2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
21 #include <linux/config.h>
22 #include <linux/module.h>
23 #include <linux/init.h>
24 #include <linux/kernel.h>
25 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
26 #include <linux/errno.h>
27 #include <linux/sched.h>
28 #include <linux/security.h>
29 #include <linux/xattr.h>
30 #include <linux/capability.h>
31 #include <linux/unistd.h>
33 #include <linux/mman.h>
34 #include <linux/slab.h>
35 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
36 #include <linux/swap.h>
37 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
38 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
40 #include <linux/file.h>
41 #include <linux/namei.h>
42 #include <linux/mount.h>
43 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
44 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
51 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
53 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/quota.h>
62 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
63 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <linux/parser.h>
65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
68 #include <linux/personality.h>
69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
70 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
77 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
79 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
80 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
82 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
83 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
85 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
87 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
90 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
93 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
94 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
96 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
98 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
101 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
104 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
105 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
107 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
108 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
109 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
110 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
111 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
113 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
114 before the policy was loaded. */
115 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
116 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
118 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
120 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
122 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
124 tsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
128 memset(tsec, 0, sizeof(struct task_security_struct));
129 tsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
131 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
132 task->security = tsec;
137 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
139 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
141 if (!tsec || tsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
144 task->security = NULL;
148 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
150 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
151 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
153 isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
157 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct inode_security_struct));
158 init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
159 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
160 isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
162 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
163 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
164 if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
165 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
167 isec->task_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
168 inode->i_security = isec;
173 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
175 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
176 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
178 if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
181 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
182 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
183 list_del_init(&isec->list);
184 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
186 inode->i_security = NULL;
190 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
192 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
193 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
195 fsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_ATOMIC);
199 memset(fsec, 0, sizeof(struct file_security_struct));
200 fsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
202 if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) {
203 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
204 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
206 fsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
207 fsec->fown_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
209 file->f_security = fsec;
214 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
216 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
218 if (!fsec || fsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
221 file->f_security = NULL;
225 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
227 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
229 sbsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
233 memset(sbsec, 0, sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct));
234 init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
235 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
236 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
237 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
238 sbsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
240 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
241 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
242 sb->s_security = sbsec;
247 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
249 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
251 if (!sbsec || sbsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
254 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
255 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
256 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
257 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
259 sb->s_security = NULL;
263 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
264 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
266 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
268 if (family != PF_UNIX)
271 ssec = kmalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
275 memset(ssec, 0, sizeof(*ssec));
276 ssec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
278 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
279 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
286 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
288 if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX || ssec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
291 sk->sk_security = NULL;
294 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
296 /* The security server must be initialized before
297 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
298 extern int ss_initialized;
300 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
302 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
304 "uses transition SIDs",
306 "uses genfs_contexts",
307 "not configured for labeling",
308 "uses mountpoint labeling",
311 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
313 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
315 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
324 static match_table_t tokens = {
325 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
326 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
327 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
330 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
332 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
334 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
337 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
338 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
344 name = sb->s_type->name;
346 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
348 /* NFS we understand. */
349 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
350 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
352 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
356 context = d->context;
363 /* Standard string-based options. */
364 char *p, *options = data;
366 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
368 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
373 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
379 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
382 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
393 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
395 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
398 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
405 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
409 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
412 "defcontext option is invalid "
413 "for this filesystem type\n");
416 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
418 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
421 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
428 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
433 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
445 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
447 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
448 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
449 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
453 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
454 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
458 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
459 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
465 if (seen & Opt_context)
466 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
470 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
472 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
473 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
474 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
478 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
481 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
482 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
486 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
487 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
491 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
503 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
505 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
506 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
507 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
511 if (sbsec->initialized)
514 if (!ss_initialized) {
515 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
516 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
517 server is ready to handle calls. */
518 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
519 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
520 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
521 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
525 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
526 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
528 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
529 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
533 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
537 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
538 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
539 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
540 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
541 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
542 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
543 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
544 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
545 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
549 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
550 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
551 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
552 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
553 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
554 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
556 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
557 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
558 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
563 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
566 sbsec->initialized = 1;
568 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
569 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
570 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
573 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
574 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
575 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
578 /* Initialize the root inode. */
579 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
581 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
582 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
583 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
585 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
587 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
588 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
589 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
590 struct inode_security_struct, list);
591 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
592 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
593 inode = igrab(inode);
595 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
599 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
600 list_del_init(&isec->list);
603 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
609 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
611 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
613 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
615 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
617 return SECCLASS_FILE;
619 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
623 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
625 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
629 return SECCLASS_FILE;
632 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
639 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
641 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
648 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
650 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
652 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
658 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
659 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
660 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
661 case NETLINK_TCPDIAG:
662 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
664 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
666 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
667 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
668 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
670 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
672 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
673 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
674 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
675 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
676 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
678 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
681 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
683 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
686 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
689 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
690 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
695 char *buffer, *path, *end;
697 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
707 while (de && de != de->parent) {
708 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
712 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
717 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
718 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
722 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
730 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
731 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
733 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
734 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
736 struct dentry *dentry;
737 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
738 char *context = NULL;
743 if (isec->initialized)
748 if (isec->initialized)
751 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
752 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
753 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
754 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
755 server is ready to handle calls. */
756 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
757 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
758 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
759 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
763 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
764 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
765 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
766 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
770 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
771 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
773 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
774 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
776 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
777 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
780 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
781 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
786 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
787 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
793 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
796 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
797 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
805 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
811 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
817 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
818 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
819 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
820 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
824 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
825 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
828 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, rc, &sid);
830 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
831 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
832 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
833 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
835 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
843 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
844 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
846 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
847 /* Default to the fs SID. */
848 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
850 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
851 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
852 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
861 /* Default to the fs SID. */
862 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
865 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
867 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
868 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
879 isec->initialized = 1;
882 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
883 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
890 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
891 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
897 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
898 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
901 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
902 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
905 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
906 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
909 /* All other signals. */
910 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
917 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
918 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
919 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
920 struct task_struct *tsk2,
923 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
925 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
926 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
927 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
928 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
931 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
932 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
935 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
936 struct avc_audit_data ad;
938 tsec = tsk->security;
940 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
944 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
945 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
948 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
949 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
952 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
954 tsec = tsk->security;
956 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
957 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
960 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
961 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
962 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
963 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
966 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
968 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
969 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
970 struct avc_audit_data ad;
972 tsec = tsk->security;
973 isec = inode->i_security;
977 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
978 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
981 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
984 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
985 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
986 pathname if needed. */
987 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
988 struct vfsmount *mnt,
989 struct dentry *dentry,
992 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
993 struct avc_audit_data ad;
994 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
996 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
997 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1000 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1001 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1002 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1003 check a particular permission to the file.
1004 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1005 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1006 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1007 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1008 static inline int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1012 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1013 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1014 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1015 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1016 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1017 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1020 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1022 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1024 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1025 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1033 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1035 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1040 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1041 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1042 struct dentry *dentry,
1045 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1046 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1047 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1049 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1052 tsec = current->security;
1053 dsec = dir->i_security;
1054 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1056 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1057 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1059 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1060 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1065 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1066 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1068 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1074 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1078 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1079 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1080 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1084 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1087 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1088 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1089 struct dentry *dentry,
1093 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1094 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1095 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1099 tsec = current->security;
1100 dsec = dir->i_security;
1101 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1103 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1104 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1107 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1108 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1123 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1127 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1131 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1132 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1133 struct inode *new_dir,
1134 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1136 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1137 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1138 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1140 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1143 tsec = current->security;
1144 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1145 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1146 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1147 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1149 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1151 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1152 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1153 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1156 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1157 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1160 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1161 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1162 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1167 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1168 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1169 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1170 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1171 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1174 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1175 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1176 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1177 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1179 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1187 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1188 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1189 struct super_block *sb,
1191 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1193 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1194 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1196 tsec = tsk->security;
1197 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1198 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1202 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1203 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1207 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1208 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1209 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1210 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1213 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1215 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1219 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1221 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1223 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1230 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1231 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1235 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1237 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1238 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1247 /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
1248 static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
1250 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1251 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1253 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1254 /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
1259 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1261 isec->initialized = 1;
1266 /* Set the security attributes on a newly created file. */
1267 static int post_create(struct inode *dir,
1268 struct dentry *dentry)
1271 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1272 struct inode *inode;
1273 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1274 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1280 tsec = current->security;
1281 dsec = dir->i_security;
1282 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1284 inode = dentry->d_inode;
1286 /* Some file system types (e.g. NFS) may not instantiate
1287 a dentry for all create operations (e.g. symlink),
1288 so we have to check to see if the inode is non-NULL. */
1289 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: no inode, dir (dev=%s, "
1290 "ino=%ld)\n", dir->i_sb->s_id, dir->i_ino);
1294 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1295 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1297 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
1298 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
1301 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: "
1302 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
1304 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1309 rc = inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
1311 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: inode_security_set_sid "
1312 "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1313 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1317 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
1318 inode->i_op->setxattr) {
1319 /* Use extended attributes. */
1320 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &len);
1322 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: sid_to_context "
1323 "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1324 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1327 down(&inode->i_sem);
1328 rc = inode->i_op->setxattr(dentry,
1334 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: setxattr failed, "
1335 "rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1336 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1345 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1347 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1349 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1350 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1353 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1357 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1358 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1360 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1364 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1365 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1369 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1373 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1376 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1377 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1381 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1385 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1388 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1389 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1391 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1394 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1398 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1402 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1405 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1409 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1413 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1417 tsec = current->security;
1419 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1420 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1422 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1423 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1426 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1427 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1429 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1430 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1438 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1439 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1445 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1458 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1460 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1465 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1467 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1470 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1476 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1478 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1481 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1485 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1490 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1491 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1492 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1494 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1495 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1496 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1497 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1499 case 0: /* Close log */
1500 case 1: /* Open log */
1501 case 2: /* Read from log */
1502 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1503 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1505 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1512 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1513 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1514 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1516 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1517 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1518 * the capability is granted.
1520 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1521 * processes that allocate mappings.
1523 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1525 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1526 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1528 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1530 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1531 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1532 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1538 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1541 /* binprm security operations */
1543 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1545 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1547 bsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1551 memset(bsec, 0, sizeof *bsec);
1552 bsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
1554 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1557 bprm->security = bsec;
1561 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1563 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1564 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1565 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1566 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1568 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1571 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1575 bsec = bprm->security;
1580 tsec = current->security;
1581 isec = inode->i_security;
1583 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1584 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1586 /* Reset create SID on execve. */
1587 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1589 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1590 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1591 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1594 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1595 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1596 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1601 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1602 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1603 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1605 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1608 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1609 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1610 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1614 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1615 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1616 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1620 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1621 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1625 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1626 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1628 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1636 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1638 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1642 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1644 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1647 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1648 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1649 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1650 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1651 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1653 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1656 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1659 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1661 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec = bprm->security;
1662 bprm->security = NULL;
1666 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1667 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1669 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1670 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1672 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1673 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1674 struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
1679 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_list);
1681 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1682 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1683 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1684 file may belong to another process and we are only
1685 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1686 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1687 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1688 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1689 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1690 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1691 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1697 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1699 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1701 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1703 unsigned long set, i;
1708 if (i >= files->max_fds || i >= files->max_fdset)
1710 set = files->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1713 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1714 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1719 if (file_has_perm(current,
1721 file_to_av(file))) {
1723 fd = get_unused_fd();
1731 atomic_inc(&devnull->f_count);
1733 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1740 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1745 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1748 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1751 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1753 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1754 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1758 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1760 tsec = current->security;
1762 bsec = bprm->security;
1765 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1767 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1768 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1769 unchanged and kill. */
1770 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1771 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1772 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1779 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1780 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1781 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1782 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1783 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1795 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1797 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1799 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1800 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1801 struct itimerval itimer;
1802 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1805 tsec = current->security;
1806 bsec = bprm->security;
1809 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1812 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1815 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1816 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1818 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1819 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1820 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1821 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1822 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1823 will be checked against the new SID. */
1824 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1825 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1827 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1828 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1829 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1830 flush_signals(current);
1831 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1832 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1833 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
1834 recalc_sigpending();
1835 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1838 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1839 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1840 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1841 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1842 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1843 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1844 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1845 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1846 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1848 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1849 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1851 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1852 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1853 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1854 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1856 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1858 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1861 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1865 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1866 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1867 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1870 /* superblock security operations */
1872 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1874 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1877 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1879 superblock_free_security(sb);
1882 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1887 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1890 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1892 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1893 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1894 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
1897 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1905 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1909 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1911 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1912 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1913 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1918 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1919 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1920 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1924 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1932 in_save = in_end = orig;
1935 if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
1936 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1938 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1939 take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1941 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1943 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1945 } while (*in_end++);
1947 copy_page(in_save, nosec_save);
1948 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1953 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1955 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1958 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
1962 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1963 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1964 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
1967 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
1969 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1971 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1972 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1973 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1976 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
1977 struct nameidata *nd,
1979 unsigned long flags,
1984 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
1988 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
1989 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
1990 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
1992 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
1996 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2000 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2004 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2005 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2008 /* inode security operations */
2010 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2012 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2015 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2017 inode_free_security(inode);
2020 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2022 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2025 static void selinux_inode_post_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2027 post_create(dir, dentry);
2030 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2034 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2037 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2040 static void selinux_inode_post_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2045 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2049 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2052 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2055 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2057 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2060 static void selinux_inode_post_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2062 post_create(dir, dentry);
2065 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2067 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2070 static void selinux_inode_post_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2072 post_create(dir, dentry);
2075 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2077 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2080 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2084 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2088 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2091 static void selinux_inode_post_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2093 post_create(dir, dentry);
2096 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2097 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2099 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2102 static void selinux_inode_post_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2103 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2108 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2110 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2113 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2117 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2120 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2123 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2124 struct nameidata *nd)
2128 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2133 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2137 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2138 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2141 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2145 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2149 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2152 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2153 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2154 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2156 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2159 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2161 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2164 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2166 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2167 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2168 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2169 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2170 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2174 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2175 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2176 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2177 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2178 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2179 Restrict to administrator. */
2183 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2184 ordinary setattr permission. */
2185 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2188 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2189 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2192 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2195 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2196 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2198 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2199 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2203 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2207 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2208 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2212 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2217 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2219 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2220 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2224 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2225 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2227 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2228 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2232 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2233 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2237 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2239 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2240 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2248 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2250 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2251 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2253 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2256 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2259 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2261 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2264 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2266 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2267 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2268 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2269 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2270 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2271 Restrict to administrator. */
2275 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2276 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2277 permission for removexattr. */
2278 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2281 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2282 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2286 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
2288 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2293 /* Permission check handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.*/
2295 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2298 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
2302 if (!buffer || !size) {
2310 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
2315 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2316 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2318 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2322 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2325 if (!value || !size)
2328 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2336 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2338 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2339 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2340 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2344 /* file security operations */
2346 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2348 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2351 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2355 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2356 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2359 return file_has_perm(current, file,
2360 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2363 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2365 return file_alloc_security(file);
2368 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2370 file_free_security(file);
2373 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2385 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2387 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2388 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2391 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2393 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2394 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2397 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2401 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2406 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2409 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2410 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2413 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2419 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2421 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2422 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2424 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2425 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2426 * This has an additional check.
2428 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2435 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2436 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2438 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2439 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2442 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2443 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2445 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2450 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2451 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2455 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2459 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2462 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2463 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2466 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2467 unsigned long reqprot,
2472 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2476 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2479 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2480 if (vma->vm_file != NULL && vma->anon_vma != NULL && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
2482 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2483 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been written,
2484 * check ability to execute the possibly modified content.
2485 * This typically should only occur for text relocations.
2487 int rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
2493 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2496 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2498 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2501 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2508 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2513 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2514 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2523 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2524 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2529 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2534 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2538 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2545 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2547 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2548 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2550 tsec = current->security;
2551 fsec = file->f_security;
2552 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2557 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2558 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2562 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2563 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2565 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2566 file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2568 tsec = tsk->security;
2569 fsec = file->f_security;
2572 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2574 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2576 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2577 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2580 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2582 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2585 /* task security operations */
2587 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2591 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2595 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2598 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2600 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2603 tsec1 = current->security;
2605 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2608 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2610 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2611 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2613 /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
2614 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2615 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2617 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2618 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2619 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2620 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2625 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2627 task_free_security(tsk);
2630 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2632 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2633 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2634 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2635 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2636 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2641 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2643 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2646 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2648 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2652 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2654 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2657 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2659 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2662 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2664 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2667 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2669 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2673 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2677 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2681 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2684 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2686 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2689 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2693 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2694 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2695 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2696 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2697 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2698 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2703 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2705 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2708 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2710 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2713 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
2718 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
2722 if (info && ((unsigned long)info == 1 ||
2723 (unsigned long)info == 2 || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2727 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2729 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2731 return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2734 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2740 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2741 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2742 the state of the current process. */
2746 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2750 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2752 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2755 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2757 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2759 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2762 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2763 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2767 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2768 struct inode *inode)
2770 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2771 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2773 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2774 isec->initialized = 1;
2778 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
2780 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2781 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2783 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2784 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2786 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2787 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2791 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2792 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2795 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2796 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2799 switch (ih->protocol) {
2801 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2803 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2807 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2811 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2812 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2817 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2819 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2823 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2827 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2828 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2839 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2841 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2842 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2845 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2846 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2848 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2849 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2853 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2854 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2857 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2858 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2859 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2865 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2867 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2871 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2872 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2877 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2879 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2883 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2884 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2888 /* includes fragments */
2898 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
2899 char **addrp, int *len, int src)
2903 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
2905 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
2909 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
2910 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
2913 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2915 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
2919 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
2920 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
2930 /* socket security operations */
2931 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
2934 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2935 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2936 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2939 tsec = task->security;
2940 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2942 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
2945 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
2946 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
2947 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
2953 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
2954 int protocol, int kern)
2957 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2962 tsec = current->security;
2963 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2964 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
2965 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
2971 static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2972 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2974 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2975 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2977 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2979 tsec = current->security;
2980 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
2981 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
2982 isec->initialized = 1;
2987 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
2988 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
2989 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
2990 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
2991 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
2993 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
2998 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3003 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3005 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3006 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3008 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3009 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3010 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3011 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3012 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3013 unsigned short snum;
3014 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3015 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3017 tsec = current->security;
3018 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3020 if (family == PF_INET) {
3021 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3022 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3023 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3024 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3026 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3027 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3028 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3029 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3032 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3033 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3034 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3035 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3038 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3039 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3040 ad.u.net.family = family;
3041 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3043 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3048 switch(sk->sk_protocol) {
3050 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3054 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3058 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3062 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3066 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3067 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3068 ad.u.net.family = family;
3070 if (family == PF_INET)
3071 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3073 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3075 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3076 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3084 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3086 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3089 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3094 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3096 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3097 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3098 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3099 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3100 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3101 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3102 unsigned short snum;
3105 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3106 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3107 if (addrlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3109 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3111 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3112 if (addrlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
3114 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3117 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3118 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3122 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3123 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3124 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3125 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3126 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3135 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3137 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3140 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3143 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3144 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3146 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3150 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3152 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3153 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3154 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3155 newisec->initialized = 1;
3160 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3163 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3166 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3167 int size, int flags)
3169 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3172 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3174 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3177 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3179 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3182 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3184 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3187 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3190 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3193 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3195 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3198 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3199 struct socket *other,
3202 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3203 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3204 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3205 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3208 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3212 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3213 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3215 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3216 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3218 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3220 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3224 /* connecting socket */
3225 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3226 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3228 /* server child socket */
3229 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3230 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3235 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3236 struct socket *other)
3238 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3239 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3240 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3243 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3244 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3246 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3247 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3249 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3250 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3257 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3262 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3265 struct socket *sock;
3266 struct net_device *dev;
3267 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3269 family = sk->sk_family;
3270 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3273 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3274 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3277 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3278 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3280 struct inode *inode;
3281 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3283 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3284 isec = inode->i_security;
3285 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3286 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3289 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3297 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3301 switch (sock_class) {
3302 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3303 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3304 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3305 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3308 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3309 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3310 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3311 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3315 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3316 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3320 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3321 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3322 ad.u.net.family = family;
3324 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3328 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
3332 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3333 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3337 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
3344 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3345 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3346 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
3351 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3352 sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
3358 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3359 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3364 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3365 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3367 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3368 if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3373 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3375 err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3379 if (scontext_len > len) {
3384 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3388 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3396 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
3398 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3401 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3403 sk_free_security(sk);
3406 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3410 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3411 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3412 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3414 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3418 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3420 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3422 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3423 audit_log(current->audit_context, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3424 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3425 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3426 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3427 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3437 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3442 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3444 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3445 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3446 const struct net_device *in,
3447 const struct net_device *out,
3448 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3452 int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
3453 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3455 struct socket *sock;
3456 struct inode *inode;
3457 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3458 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3459 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3460 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3466 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3470 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3474 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3478 isec = inode->i_security;
3480 switch (isec->sclass) {
3481 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3482 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3483 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3484 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3487 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3488 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3489 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3490 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3494 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3495 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3500 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3501 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3502 ad.u.net.family = family;
3504 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
3505 &len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3506 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3509 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
3510 netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3511 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3514 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3515 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
3516 &node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3517 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3520 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
3521 node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3522 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3528 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3529 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3532 ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
3533 &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3534 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3537 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3538 send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3545 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3546 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3547 const struct net_device *in,
3548 const struct net_device *out,
3549 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3551 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3554 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3556 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3557 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3558 const struct net_device *in,
3559 const struct net_device *out,
3560 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3562 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3567 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3571 static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3576 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
3578 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3580 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3581 struct av_decision avd;
3584 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3588 tsec = current->security;
3591 avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
3592 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
3593 cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
3595 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3596 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3601 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
3603 if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
3608 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3609 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3612 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3613 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3615 isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3619 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct));
3620 isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
3621 isec->sclass = sclass;
3622 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3624 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3626 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3628 perm->security = isec;
3633 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3635 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3636 if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
3639 perm->security = NULL;
3643 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3645 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3647 msec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3651 memset(msec, 0, sizeof(struct msg_security_struct));
3652 msec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
3654 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3655 msg->security = msec;
3660 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3662 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3663 if (!msec || msec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
3666 msg->security = NULL;
3670 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3673 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3674 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3675 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3677 tsec = current->security;
3678 isec = ipc_perms->security;
3680 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3681 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3683 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3686 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3688 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3691 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3693 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3696 /* message queue security operations */
3697 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3699 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3700 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3701 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3704 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3708 tsec = current->security;
3709 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3711 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3712 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3714 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3717 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3723 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3725 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3728 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3730 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3731 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3732 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3734 tsec = current->security;
3735 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3737 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3738 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3740 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3741 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3744 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3752 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3753 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3756 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
3759 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
3762 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
3768 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
3772 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
3774 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3775 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3776 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3777 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3780 tsec = current->security;
3781 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3782 msec = msg->security;
3785 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
3787 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
3789 * Compute new sid based on current process and
3790 * message queue this message will be stored in
3792 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3800 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3801 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3803 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
3804 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3807 /* Can this process send the message */
3808 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3809 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
3811 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
3812 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
3813 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
3818 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3819 struct task_struct *target,
3820 long type, int mode)
3822 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3823 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3824 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3825 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3828 tsec = target->security;
3829 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3830 msec = msg->security;
3832 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3833 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3835 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
3836 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
3838 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3839 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
3843 /* Shared Memory security operations */
3844 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3846 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3847 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3848 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3851 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
3855 tsec = current->security;
3856 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3858 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3859 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3861 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3864 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3870 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3872 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3875 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3877 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3878 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3879 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3881 tsec = current->security;
3882 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3884 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3885 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3887 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3888 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3891 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
3892 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3900 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3901 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3904 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
3907 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
3914 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
3920 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3924 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
3925 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
3930 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
3934 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
3937 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
3939 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3942 /* Semaphore security operations */
3943 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3945 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3946 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3947 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3950 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
3954 tsec = current->security;
3955 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3957 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3958 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3960 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3963 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3969 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3971 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3974 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3976 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3977 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3978 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3980 tsec = current->security;
3981 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3983 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3984 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3986 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3987 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3990 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
3991 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3999 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4000 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4004 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4015 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4018 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4022 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4028 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4032 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4033 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4038 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4042 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4045 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4051 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4053 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4058 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4061 /* module stacking operations */
4062 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4064 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4065 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4066 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4070 secondary_ops = ops;
4072 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4079 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4081 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4082 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4083 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4087 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4092 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4095 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4098 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4099 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4101 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4107 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4117 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4119 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4121 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4122 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4123 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4124 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4131 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
4138 memcpy(value, context, len);
4143 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4144 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4146 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4152 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4153 security attributes. */
4158 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4159 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4160 * above restriction is ever removed.
4162 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4163 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4164 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4165 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4166 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4167 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4173 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4174 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4175 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4179 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4184 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4185 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4186 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4187 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4188 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4189 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4191 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4192 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4193 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4194 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4195 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4196 struct av_decision avd;
4201 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4202 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4203 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4204 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4205 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4206 do_each_thread(g, t)
4207 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4208 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4211 while_each_thread(g, t);
4212 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4215 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4216 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4217 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4221 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4222 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4224 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4225 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4227 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4231 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4232 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4246 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4247 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4248 .capget = selinux_capget,
4249 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4250 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4251 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4252 .capable = selinux_capable,
4253 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4254 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4255 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4256 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4258 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4259 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4261 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4262 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4263 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4264 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4265 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4266 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4267 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4269 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4270 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4271 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4272 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4273 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4274 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4275 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4277 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4278 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4279 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4280 .inode_post_create = selinux_inode_post_create,
4281 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4282 .inode_post_link = selinux_inode_post_link,
4283 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4284 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4285 .inode_post_symlink = selinux_inode_post_symlink,
4286 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4287 .inode_post_mkdir = selinux_inode_post_mkdir,
4288 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4289 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4290 .inode_post_mknod = selinux_inode_post_mknod,
4291 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4292 .inode_post_rename = selinux_inode_post_rename,
4293 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4294 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4295 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4296 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4297 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4298 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4299 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4300 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4301 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4302 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4303 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4304 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4305 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4307 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4308 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4309 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4310 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4311 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4312 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4313 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4314 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4315 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4316 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4317 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4319 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4320 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4321 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4322 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4323 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4324 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4325 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4326 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4327 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4328 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4329 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4330 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4331 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4332 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4333 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4334 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4335 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4336 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4337 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4339 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4341 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4342 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4344 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4345 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4346 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4347 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4348 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4349 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4351 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4352 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4353 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4354 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4355 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4357 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4358 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4359 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4360 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4361 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4363 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4364 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4366 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4368 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4369 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4371 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
4372 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4373 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4375 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4376 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4377 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4378 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4379 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4380 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4381 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4382 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4383 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4384 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4385 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4386 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4387 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4388 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4389 .socket_getpeersec = selinux_socket_getpeersec,
4390 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4391 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4395 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4397 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4399 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4400 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4404 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4406 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4407 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4408 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4409 tsec = current->security;
4410 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4414 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4416 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4417 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4418 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4420 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4421 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4423 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4428 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4430 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4432 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4433 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4434 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4436 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4437 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4438 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4439 struct superblock_security_struct,
4441 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4442 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4444 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4445 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4446 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4448 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4450 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4451 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4454 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4457 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4458 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4459 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4461 #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4463 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4464 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4465 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4467 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4468 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4471 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4473 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4474 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4475 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4477 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4478 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4483 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4487 if (!selinux_enabled)
4490 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4492 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4494 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4496 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4498 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4500 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4507 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4509 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4510 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4512 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4514 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4515 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4516 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4521 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4523 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4524 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4527 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4529 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4530 int selinux_disable(void)
4532 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4533 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4535 if (ss_initialized) {
4536 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4540 if (selinux_disabled) {
4541 /* Only do this once. */
4545 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4547 selinux_disabled = 1;
4549 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4550 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4552 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4553 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4555 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */