sb_alloc_security =            selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5480         .sb_free_security =             selinux_sb_free_security,
5481         .sb_copy_data =                 selinux_sb_copy_data,
5482         .sb_kern_mount =                selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5483         .sb_show_options =              selinux_sb_show_options,
5484         .sb_statfs =                    selinux_sb_statfs,
5485         .sb_mount =                     selinux_mount,
5486         .sb_umount =                    selinux_umount,
5487         .sb_set_mnt_opts =              selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5488         .sb_clone_mnt_opts =            selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5489         .sb_parse_opts_str =            selinux_parse_opts_str,
5490
5491
5492         .inode_alloc_security =         selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5493         .inode_free_security =          selinux_inode_free_security,
5494         .inode_init_security =          selinux_inode_init_security,
5495         .inode_create =                 selinux_inode_create,
5496         .inode_link =                   selinux_inode_link,
5497         .inode_unlink =                 selinux_inode_unlink,
5498         .inode_symlink =                selinux_inode_symlink,
5499         .inode_mkdir =                  selinux_inode_mkdir,
5500         .inode_rmdir =                  selinux_inode_rmdir,
5501         .inode_mknod =                  selinux_inode_mknod,
5502         .inode_rename =                 selinux_inode_rename,
5503         .inode_readlink =               selinux_inode_readlink,
5504         .inode_follow_link =            selinux_inode_follow_link,
5505         .inode_permission =             selinux_inode_permission,
5506         .inode_setattr =                selinux_inode_setattr,
5507         .inode_getattr =                selinux_inode_getattr,
5508         .inode_setxattr =               selinux_inode_setxattr,
5509         .inode_post_setxattr =          selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5510         .inode_getxattr =               selinux_inode_getxattr,
5511         .inode_listxattr =              selinux_inode_listxattr,
5512         .inode_removexattr =            selinux_inode_removexattr,
5513         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5514         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5515         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5516         .inode_getsecid =               selinux_inode_getsecid,
5517
5518         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
5519         .file_alloc_security =          selinux_file_alloc_security,
5520         .file_free_security =           selinux_file_free_security,
5521         .file_ioctl =                   selinux_file_ioctl,
5522         .file_mmap =                    selinux_file_mmap,
5523         .file_mprotect =                selinux_file_mprotect,
5524         .file_lock =                    selinux_file_lock,
5525         .file_fcntl =                   selinux_file_fcntl,
5526         .file_set_fowner =              selinux_file_set_fowner,
5527         .file_send_sigiotask =          selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5528         .file_receive =                 selinux_file_receive,
5529
5530         .dentry_open =                  selinux_dentry_open,
5531
5532         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
5533         .cred_free =                    selinux_cred_free,
5534         .cred_prepare =                 selinux_cred_prepare,
5535         .kernel_act_as =                selinux_kernel_act_as,
5536         .kernel_create_files_as =       selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5537         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
5538         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
5539         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
5540         .task_getsecid =                selinux_task_getsecid,
5541         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
5542         .task_setioprio =               selinux_task_setioprio,
5543         .task_getioprio =               selinux_task_getioprio,
5544         .task_setrlimit =               selinux_task_setrlimit,
5545         .task_setscheduler =            selinux_task_setscheduler,
5546         .task_getscheduler =            selinux_task_getscheduler,
5547         .task_movememory =              selinux_task_movememory,
5548         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
5549         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
5550         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
5551
5552         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
5553         .ipc_getsecid =                 selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5554
5555         .msg_msg_alloc_security =       selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5556         .msg_msg_free_security =        selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5557
5558         .msg_queue_alloc_security =     selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5559         .msg_queue_free_security =      selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5560         .msg_queue_associate =          selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5561         .msg_queue_msgctl =             selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5562         .msg_queue_msgsnd =             selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5563         .msg_queue_msgrcv =             selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5564
5565         .shm_alloc_security =           selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5566         .shm_free_security =            selinux_shm_free_security,
5567         .shm_associate =                selinux_shm_associate,
5568         .shm_shmctl =                   selinux_shm_shmctl,
5569         .shm_shmat =                    selinux_shm_shmat,
5570
5571         .sem_alloc_security =           selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5572         .sem_free_security =            selinux_sem_free_security,
5573         .sem_associate =                selinux_sem_associate,
5574         .sem_semctl =                   selinux_sem_semctl,
5575         .sem_semop =                    selinux_sem_semop,
5576
5577         .d_instantiate =                selinux_d_instantiate,
5578
5579         .getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
5580         .setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
5581
5582         .secid_to_secctx =              selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5583         .secctx_to_secid =              selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5584         .release_secctx =               selinux_release_secctx,
5585
5586         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5587         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5588
5589         .socket_create =                selinux_socket_create,
5590         .socket_post_create =           selinux_socket_post_create,
5591         .socket_bind =                  selinux_socket_bind,
5592         .socket_connect =               selinux_socket_connect,
5593         .socket_listen =                selinux_socket_listen,
5594         .socket_accept =                selinux_socket_accept,
5595         .socket_sendmsg =               selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5596         .socket_recvmsg =               selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5597         .socket_getsockname =           selinux_socket_getsockname,
5598         .socket_getpeername =           selinux_socket_getpeername,
5599         .socket_getsockopt =            selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5600         .socket_setsockopt =            selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5601         .socket_shutdown =              selinux_socket_shutdown,
5602         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5603         .socket_getpeersec_stream =     selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5604         .socket_getpeersec_dgram =      selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5605         .sk_alloc_security =            selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5606         .sk_free_security =             selinux_sk_free_security,
5607         .sk_clone_security =            selinux_sk_clone_security,
5608         .sk_getsecid =                  selinux_sk_getsecid,
5609         .sock_graft =                   selinux_sock_graft,
5610         .inet_conn_request =            selinux_inet_conn_request,
5611         .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5612         .inet_conn_established =        selinux_inet_conn_established,
5613         .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
5614
5615 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5616         .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5617         .xfrm_policy_clone_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5618         .xfrm_policy_free_security =    selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5619         .xfrm_policy_delete_security =  selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5620         .xfrm_state_alloc_security =    selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5621         .xfrm_state_free_security =     selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5622         .xfrm_state_delete_security =   selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5623         .xfrm_policy_lookup =           selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5624         .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =    selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5625         .xfrm_decode_session =          selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5626 #endif
5627
5628 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5629         .key_alloc =                    selinux_key_alloc,
5630         .key_free =                     selinux_key_free,
5631         .key_permission =               selinux_key_permission,
5632         .key_getsecurity =              selinux_key_getsecurity,
5633 #endif
5634
5635 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5636         .audit_rule_init =              selinux_audit_rule_init,
5637         .audit_rule_known =             selinux_audit_rule_known,
5638         .audit_rule_match =             selinux_audit_rule_match,
5639         .audit_rule_free =              selinux_audit_rule_free,
5640 #endif
5641 };
5642
5643 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5644 {
5645         if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5646                 selinux_enabled = 0;
5647                 return 0;
5648         }
5649
5650         if (!selinux_enabled) {
5651                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
5652                 return 0;
5653         }
5654
5655         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
5656
5657         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5658         cred_init_security();
5659
5660         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5661                                             sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5662                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5663         avc_init();
5664
5665         secondary_ops = security_ops;
5666         if (!secondary_ops)
5667                 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5668         if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5669                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5670
5671         if (selinux_enforcing)
5672                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5673         else
5674                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
5675
5676         return 0;
5677 }
5678
5679 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5680 {
5681         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
5682
5683         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5684         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5685         spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5686         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5687 next_sb:
5688         if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5689                 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5690                                 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5691                                            struct superblock_security_struct,
5692                                            list);
5693                 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5694                 sb->s_count++;
5695                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5696                 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5697                 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5698                 if (sb->s_root)
5699                         superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5700                 drop_super(sb);
5701                 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5702                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5703                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5704                 goto next_sb;
5705         }
5706         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5707         spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5708 }
5709
5710 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5711    all processes and objects when they are created. */
5712 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5713
5714 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5715
5716 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5717         {
5718                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5719                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5720                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5721                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5722                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5723         },
5724         {
5725                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_forward,
5726                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5727                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5728                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
5729                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5730         },
5731         {
5732                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_output,
5733                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5734                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5735                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5736                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5737         }
5738 };
5739
5740 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5741
5742 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5743         {
5744                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5745                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5746                 .pf =           PF_INET6,
5747                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5748                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5749         },
5750         {
5751                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_forward,
5752                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5753                 .pf =           PF_INET6,
5754                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
5755                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5756         }
5757 };
5758
5759 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5760
5761 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5762 {
5763         int err = 0;
5764
5765         if (!selinux_enabled)
5766                 goto out;
5767
5768         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5769
5770         err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5771         if (err)
5772                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5773
5774 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5775         err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5776         if (err)
5777                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5778 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5779
5780 out:
5781         return err;
5782 }
5783
5784 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5785
5786 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5787 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5788 {
5789         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5790
5791         nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5792 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5793         nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5794 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5795 }
5796 #endif
5797
5798 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5799
5800 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5801 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5802 #endif
5803
5804 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5805
5806 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5807 static int selinux_disabled;
5808
5809 int selinux_disable(void)
5810 {
5811         extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5812
5813         if (ss_initialized) {
5814                 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5815                 return -EINVAL;
5816         }
5817
5818         if (selinux_disabled) {
5819                 /* Only do this once. */
5820                 return -EINVAL;
5821         }
5822
5823         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
5824
5825         selinux_disabled = 1;
5826         selinux_enabled = 0;
5827
5828         /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5829         security_ops = secondary_ops;
5830
5831         /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5832         selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5833
5834         /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5835         exit_sel_fs();
5836
5837         return 0;
5838 }
5839 #endif