git.oblomov.eu Git - linux-2.6/blob - security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
   7  *            Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
   8  *            Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
   9  *            James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  10  *
  11  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  13  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  14  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  15  *  Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  16  *                     Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
  17  *
  18  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  19  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  20  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  21  */
  22
  23 #include <linux/module.h>
  24 #include <linux/init.h>
  25 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  26 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  27 #include <linux/errno.h>
  28 #include <linux/sched.h>
  29 #include <linux/security.h>
  30 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  31 #include <linux/capability.h>
  32 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  33 #include <linux/mm.h>
  34 #include <linux/mman.h>
  35 #include <linux/slab.h>
  36 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  37 #include <linux/swap.h>
  38 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
  39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  41 #include <linux/file.h>
  42 #include <linux/namei.h>
  43 #include <linux/mount.h>
  44 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
  45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  46 #include <linux/kd.h>
  47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  49 #include <linux/tty.h>
  50 #include <net/icmp.h>
  51 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
  52 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  53 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
  54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  57 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  60 #include <linux/udp.h>
  61 #include <linux/quota.h>
  62 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  63 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  64 #include <linux/parser.h>
  65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  66 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  68 #include <linux/personality.h>
  69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  70 #include <linux/audit.h>
  71 #include <linux/string.h>
  72 #include <linux/selinux.h>
  73 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  74
  75 #include "avc.h"
  76 #include "objsec.h"
  77 #include "netif.h"
  78 #include "xfrm.h"
  79 #include "selinux_netlabel.h"
  80
  81 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
  82 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
  83
  84 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
  85 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
  86 extern int selinux_compat_net;
  87
  88 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
  89 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
  90
  91 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
  92 {
  93         selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
  94         return 1;
  95 }
  96 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
  97 #endif
  98
  99 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 100 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 101
 102 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 103 {
 104         selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
 105         return 1;
 106 }
 107 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 108 #else
 109 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 110 #endif
 111
 112 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
 113 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
 114
 115 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
 116    just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
 117    The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
 118    module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
 119 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
 120
 121 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
 122    before the policy was loaded. */
 123 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 124 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 125
 126 static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
 127
 128 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
 129    length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
 130 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
 131 {
 132         char *context;
 133         unsigned len;
 134         int rc;
 135
 136         rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
 137         if (rc)
 138                 return rc;
 139
 140         if (!buffer || !size)
 141                 goto getsecurity_exit;
 142
 143         if (size < len) {
 144                 len = -ERANGE;
 145                 goto getsecurity_exit;
 146         }
 147         memcpy(buffer, context, len);
 148
 149 getsecurity_exit:
 150         kfree(context);
 151         return len;
 152 }
 153
 154 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 155
 156 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
 157 {
 158         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 159
 160         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 161         if (!tsec)
 162                 return -ENOMEM;
 163
 164         tsec->task = task;
 165         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 166         task->security = tsec;
 167
 168         return 0;
 169 }
 170
 171 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
 172 {
 173         struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
 174         task->security = NULL;
 175         kfree(tsec);
 176 }
 177
 178 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 179 {
 180         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 181         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 182
 183         isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
 184         if (!isec)
 185                 return -ENOMEM;
 186
 187         memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
 188         mutex_init(&isec->lock);
 189         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 190         isec->inode = inode;
 191         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 192         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
 193         isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
 194         inode->i_security = isec;
 195
 196         return 0;
 197 }
 198
 199 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 200 {
 201         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 202         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 203
 204         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 205         if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
 206                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 207         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 208
 209         inode->i_security = NULL;
 210         kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 211 }
 212
 213 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 214 {
 215         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 216         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 217
 218         fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 219         if (!fsec)
 220                 return -ENOMEM;
 221
 222         fsec->file = file;
 223         fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
 224         fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
 225         file->f_security = fsec;
 226
 227         return 0;
 228 }
 229
 230 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 231 {
 232         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 233         file->f_security = NULL;
 234         kfree(fsec);
 235 }
 236
 237 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 238 {
 239         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 240
 241         sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 242         if (!sbsec)
 243                 return -ENOMEM;
 244
 245         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 246         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
 247         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 248         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 249         sbsec->sb = sb;
 250         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 251         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 252         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 253         sb->s_security = sbsec;
 254
 255         return 0;
 256 }
 257
 258 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 259 {
 260         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 261
 262         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 263         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 264                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
 265         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 266
 267         sb->s_security = NULL;
 268         kfree(sbsec);
 269 }
 270
 271 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 272 {
 273         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 274
 275         ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
 276         if (!ssec)
 277                 return -ENOMEM;
 278
 279         ssec->sk = sk;
 280         ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 281         ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 282         sk->sk_security = ssec;
 283
 284         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
 285
 286         return 0;
 287 }
 288
 289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 290 {
 291         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
 292
 293         sk->sk_security = NULL;
 294         kfree(ssec);
 295 }
 296
 297 /* The security server must be initialized before
 298    any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
 299 extern int ss_initialized;
 300
 301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
 302
 303 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
 304         "uses xattr",
 305         "uses transition SIDs",
 306         "uses task SIDs",
 307         "uses genfs_contexts",
 308         "not configured for labeling",
 309         "uses mountpoint labeling",
 310 };
 311
 312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 313
 314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
 315 {
 316         return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 317 }
 318
 319 enum {
 320         Opt_context = 1,
 321         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 322         Opt_defcontext = 4,
 323         Opt_rootcontext = 8,
 324 };
 325
 326 static match_table_t tokens = {
 327         {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
 328         {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
 329         {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
 330         {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
 331 };
 332
 333 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 334
 335 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 336                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 337                         struct task_security_struct *tsec)
 338 {
 339         int rc;
 340
 341         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 342                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 343         if (rc)
 344                 return rc;
 345
 346         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 347                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 348         return rc;
 349 }
 350
 351 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 352                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 353                         struct task_security_struct *tsec)
 354 {
 355         int rc;
 356         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 357                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 358         if (rc)
 359                 return rc;
 360
 361         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 362                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 363         return rc;
 364 }
 365
 366 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 367 {
 368         char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
 369         char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
 370         const char *name;
 371         u32 sid;
 372         int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
 373         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 374         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 375
 376         if (!data)
 377                 goto out;
 378
 379         name = sb->s_type->name;
 380
 381         if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
 382
 383                 /* NFS we understand. */
 384                 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
 385                         struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
 386
 387                         if (d->version <  NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
 388                                 goto out;
 389
 390                         if (d->context[0]) {
 391                                 context = d->context;
 392                                 seen |= Opt_context;
 393                         }
 394                 } else
 395                         goto out;
 396
 397         } else {
 398                 /* Standard string-based options. */
 399                 char *p, *options = data;
 400
 401                 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
 402                         int token;
 403                         substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 404
 405                         if (!*p)
 406                                 continue;
 407
 408                         token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
 409
 410                         switch (token) {
 411                         case Opt_context:
 412                                 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
 413                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 414                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 415                                         goto out_free;
 416                                 }
 417                                 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 418                                 if (!context) {
 419                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 420                                         goto out_free;
 421                                 }
 422                                 if (!alloc)
 423                                         alloc = 1;
 424                                 seen |= Opt_context;
 425                                 break;
 426
 427                         case Opt_fscontext:
 428                                 if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
 429                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 430                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 431                                         goto out_free;
 432                                 }
 433                                 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 434                                 if (!fscontext) {
 435                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 436                                         goto out_free;
 437                                 }
 438                                 if (!alloc)
 439                                         alloc = 1;
 440                                 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
 441                                 break;
 442
 443                         case Opt_rootcontext:
 444                                 if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
 445                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 446                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 447                                         goto out_free;
 448                                 }
 449                                 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 450                                 if (!rootcontext) {
 451                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 452                                         goto out_free;
 453                                 }
 454                                 if (!alloc)
 455                                         alloc = 1;
 456                                 seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
 457                                 break;
 458
 459                         case Opt_defcontext:
 460                                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 461                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 462                                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  "
 463                                                "defcontext option is invalid "
 464                                                "for this filesystem type\n");
 465                                         goto out_free;
 466                                 }
 467                                 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
 468                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 469                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 470                                         goto out_free;
 471                                 }
 472                                 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 473                                 if (!defcontext) {
 474                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 475                                         goto out_free;
 476                                 }
 477                                 if (!alloc)
 478                                         alloc = 1;
 479                                 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
 480                                 break;
 481
 482                         default:
 483                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 484                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount "
 485                                        "option\n");
 486                                 goto out_free;
 487
 488                         }
 489                 }
 490         }
 491
 492         if (!seen)
 493                 goto out;
 494
 495         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 496         if (fscontext) {
 497                 rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
 498                 if (rc) {
 499                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 500                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 501                                fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 502                         goto out_free;
 503                 }
 504
 505                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 506                 if (rc)
 507                         goto out_free;
 508
 509                 sbsec->sid = sid;
 510         }
 511
 512         /*
 513          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 514          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 515          * the superblock context if not already set.
 516          */
 517         if (context) {
 518                 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
 519                 if (rc) {
 520                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 521                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 522                                context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 523                         goto out_free;
 524                 }
 525
 526                 if (!fscontext) {
 527                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 528                         if (rc)
 529                                 goto out_free;
 530                         sbsec->sid = sid;
 531                 } else {
 532                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 533                         if (rc)
 534                                 goto out_free;
 535                 }
 536                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 537
 538                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 539         }
 540
 541         if (rootcontext) {
 542                 struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
 543                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 544                 rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
 545                 if (rc) {
 546                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 547                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 548                                rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 549                         goto out_free;
 550                 }
 551
 552                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 553                 if (rc)
 554                         goto out_free;
 555
 556                 isec->sid = sid;
 557                 isec->initialized = 1;
 558         }
 559
 560         if (defcontext) {
 561                 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
 562                 if (rc) {
 563                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 564                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 565                                defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 566                         goto out_free;
 567                 }
 568
 569                 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
 570                         goto out_free;
 571
 572                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 573                 if (rc)
 574                         goto out_free;
 575
 576                 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
 577         }
 578
 579 out_free:
 580         if (alloc) {
 581                 kfree(context);
 582                 kfree(defcontext);
 583                 kfree(fscontext);
 584                 kfree(rootcontext);
 585         }
 586 out:
 587         return rc;
 588 }
 589
 590 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 591 {
 592         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 593         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 594         struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
 595         int rc = 0;
 596
 597         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 598         if (sbsec->initialized)
 599                 goto out;
 600
 601         if (!ss_initialized) {
 602                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 603                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 604                    server is ready to handle calls. */
 605                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 606                 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 607                         list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 608                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 609                 goto out;
 610         }
 611
 612         /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
 613         rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 614         if (rc) {
 615                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 616                        __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 617                 goto out;
 618         }
 619
 620         rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
 621         if (rc)
 622                 goto out;
 623
 624         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 625                 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 626                    error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 627                    the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 628                    the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 629                    assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 630                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 631                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
 632                                "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 633                         rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 634                         goto out;
 635                 }
 636                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 637                 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 638                         if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 639                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 640                                        "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 641                                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 642                         else
 643                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 644                                        "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
 645                                        sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 646                         goto out;
 647                 }
 648         }
 649
 650         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 651                 sbsec->proc = 1;
 652
 653         sbsec->initialized = 1;
 654
 655         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
 656                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
 657                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 658         }
 659         else {
 660                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
 661                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 662                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 663         }
 664
 665         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 666         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
 667
 668         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 669            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 670            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 671            populates itself. */
 672         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 673 next_inode:
 674         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 675                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 676                                 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
 677                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 678                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 679                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 680                 inode = igrab(inode);
 681                 if (inode) {
 682                         if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
 683                                 inode_doinit(inode);
 684                         iput(inode);
 685                 }
 686                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 687                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 688                 goto next_inode;
 689         }
 690         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 691 out:
 692         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 693         return rc;
 694 }
 695
 696 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
 697 {
 698         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 699         case S_IFSOCK:
 700                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
 701         case S_IFLNK:
 702                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
 703         case S_IFREG:
 704                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
 705         case S_IFBLK:
 706                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
 707         case S_IFDIR:
 708                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
 709         case S_IFCHR:
 710                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
 711         case S_IFIFO:
 712                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
 713
 714         }
 715
 716         return SECCLASS_FILE;
 717 }
 718
 719 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
 720 {
 721         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
 722 }
 723
 724 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
 725 {
 726         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
 727 }
 728
 729 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
 730 {
 731         switch (family) {
 732         case PF_UNIX:
 733                 switch (type) {
 734                 case SOCK_STREAM:
 735                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
 736                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
 737                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
 738                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
 739                 }
 740                 break;
 741         case PF_INET:
 742         case PF_INET6:
 743                 switch (type) {
 744                 case SOCK_STREAM:
 745                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
 746                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
 747                         else
 748                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 749                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
 750                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
 751                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
 752                         else
 753                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 754                 default:
 755                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 756                 }
 757                 break;
 758         case PF_NETLINK:
 759                 switch (protocol) {
 760                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
 761                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
 762                 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
 763                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
 764                 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
 765                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
 766                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
 767                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
 768                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
 769                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
 770                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
 771                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
 772                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
 773                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
 774                 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
 775                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
 776                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
 777                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
 778                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
 779                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
 780                 default:
 781                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
 782                 }
 783         case PF_PACKET:
 784                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
 785         case PF_KEY:
 786                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
 787         case PF_APPLETALK:
 788                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
 789         }
 790
 791         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
 792 }
 793
 794 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 795 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
 796                                 u16 tclass,
 797                                 u32 *sid)
 798 {
 799         int buflen, rc;
 800         char *buffer, *path, *end;
 801
 802         buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 803         if (!buffer)
 804                 return -ENOMEM;
 805
 806         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
 807         end = buffer+buflen;
 808         *--end = '\0';
 809         buflen--;
 810         path = end-1;
 811         *path = '/';
 812         while (de && de != de->parent) {
 813                 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
 814                 if (buflen < 0)
 815                         break;
 816                 end -= de->namelen;
 817                 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
 818                 *--end = '/';
 819                 path = end;
 820                 de = de->parent;
 821         }
 822         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
 823         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
 824         return rc;
 825 }
 826 #else
 827 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
 828                                 u16 tclass,
 829                                 u32 *sid)
 830 {
 831         return -EINVAL;
 832 }
 833 #endif
 834
 835 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
 836 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
 837 {
 838         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
 839         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 840         u32 sid;
 841         struct dentry *dentry;
 842 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
 843         char *context = NULL;
 844         unsigned len = 0;
 845         int rc = 0;
 846
 847         if (isec->initialized)
 848                 goto out;
 849
 850         mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
 851         if (isec->initialized)
 852                 goto out_unlock;
 853
 854         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 855         if (!sbsec->initialized) {
 856                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 857                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 858                    server is ready to handle calls. */
 859                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 860                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
 861                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
 862                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 863                 goto out_unlock;
 864         }
 865
 866         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
 867         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
 868                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 869                         isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 870                         break;
 871                 }
 872
 873                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
 874                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
 875                 if (opt_dentry) {
 876                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
 877                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
 878                 } else {
 879                         /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
 880                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
 881                 }
 882                 if (!dentry) {
 883                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
 884                                "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
 885                                inode->i_ino);
 886                         goto out_unlock;
 887                 }
 888
 889                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
 890                 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
 891                 if (!context) {
 892                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 893                         dput(dentry);
 894                         goto out_unlock;
 895                 }
 896                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 897                                            context, len);
 898                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
 899                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
 900                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 901                                                    NULL, 0);
 902                         if (rc < 0) {
 903                                 dput(dentry);
 904                                 goto out_unlock;
 905                         }
 906                         kfree(context);
 907                         len = rc;
 908                         context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
 909                         if (!context) {
 910                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 911                                 dput(dentry);
 912                                 goto out_unlock;
 913                         }
 914                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
 915                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 916                                                    context, len);
 917                 }
 918                 dput(dentry);
 919                 if (rc < 0) {
 920                         if (rc != -ENODATA) {
 921                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  getxattr returned "
 922                                        "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
 923                                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 924                                 kfree(context);
 925                                 goto out_unlock;
 926                         }
 927                         /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
 928                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 929                         rc = 0;
 930                 } else {
 931                         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
 932                                                              sbsec->def_sid);
 933                         if (rc) {
 934                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
 935                                        "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
 936                                        __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
 937                                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 938                                 kfree(context);
 939                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
 940                                 rc = 0;
 941                                 break;
 942                         }
 943                 }
 944                 kfree(context);
 945                 isec->sid = sid;
 946                 break;
 947         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
 948                 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
 949                 break;
 950         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
 951                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
 952                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 953
 954                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
 955                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 956                 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
 957                                              sbsec->sid,
 958                                              isec->sclass,
 959                                              &sid);
 960                 if (rc)
 961                         goto out_unlock;
 962                 isec->sid = sid;
 963                 break;
 964         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
 965                 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 966                 break;
 967         default:
 968                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
 969                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 970
 971                 if (sbsec->proc) {
 972                         struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
 973                         if (proci->pde) {
 974                                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 975                                 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
 976                                                           isec->sclass,
 977                                                           &sid);
 978                                 if (rc)
 979                                         goto out_unlock;
 980                                 isec->sid = sid;
 981                         }
 982                 }
 983                 break;
 984         }
 985
 986         isec->initialized = 1;
 987
 988 out_unlock:
 989         mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
 990 out:
 991         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
 992                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 993         return rc;
 994 }
 995
 996 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
 997 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
 998 {
 999         u32 perm = 0;
1000
1001         switch (sig) {
1002         case SIGCHLD:
1003                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1004                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1005                 break;
1006         case SIGKILL:
1007                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1008                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1009                 break;
1010         case SIGSTOP:
1011                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1012                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1013                 break;
1014         default:
1015                 /* All other signals. */
1016                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1017                 break;
1018         }
1019
1020         return perm;
1021 }
1022
1023 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1024    fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1025 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1026                          struct task_struct *tsk2,
1027                          u32 perms)
1028 {
1029         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1030
1031         tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1032         tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1033         return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1034                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1035 }
1036
1037 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1038 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1039                                int cap)
1040 {
1041         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1042         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1043
1044         tsec = tsk->security;
1045
1046         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
1047         ad.tsk = tsk;
1048         ad.u.cap = cap;
1049
1050         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1051                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
1052 }
1053
1054 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1055 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1056                            u32 perms)
1057 {
1058         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1059
1060         tsec = tsk->security;
1061
1062         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1063                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1064 }
1065
1066 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1067    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1068    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1069 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1070                           struct inode *inode,
1071                           u32 perms,
1072                           struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1073 {
1074         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1075         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1076         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1077
1078         tsec = tsk->security;
1079         isec = inode->i_security;
1080
1081         if (!adp) {
1082                 adp = &ad;
1083                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1084                 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1085         }
1086
1087         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1088 }
1089
1090 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1091    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1092    pathname if needed. */
1093 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1094                                   struct vfsmount *mnt,
1095                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1096                                   u32 av)
1097 {
1098         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1099         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1100         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1101         ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1102         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1103         return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1104 }
1105
1106 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1107    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1108    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1109    check a particular permission to the file.
1110    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1111    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1112    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1113    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1114 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1115                                 struct file *file,
1116                                 u32 av)
1117 {
1118         struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1119         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1120         struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1121         struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1122         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1123         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1124         int rc;
1125
1126         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1127         ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1128         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1129
1130         if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1131                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1132                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1133                                   FD__USE,
1134                                   &ad);
1135                 if (rc)
1136                         return rc;
1137         }
1138
1139         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1140         if (av)
1141                 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1142
1143         return 0;
1144 }
1145
1146 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1147 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1148                       struct dentry *dentry,
1149                       u16 tclass)
1150 {
1151         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1152         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1153         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1154         u32 newsid;
1155         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1156         int rc;
1157
1158         tsec = current->security;
1159         dsec = dir->i_security;
1160         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1161
1162         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1163         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1164
1165         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1166                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1167                           &ad);
1168         if (rc)
1169                 return rc;
1170
1171         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1172                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1173         } else {
1174                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1175                                              &newsid);
1176                 if (rc)
1177                         return rc;
1178         }
1179
1180         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1181         if (rc)
1182                 return rc;
1183
1184         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1185                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1186                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1187 }
1188
1189 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1190 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1191                           struct task_struct *ctx)
1192 {
1193         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1194
1195         tsec = ctx->security;
1196
1197         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1198 }
1199
1200 #define MAY_LINK   0
1201 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1202 #define MAY_RMDIR  2
1203
1204 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1205 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1206                     struct dentry *dentry,
1207                     int kind)
1208
1209 {
1210         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1211         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1212         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1213         u32 av;
1214         int rc;
1215
1216         tsec = current->security;
1217         dsec = dir->i_security;
1218         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1219
1220         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1221         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1222
1223         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1224         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1225         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1226         if (rc)
1227                 return rc;
1228
1229         switch (kind) {
1230         case MAY_LINK:
1231                 av = FILE__LINK;
1232                 break;
1233         case MAY_UNLINK:
1234                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1235                 break;
1236         case MAY_RMDIR:
1237                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1238                 break;
1239         default:
1240                 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link:  unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1241                 return 0;
1242         }
1243
1244         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1245         return rc;
1246 }
1247
1248 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1249                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1250                              struct inode *new_dir,
1251                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1252 {
1253         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1254         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1255         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1256         u32 av;
1257         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1258         int rc;
1259
1260         tsec = current->security;
1261         old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1262         old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1263         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1264         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1265
1266         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1267
1268         ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1269         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1270                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1271         if (rc)
1272                 return rc;
1273         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1274                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1275         if (rc)
1276                 return rc;
1277         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1278                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1279                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1280                 if (rc)
1281                         return rc;
1282         }
1283
1284         ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1285         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1286         if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1287                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1288         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1289         if (rc)
1290                 return rc;
1291         if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1292                 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1293                 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1294                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1295                                   new_isec->sclass,
1296                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1297                 if (rc)
1298                         return rc;
1299         }
1300
1301         return 0;
1302 }
1303
1304 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1305 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1306                                struct super_block *sb,
1307                                u32 perms,
1308                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1309 {
1310         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1311         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1312
1313         tsec = tsk->security;
1314         sbsec = sb->s_security;
1315         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1316                             perms, ad);
1317 }
1318
1319 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1320 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1321 {
1322         u32 av = 0;
1323
1324         if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1325                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1326                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1327                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1328                         av |= FILE__READ;
1329
1330                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1331                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1332                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1333                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1334
1335         } else {
1336                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1337                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1338                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1339                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1340                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1341                         av |= DIR__READ;
1342         }
1343
1344         return av;
1345 }
1346
1347 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1348 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1349 {
1350         u32 av = 0;
1351
1352         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1353                 av |= FILE__READ;
1354         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1355                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1356                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1357                 else
1358                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1359         }
1360
1361         return av;
1362 }
1363
1364 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1365
1366 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1367 {
1368         struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1369         struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1370         int rc;
1371
1372         rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1373         if (rc)
1374                 return rc;
1375
1376         rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1377         /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1378         if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1379                 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1380         return rc;
1381 }
1382
1383 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1384                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1385 {
1386         int error;
1387
1388         error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1389         if (error)
1390                 return error;
1391
1392         return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1393 }
1394
1395 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1396                                 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1397 {
1398         int error;
1399
1400         error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1401         if (error)
1402                 return error;
1403
1404         return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1405 }
1406
1407 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1408                                kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1409 {
1410         secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1411 }
1412
1413 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1414 {
1415         int rc;
1416
1417         rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1418         if (rc)
1419                 return rc;
1420
1421         return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1422 }
1423
1424 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1425 {
1426         int error = 0;
1427         u32 av;
1428         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1429         u32 tsid;
1430         int rc;
1431
1432         rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1433         if (rc)
1434                 return rc;
1435
1436         tsec = current->security;
1437
1438         rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1439                                   SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1440         if (rc) {
1441                 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1442                 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1443         }
1444
1445         /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1446          * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1447         if(op == 001) {
1448                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1449                                      SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1450         } else {
1451                 av = 0;
1452                 if (op & 004)
1453                         av |= FILE__READ;
1454                 if (op & 002)
1455                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1456                 if (av)
1457                         error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1458                                              SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1459         }
1460
1461         return error;
1462 }
1463
1464 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1465 {
1466         int rc = 0;
1467
1468         if (!sb)
1469                 return 0;
1470
1471         switch (cmds) {
1472                 case Q_SYNC:
1473                 case Q_QUOTAON:
1474                 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1475                 case Q_SETINFO:
1476                 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1477                         rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1478                                                  sb,
1479                                                  FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1480                         break;
1481                 case Q_GETFMT:
1482                 case Q_GETINFO:
1483                 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1484                         rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1485                                                  sb,
1486                                                  FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1487                         break;
1488                 default:
1489                         rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1490                         break;
1491         }
1492         return rc;
1493 }
1494
1495 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1496 {
1497         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1498 }
1499
1500 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1501 {
1502         int rc;
1503
1504         rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1505         if (rc)
1506                 return rc;
1507
1508         switch (type) {
1509                 case 3:         /* Read last kernel messages */
1510                 case 10:        /* Return size of the log buffer */
1511                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1512                         break;
1513                 case 6:         /* Disable logging to console */
1514                 case 7:         /* Enable logging to console */
1515                 case 8:         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1516                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1517                         break;
1518                 case 0:         /* Close log */
1519                 case 1:         /* Open log */
1520                 case 2:         /* Read from log */
1521                 case 4:         /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1522                 case 5:         /* Clear ring buffer */
1523                 default:
1524                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1525                         break;
1526         }
1527         return rc;
1528 }
1529
1530 /*
1531  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1532  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1533  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1534  *
1535  * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1536  * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1537  * the capability is granted.
1538  *
1539  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1540  * processes that allocate mappings.
1541  */
1542 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1543 {
1544         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1545         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1546
1547         rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1548         if (rc == 0)
1549                 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1550                                         SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1551                                         CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1552                                         NULL);
1553
1554         if (rc == 0)
1555                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1556
1557         return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1558 }
1559
1560 /* binprm security operations */
1561
1562 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1563 {
1564         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1565
1566         bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1567         if (!bsec)
1568                 return -ENOMEM;
1569
1570         bsec->bprm = bprm;
1571         bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1572         bsec->set = 0;
1573
1574         bprm->security = bsec;
1575         return 0;
1576 }
1577
1578 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1579 {
1580         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1581         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1582         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1583         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1584         u32 newsid;
1585         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1586         int rc;
1587
1588         rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1589         if (rc)
1590                 return rc;
1591
1592         bsec = bprm->security;
1593
1594         if (bsec->set)
1595                 return 0;
1596
1597         tsec = current->security;
1598         isec = inode->i_security;
1599
1600         /* Default to the current task SID. */
1601         bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1602
1603         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1604         tsec->create_sid = 0;
1605         tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1606         tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1607
1608         if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1609                 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1610                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1611                 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1612         } else {
1613                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1614                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1615                                              SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1616                 if (rc)
1617                         return rc;
1618         }
1619
1620         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1621         ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1622         ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1623
1624         if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1625                 newsid = tsec->sid;
1626
1627         if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1628                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1629                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1630                 if (rc)
1631                         return rc;
1632         } else {
1633                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1634                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1635                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1636                 if (rc)
1637                         return rc;
1638
1639                 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1640                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1641                 if (rc)
1642                         return rc;
1643
1644                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1645                 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1646
1647                 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1648                 bsec->sid = newsid;
1649         }
1650
1651         bsec->set = 1;
1652         return 0;
1653 }
1654
1655 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1656 {
1657         return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1658 }
1659
1660
1661 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1662 {
1663         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1664         int atsecure = 0;
1665
1666         if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1667                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1668                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
1669                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1670                 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1671                                          SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1672                                          PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1673         }
1674
1675         return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1676 }
1677
1678 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1679 {
1680         kfree(bprm->security);
1681         bprm->security = NULL;
1682 }
1683
1684 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1685 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1686
1687 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1688 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1689 {
1690         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1691         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1692         struct tty_struct *tty;
1693         struct fdtable *fdt;
1694         long j = -1;
1695
1696         mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1697         tty = current->signal->tty;
1698         if (tty) {
1699                 file_list_lock();
1700                 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1701                 if (file) {
1702                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1703                            Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1704                            than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1705                            file may belong to another process and we are only
1706                            interested in the inode-based check here. */
1707                         struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1708                         if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1709                                            FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1710                                 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1711                                 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1712                                 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1713                         }
1714                 }
1715                 file_list_unlock();
1716         }
1717         mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1718
1719         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1720
1721         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1722
1723         spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1724         for (;;) {
1725                 unsigned long set, i;
1726                 int fd;
1727
1728                 j++;
1729                 i = j * __NFDBITS;
1730                 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1731                 if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
1732                         break;
1733                 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1734                 if (!set)
1735                         continue;
1736                 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1737                 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1738                         if (set & 1) {
1739                                 file = fget(i);
1740                                 if (!file)
1741                                         continue;
1742                                 if (file_has_perm(current,
1743                                                   file,
1744                                                   file_to_av(file))) {
1745                                         sys_close(i);
1746                                         fd = get_unused_fd();
1747                                         if (fd != i) {
1748                                                 if (fd >= 0)
1749                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
1750                                                 fput(file);
1751                                                 continue;
1752                                         }
1753                                         if (devnull) {
1754                                                 get_file(devnull);
1755                                         } else {
1756                                                 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1757                                                 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
1758                                                         devnull = NULL;
1759                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
1760                                                         fput(file);
1761                                                         continue;
1762                                                 }
1763                                         }
1764                                         fd_install(fd, devnull);
1765                                 }
1766                                 fput(file);
1767                         }
1768                 }
1769                 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1770
1771         }
1772         spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1773 }
1774
1775 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1776 {
1777         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1778         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1779         u32 sid;
1780         int rc;
1781
1782         secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1783
1784         tsec = current->security;
1785
1786         bsec = bprm->security;
1787         sid = bsec->sid;
1788
1789         tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1790         bsec->unsafe = 0;
1791         if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1792                 /* Check for shared state.  If not ok, leave SID
1793                    unchanged and kill. */
1794                 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1795                         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1796                                         PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1797                         if (rc) {
1798                                 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1799                                 return;
1800                         }
1801                 }
1802
1803                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1804                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1805                 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1806                         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1807                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1808                                           NULL);
1809                         if (rc) {
1810                                 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1811                                 return;
1812                         }
1813                 }
1814                 tsec->sid = sid;
1815         }
1816 }
1817
1818 /*
1819  * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1820  */
1821 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1822 {
1823         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1824         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1825         struct itimerval itimer;
1826         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1827         int rc, i;
1828
1829         tsec = current->security;
1830         bsec = bprm->security;
1831
1832         if (bsec->unsafe) {
1833                 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1834                 return;
1835         }
1836         if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1837                 return;
1838
1839         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1840         flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1841
1842         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1843            from the old SID.  If not, clear itimers to avoid
1844            subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1845            signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1846           been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1847           will be checked against the new SID. */
1848         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1849                           PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1850         if (rc) {
1851                 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1852                 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1853                         do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1854                 flush_signals(current);
1855                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1856                 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1857                 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
1858                 recalc_sigpending();
1859                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1860         }
1861
1862         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1863            from the old SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to
1864            the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1865            task's soft limit.  Note that the setting of hard limits
1866            (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1867            check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1868            the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1869            than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1870            is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1871            RLIMIT_STACK.*/
1872         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1873                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1874         if (rc) {
1875                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1876                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1877                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1878                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1879                 }
1880                 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1881                         /*
1882                          * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1883                          * to be refigured.
1884                          */
1885                         current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1886                 }
1887         }
1888
1889         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1890            recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1891         wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1892 }
1893
1894 /* superblock security operations */
1895
1896 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1897 {
1898         return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1899 }
1900
1901 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1902 {
1903         superblock_free_security(sb);
1904 }
1905
1906 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1907 {
1908         if (plen > olen)
1909                 return 0;
1910
1911         return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1912 }
1913
1914 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1915 {
1916         return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1917                 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1918                 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1919                 match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
1920 }
1921
1922 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1923 {
1924         if (!*first) {
1925                 **to = ',';
1926                 *to += 1;
1927         } else
1928                 *first = 0;
1929         memcpy(*to, from, len);
1930         *to += len;
1931 }
1932
1933 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
1934                                        int len)
1935 {
1936         int current_size = 0;
1937
1938         if (!*first) {
1939                 **to = '|';
1940                 *to += 1;
1941         }
1942         else
1943                 *first = 0;
1944
1945         while (current_size < len) {
1946                 if (*from != '"') {
1947                         **to = *from;
1948                         *to += 1;
1949                 }
1950                 from += 1;
1951                 current_size += 1;
1952         }
1953 }
1954
1955 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1956 {
1957         int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1958         char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1959         char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1960         int open_quote = 0;
1961
1962         in_curr = orig;
1963         sec_curr = copy;
1964
1965         /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1966         if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1967                 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1968                 goto out;
1969         }
1970
1971         nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1972         if (!nosec) {
1973                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1974                 goto out;
1975         }
1976
1977         nosec_save = nosec;
1978         fnosec = fsec = 1;
1979         in_save = in_end = orig;
1980
1981         do {
1982                 if (*in_end == '"')
1983                         open_quote = !open_quote;
1984                 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
1985                                 *in_end == '\0') {
1986                         int len = in_end - in_curr;
1987
1988                         if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1989                                 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1990                         else
1991                                 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1992
1993                         in_curr = in_end + 1;
1994                 }
1995         } while (*in_end++);
1996
1997         strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
1998         free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1999 out:
2000         return rc;
2001 }
2002
2003 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2004 {
2005         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2006         int rc;
2007
2008         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2009         if (rc)
2010                 return rc;
2011
2012         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2013         ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
2014         return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2015 }
2016
2017 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2018 {
2019         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2020
2021         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2022         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2023         return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2024 }
2025
2026 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
2027                          struct nameidata *nd,
2028                          char * type,
2029                          unsigned long flags,
2030                          void * data)
2031 {
2032         int rc;
2033
2034         rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
2035         if (rc)
2036                 return rc;
2037
2038         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2039                 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
2040                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2041         else
2042                 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
2043                                        FILE__MOUNTON);
2044 }
2045
2046 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2047 {
2048         int rc;
2049
2050         rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2051         if (rc)
2052                 return rc;
2053
2054         return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2055                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2056 }
2057
2058 /* inode security operations */
2059
2060 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2061 {
2062         return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2063 }
2064
2065 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2066 {
2067         inode_free_security(inode);
2068 }
2069
2070 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2071                                        char **name, void **value,
2072                                        size_t *len)
2073 {
2074         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2075         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2076         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2077         u32 newsid, clen;
2078         int rc;
2079         char *namep = NULL, *context;
2080
2081         tsec = current->security;
2082         dsec = dir->i_security;
2083         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2084
2085         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2086                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2087         } else {
2088                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2089                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2090                                              &newsid);
2091                 if (rc) {
2092                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
2093                                "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2094                                "ino=%ld)\n",
2095                                __FUNCTION__,
2096                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2097                         return rc;
2098                 }
2099         }
2100
2101         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2102         if (sbsec->initialized) {
2103                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2104                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2105                 isec->sid = newsid;
2106                 isec->initialized = 1;
2107         }
2108
2109         if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2110                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2111
2112         if (name) {
2113                 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2114                 if (!namep)
2115                         return -ENOMEM;
2116                 *name = namep;
2117         }
2118
2119         if (value && len) {
2120                 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2121                 if (rc) {
2122                         kfree(namep);
2123                         return rc;
2124                 }
2125                 *value = context;
2126                 *len = clen;
2127         }
2128
2129         return 0;
2130 }
2131
2132 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2133 {
2134         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2135 }
2136
2137 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2138 {
2139         int rc;
2140
2141         rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2142         if (rc)
2143                 return rc;
2144         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2145 }
2146
2147 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2148 {
2149         int rc;
2150
2151         rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2152         if (rc)
2153                 return rc;
2154         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2155 }
2156
2157 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2158 {
2159         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2160 }
2161
2162 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2163 {
2164         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2165 }
2166
2167 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2168 {
2169         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2170 }
2171
2172 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2173 {
2174         int rc;
2175
2176         rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2177         if (rc)
2178                 return rc;
2179
2180         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2181 }
2182
2183 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2184                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2185 {
2186         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2187 }
2188
2189 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2190 {
2191         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2192 }
2193
2194 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2195 {
2196         int rc;
2197
2198         rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2199         if (rc)
2200                 return rc;
2201         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2202 }
2203
2204 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2205                                     struct nameidata *nd)
2206 {
2207         int rc;
2208
2209         rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2210         if (rc)
2211                 return rc;
2212
2213         if (!mask) {
2214                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2215                 return 0;
2216         }
2217
2218         return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2219                                file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2220 }
2221
2222 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2223 {
2224         int rc;
2225
2226         rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2227         if (rc)
2228                 return rc;
2229
2230         if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2231                 return 0;
2232
2233         if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2234                                ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2235                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2236
2237         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2238 }
2239
2240 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2241 {
2242         return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2243 }
2244
2245 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2246 {
2247         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2248         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2249         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2250         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2251         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2252         u32 newsid;
2253         int rc = 0;
2254
2255         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2256                 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2257                              sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2258                     !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2259                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2260                            Restrict to administrator. */
2261                         return -EPERM;
2262                 }
2263
2264                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2265                    ordinary setattr permission. */
2266                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2267         }
2268
2269         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2270         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2271                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2272
2273         if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2274                 return -EPERM;
2275
2276         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2277         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2278
2279         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2280                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2281         if (rc)
2282                 return rc;
2283
2284         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2285         if (rc)
2286                 return rc;
2287
2288         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2289                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2290         if (rc)
2291                 return rc;
2292
2293         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2294                                           isec->sclass);
2295         if (rc)
2296                 return rc;
2297
2298         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2299                             sbsec->sid,
2300                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2301                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2302                             &ad);
2303 }
2304
2305 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2306                                         void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2307 {
2308         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2309         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2310         u32 newsid;
2311         int rc;
2312
2313         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2314                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2315                 return;
2316         }
2317
2318         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2319         if (rc) {
2320                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  unable to obtain SID for context "
2321                        "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2322                 return;
2323         }
2324
2325         isec->sid = newsid;
2326         return;
2327 }
2328
2329 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2330 {
2331         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2332 }
2333
2334 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2335 {
2336         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2337 }
2338
2339 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2340 {
2341         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2342                 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2343                              sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2344                     !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2345                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2346                            Restrict to administrator. */
2347                         return -EPERM;
2348                 }
2349
2350                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2351                    ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2352                    permission for removexattr. */
2353                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2354         }
2355
2356         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2357            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2358         return -EACCES;
2359 }
2360
2361 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2362 {
2363       return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2364 }
2365
2366 /*
2367  * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user.  If the
2368  * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2369  * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2370  *
2371  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2372  */
2373 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2374 {
2375         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2376
2377         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2378                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2379
2380         return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2381 }
2382
2383 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2384                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2385 {
2386         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2387         u32 newsid;
2388         int rc;
2389
2390         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2391                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2392
2393         if (!value || !size)
2394                 return -EACCES;
2395
2396         rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2397         if (rc)
2398                 return rc;
2399
2400         isec->sid = newsid;
2401         return 0;
2402 }
2403
2404 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2405 {
2406         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2407         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2408                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2409         return len;
2410 }
2411
2412 /* file security operations */
2413
2414 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2415 {
2416         int rc;
2417         struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2418
2419         if (!mask) {
2420                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2421                 return 0;
2422         }
2423
2424         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2425         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2426                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2427
2428         rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2429                            file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2430         if (rc)
2431                 return rc;
2432
2433         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2434 }
2435
2436 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2437 {
2438         return file_alloc_security(file);
2439 }
2440
2441 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2442 {
2443         file_free_security(file);
2444 }
2445
2446 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2447                               unsigned long arg)
2448 {
2449         int error = 0;
2450
2451         switch (cmd) {
2452                 case FIONREAD:
2453                 /* fall through */
2454                 case FIBMAP:
2455                 /* fall through */
2456                 case FIGETBSZ:
2457                 /* fall through */
2458                 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2459                 /* fall through */
2460                 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2461                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2462                         break;
2463
2464                 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2465                 /* fall through */
2466                 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2467                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2468                         break;
2469
2470                 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2471                 case FIONBIO:
2472                 /* fall through */
2473                 case FIOASYNC:
2474                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2475                         break;
2476
2477                 case KDSKBENT:
2478                 case KDSKBSENT:
2479                         error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2480                         break;
2481
2482                 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2483                  * to the file's ioctl() function.
2484                  */
2485                 default:
2486                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2487
2488         }
2489         return error;
2490 }
2491
2492 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2493 {
2494 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2495         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2496                 /*
2497                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2498                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2499                  * This has an additional check.
2500                  */
2501                 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2502                 if (rc)
2503                         return rc;
2504         }
2505 #endif
2506
2507         if (file) {
2508                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2509                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2510
2511                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2512                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2513                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
2514
2515                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2516                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2517
2518                 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2519         }
2520         return 0;
2521 }
2522
2523 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2524                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2525 {
2526         int rc;
2527
2528         rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2529         if (rc)
2530                 return rc;
2531
2532         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2533                 prot = reqprot;
2534
2535         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2536                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2537 }
2538
2539 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2540                                  unsigned long reqprot,
2541                                  unsigned long prot)
2542 {
2543         int rc;
2544
2545         rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2546         if (rc)
2547                 return rc;
2548
2549         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2550                 prot = reqprot;
2551
2552 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2553         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2554                 rc = 0;
2555                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2556                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2557                         rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2558                                            PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2559                 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2560                            vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2561                            vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2562                         rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2563                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2564                         /*
2565                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2566                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2567                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2568                          * modified content.  This typically should only
2569                          * occur for text relocations.
2570                          */
2571                         rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2572                                            FILE__EXECMOD);
2573                 }
2574                 if (rc)
2575                         return rc;
2576         }
2577 #endif
2578
2579         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2580 }
2581
2582 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2583 {
2584         return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2585 }
2586
2587 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2588                               unsigned long arg)
2589 {
2590         int err = 0;
2591
2592         switch (cmd) {
2593                 case F_SETFL:
2594                         if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2595                                 err = -EINVAL;
2596                                 break;
2597                         }
2598
2599                         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2600                                 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2601                                 break;
2602                         }
2603                         /* fall through */
2604                 case F_SETOWN:
2605                 case F_SETSIG:
2606                 case F_GETFL:
2607                 case F_GETOWN:
2608                 case F_GETSIG:
2609                         /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2610                         err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2611                         break;
2612                 case F_GETLK:
2613                 case F_SETLK:
2614                 case F_SETLKW:
2615 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2616                 case F_GETLK64:
2617                 case F_SETLK64:
2618                 case F_SETLKW64:
2619 #endif
2620                         if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2621                                 err = -EINVAL;
2622                                 break;
2623                         }
2624                         err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2625                         break;
2626         }
2627
2628         return err;
2629 }
2630
2631 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2632 {
2633         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2634         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2635
2636         tsec = current->security;
2637         fsec = file->f_security;
2638         fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2639
2640         return 0;
2641 }
2642
2643 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2644                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2645 {
2646         struct file *file;
2647         u32 perm;
2648         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2649         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2650
2651         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2652         file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2653
2654         tsec = tsk->security;
2655         fsec = file->f_security;
2656
2657         if (!signum)
2658                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2659         else
2660                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2661
2662         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2663                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2664 }
2665
2666 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2667 {
2668         return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2669 }
2670
2671 /* task security operations */
2672
2673 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2674 {
2675         int rc;
2676
2677         rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2678         if (rc)
2679                 return rc;
2680
2681         return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2682 }
2683
2684 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2685 {
2686         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2687         int rc;
2688
2689         tsec1 = current->security;
2690
2691         rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2692         if (rc)
2693                 return rc;
2694         tsec2 = tsk->security;
2695
2696         tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2697         tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2698
2699         /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
2700         tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2701         tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2702         tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
2703         tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
2704
2705         /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2706            This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2707            subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2708         tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2709
2710         return 0;
2711 }
2712
2713 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2714 {
2715         task_free_security(tsk);
2716 }
2717
2718 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2719 {
2720         /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2721            since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2722            identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2723            this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use
2724            of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2725            capable hook. */
2726         return 0;
2727 }
2728
2729 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2730 {
2731         return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2732 }
2733
2734 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2735 {
2736         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2737         return 0;
2738 }
2739
2740 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2741 {
2742         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2743 }
2744
2745 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2746 {
2747         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2748 }
2749
2750 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2751 {
2752         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2753 }
2754
2755 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2756 {
2757         selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
2758 }
2759
2760 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2761 {
2762         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2763         return 0;
2764 }
2765
2766 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2767 {
2768         int rc;
2769
2770         rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2771         if (rc)
2772                 return rc;
2773
2774         return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2775 }
2776
2777 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2778 {
2779         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2780 }
2781
2782 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2783 {
2784         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2785 }
2786
2787 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2788 {
2789         struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2790         int rc;
2791
2792         rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2793         if (rc)
2794                 return rc;
2795
2796         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2797            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2798            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2799            upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2800         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2801                 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2802
2803         return 0;
2804 }
2805
2806 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2807 {
2808         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2809 }
2810
2811 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2812 {
2813         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2814 }
2815
2816 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2817 {
2818         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2819 }
2820
2821 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2822                                 int sig, u32 secid)
2823 {
2824         u32 perm;
2825         int rc;
2826         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2827
2828         rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
2829         if (rc)
2830                 return rc;
2831
2832         if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2833                 return 0;
2834
2835         if (!sig)
2836                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2837         else
2838                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2839         tsec = p->security;
2840         if (secid)
2841                 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2842         else
2843                 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2844         return rc;
2845 }
2846
2847 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2848                               unsigned long arg2,
2849                               unsigned long arg3,
2850                               unsigned long arg4,
2851                               unsigned long arg5)
2852 {
2853         /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2854            any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2855            the state of the current process. */
2856         return 0;
2857 }
2858
2859 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2860 {
2861         u32 perm;
2862
2863         perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2864
2865         return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2866 }
2867
2868 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2869 {
2870         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2871
2872         secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2873
2874         tsec = p->security;
2875         tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2876         tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2877         return;
2878 }
2879
2880 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2881                                   struct inode *inode)
2882 {
2883         struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2884         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2885
2886         isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2887         isec->initialized = 1;
2888         return;
2889 }
2890
2891 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2892 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2893 {
2894         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2895         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2896
2897         offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2898         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2899         if (ih == NULL)
2900                 goto out;
2901
2902         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2903         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2904                 goto out;
2905
2906         ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2907         ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2908         ret = 0;
2909
2910         switch (ih->protocol) {
2911         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2912                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2913
2914                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2915                         break;
2916
2917                 offset += ihlen;
2918                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2919                 if (th == NULL)
2920                         break;
2921
2922                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2923                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2924                 break;
2925         }
2926
2927         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2928                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2929
2930                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2931                         break;
2932
2933                 offset += ihlen;
2934                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2935                 if (uh == NULL)
2936                         break;
2937
2938                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2939                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2940                 break;
2941         }
2942
2943         default:
2944                 break;
2945         }
2946 out:
2947         return ret;
2948 }
2949
2950 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2951
2952 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2953 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2954 {
2955         u8 nexthdr;
2956         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2957         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2958
2959         offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2960         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2961         if (ip6 == NULL)
2962                 goto out;
2963
2964         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2965         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2966         ret = 0;
2967
2968         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2969         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2970         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2971         if (offset < 0)
2972                 goto out;
2973
2974         switch (nexthdr) {
2975         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2976                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2977
2978                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2979                 if (th == NULL)
2980                         break;
2981
2982                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2983                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2984                 break;
2985         }
2986
2987         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2988                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2989
2990                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2991                 if (uh == NULL)
2992                         break;
2993
2994                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2995                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2996                 break;
2997         }
2998
2999         /* includes fragments */
3000         default:
3001                 break;
3002         }
3003 out:
3004         return ret;
3005 }
3006
3007 #endif /* IPV6 */
3008
3009 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3010                              char **addrp, int *len, int src)
3011 {
3012         int ret = 0;
3013
3014         switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3015         case PF_INET:
3016                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
3017                 if (ret || !addrp)
3018                         break;
3019                 *len = 4;
3020                 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3021                                         &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3022                 break;
3023
3024 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3025         case PF_INET6:
3026                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
3027                 if (ret || !addrp)
3028                         break;
3029                 *len = 16;
3030                 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3031                                         &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3032                 break;
3033 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3034         default:
3035                 break;
3036         }
3037
3038         return ret;
3039 }
3040
3041 /* socket security operations */
3042 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3043                            u32 perms)
3044 {
3045         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3046         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3047         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3048         int err = 0;
3049
3050         tsec = task->security;
3051         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3052
3053         if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3054                 goto out;
3055
3056         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3057         ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3058         err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3059
3060 out:
3061         return err;
3062 }
3063
3064 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3065                                  int protocol, int kern)
3066 {
3067         int err = 0;
3068         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3069         u32 newsid;
3070
3071         if (kern)
3072                 goto out;
3073
3074         tsec = current->security;
3075         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3076         err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3077                            socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3078                            protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3079
3080 out:
3081         return err;
3082 }
3083
3084 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3085                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
3086 {
3087         int err = 0;
3088         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3089         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3090         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3091         u32 newsid;
3092
3093         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3094
3095         tsec = current->security;
3096         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3097         isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3098         isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3099         isec->initialized = 1;
3100
3101         if (sock->sk) {
3102                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3103                 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3104                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock,
3105                                                         family,
3106                                                         isec->sid);
3107         }
3108
3109         return err;
3110 }
3111
3112 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3113    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3114    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3115 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
3116 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
3117
3118 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3119 {
3120         u16 family;
3121         int err;
3122
3123         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3124         if (err)
3125                 goto out;
3126
3127         /*
3128          * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3129          * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3130          * check the first address now.
3131          */
3132         family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3133         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3134                 char *addrp;
3135                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3136                 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3137                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3138                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3139                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3140                 unsigned short snum;
3141                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3142                 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3143
3144                 tsec = current->security;
3145                 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3146
3147                 if (family == PF_INET) {
3148                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3149                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3150                         addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3151                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3152                 } else {
3153                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3154                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3155                         addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3156                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3157                 }
3158
3159                 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3160                            snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3161                         err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3162                                                 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3163                         if (err)
3164                                 goto out;
3165                         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3166                         ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3167                         ad.u.net.family = family;
3168                         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3169                                            isec->sclass,
3170                                            SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3171                         if (err)
3172                                 goto out;
3173                 }
3174
3175                 switch(isec->sclass) {
3176                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3177                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3178                         break;
3179
3180                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3181                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3182                         break;
3183
3184                 default:
3185                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3186                         break;
3187                 }
3188
3189                 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3190                 if (err)
3191                         goto out;
3192
3193                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3194                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3195                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3196
3197                 if (family == PF_INET)
3198                         ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3199                 else
3200                         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3201
3202                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3203                                    isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3204                 if (err)
3205                         goto out;
3206         }
3207 out:
3208         return err;
3209 }
3210
3211 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3212 {
3213         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3214         int err;
3215
3216         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3217         if (err)
3218                 return err;
3219
3220         /*
3221          * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3222          */
3223         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3224         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3225                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3226                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3227                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3228                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3229                 unsigned short snum;
3230                 u32 sid;
3231
3232                 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3233                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3234                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3235                                 return -EINVAL;
3236                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3237                 } else {
3238                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3239                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3240                                 return -EINVAL;
3241                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3242                 }
3243
3244                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3245                                         sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3246                 if (err)
3247                         goto out;
3248
3249                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3250                 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3251                 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3252                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3253                                    TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3254                 if (err)
3255                         goto out;
3256         }
3257
3258 out:
3259         return err;
3260 }
3261
3262 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3263 {
3264         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3265 }
3266
3267 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3268 {
3269         int err;
3270         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3271         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3272
3273         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3274         if (err)
3275                 return err;
3276
3277         newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3278
3279         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3280         newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3281         newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3282         newisec->initialized = 1;
3283
3284         return 0;
3285 }
3286
3287 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3288                                   int size)
3289 {
3290         int rc;
3291
3292         rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3293         if (rc)
3294                 return rc;
3295
3296         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3297 }
3298
3299 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3300                                   int size, int flags)
3301 {
3302         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3303 }
3304
3305 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3306 {
3307         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3308 }
3309
3310 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3311 {
3312         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3313 }
3314
3315 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3316 {
3317         int err;
3318
3319         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3320         if (err)
3321                 return err;
3322
3323         return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3324 }
3325
3326 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3327                                      int optname)
3328 {
3329         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3330 }
3331
3332 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3333 {
3334         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3335 }
3336
3337 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3338                                               struct socket *other,
3339                                               struct sock *newsk)
3340 {
3341         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3342         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3343         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3344         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3345         int err;
3346
3347         err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3348         if (err)
3349                 return err;
3350
3351         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3352         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3353
3354         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3355         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3356
3357         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3358                            isec->sclass,
3359                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3360         if (err)
3361                 return err;
3362
3363         /* connecting socket */
3364         ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3365         ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3366
3367         /* server child socket */
3368         ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3369         ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3370         err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3371
3372         return err;
3373 }
3374
3375 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3376                                         struct socket *other)
3377 {
3378         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3379         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3380         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3381         int err;
3382
3383         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3384         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3385
3386         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3387         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3388
3389         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3390                            isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3391         if (err)
3392                 return err;
3393
3394         return 0;
3395 }
3396
3397 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3398                 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3399 {
3400         int err = 0;
3401         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3402         struct socket *sock;
3403         u16 sock_class = 0;
3404         u32 sock_sid = 0;
3405
3406         read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3407         sock = sk->sk_socket;
3408         if (sock) {
3409                 struct inode *inode;
3410                 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3411                 if (inode) {
3412                         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3413                         isec = inode->i_security;
3414                         sock_sid = isec->sid;
3415                         sock_class = isec->sclass;
3416                 }
3417         }
3418         read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3419         if (!sock_sid)
3420                 goto out;
3421
3422         if (!skb->dev)
3423                 goto out;
3424
3425         err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3426         if (err)
3427                 goto out;
3428
3429         switch (sock_class) {
3430         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3431                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3432                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3433                 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3434                 break;
3435
3436         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3437                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3438                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3439                 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3440                 break;
3441
3442         default:
3443                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3444                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3445                 break;
3446         }
3447
3448         err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3449         if (err)
3450                 goto out;
3451
3452         err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3453         if (err)
3454                 goto out;
3455
3456         err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3457         if (err)
3458                 goto out;
3459
3460         if (recv_perm) {
3461                 u32 port_sid;
3462
3463                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3464                                         sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3465                                         &port_sid);
3466                 if (err)
3467                         goto out;
3468
3469                 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3470                                    sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3471         }
3472
3473 out:
3474         return err;
3475 }
3476
3477 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3478 {
3479         u16 family;
3480         char *addrp;
3481         int len, err = 0;
3482         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3483         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3484
3485         family = sk->sk_family;
3486         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3487                 goto out;
3488
3489         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3490         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3491                 family = PF_INET;
3492
3493         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3494         ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3495         ad.u.net.family = family;
3496
3497         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3498         if (err)
3499                 goto out;
3500
3501         if (selinux_compat_net)
3502                 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
3503                                                   addrp, len);
3504         else
3505                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3506                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
3507         if (err)
3508                 goto out;
3509
3510         err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
3511         if (err)
3512                 goto out;
3513
3514         err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3515 out:
3516         return err;
3517 }
3518
3519 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3520                                             int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3521 {
3522         int err = 0;
3523         char *scontext;
3524         u32 scontext_len;
3525         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3526         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3527         u32 peer_sid = 0;
3528
3529         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3530
3531         /* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
3532         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3533                 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3534                 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3535         }
3536         else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3537                 peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock);
3538                 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
3539                         peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
3540                 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3541                         err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3542                         goto out;
3543                 }
3544         }
3545         else {
3546                 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3547                 goto out;
3548         }
3549
3550         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3551
3552         if (err)
3553                 goto out;
3554
3555         if (scontext_len > len) {
3556                 err = -ERANGE;
3557                 goto out_len;
3558         }
3559
3560         if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3561                 err = -EFAULT;
3562
3563 out_len:
3564         if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3565                 err = -EFAULT;
3566
3567         kfree(scontext);
3568 out:
3569         return err;
3570 }
3571
3572 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3573 {
3574         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3575         int err = 0;
3576
3577         if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX))
3578                 selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
3579         else if (skb) {
3580                 peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb);
3581                 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3582                         peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
3583         }
3584
3585         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3586                 err = -EINVAL;
3587         *secid = peer_secid;
3588
3589         return err;
3590 }
3591
3592 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3593 {
3594         return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3595 }
3596
3597 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3598 {
3599         sk_free_security(sk);
3600 }
3601
3602 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
3603 {
3604         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
3605         struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
3606
3607         newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
3608         newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3609
3610         selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(ssec, newssec);
3611 }
3612
3613 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
3614 {
3615         if (!sk)
3616                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3617         else {
3618                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3619
3620                 *secid = sksec->sid;
3621         }
3622 }
3623
3624 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
3625 {
3626         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
3627         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3628
3629         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
3630             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3631                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
3632
3633         selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
3634 }
3635
3636 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3637                                      struct request_sock *req)
3638 {
3639         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3640         int err;
3641         u32 newsid;
3642         u32 peersid;
3643
3644         newsid = selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(skb, sksec->sid);
3645         if (newsid != SECSID_NULL) {
3646                 req->secid = newsid;
3647                 return 0;
3648         }
3649
3650         err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
3651         BUG_ON(err);
3652
3653         if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
3654                 req->secid = sksec->sid;
3655                 return 0;
3656         }
3657
3658         err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
3659         if (err)
3660                 return err;
3661
3662         req->secid = newsid;
3663         return 0;
3664 }
3665
3666 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
3667                                    const struct request_sock *req)
3668 {
3669         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
3670
3671         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
3672         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
3673            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
3674            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
3675            time it will have been created and available. */
3676
3677         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
3678 }
3679
3680 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
3681                                       struct flowi *fl)
3682 {
3683         fl->secid = req->secid;
3684 }
3685
3686 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3687 {
3688         int err = 0;
3689         u32 perm;
3690         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3691         struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3692         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3693
3694         if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3695                 err = -EINVAL;
3696                 goto out;
3697         }
3698         nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3699
3700         err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3701         if (err) {
3702                 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3703                         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3704                                   "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
3705                                   " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3706                                   nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3707                         if (!selinux_enforcing)
3708                                 err = 0;
3709                 }
3710
3711                 /* Ignore */
3712                 if (err == -ENOENT)
3713                         err = 0;
3714                 goto out;
3715         }
3716
3717         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3718 out:
3719         return err;
3720 }
3721
3722 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3723
3724 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
3725                                             struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3726                                             u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3727 {
3728         int err = 0;
3729         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3730         struct socket *sock;
3731         struct inode *inode;
3732         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3733
3734         sock = sk->sk_socket;
3735         if (!sock)
3736                 goto out;
3737
3738         inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3739         if (!inode)
3740                 goto out;
3741
3742         isec = inode->i_security;
3743
3744         err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3745         if (err)
3746                 goto out;
3747
3748         switch (isec->sclass) {
3749         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3750                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3751                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3752                 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3753                 break;
3754
3755         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3756                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3757                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3758                 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3759                 break;
3760
3761         default:
3762                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3763                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3764                 break;
3765         }
3766
3767         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3768         if (err)
3769                 goto out;
3770
3771         err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3772         if (err)
3773                 goto out;
3774
3775         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3776         if (err)
3777                 goto out;
3778
3779         if (send_perm) {
3780                 u32 port_sid;
3781
3782                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3783                                         sk->sk_type,
3784                                         sk->sk_protocol,
3785                                         ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
3786                                         &port_sid);
3787                 if (err)
3788                         goto out;
3789
3790                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3791                                    send_perm, ad);
3792         }
3793 out:
3794         return err;
3795 }
3796
3797 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3798                                               struct sk_buff **pskb,
3799                                               const struct net_device *in,
3800                                               const struct net_device *out,
3801                                               int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3802                                               u16 family)
3803 {
3804         char *addrp;
3805         int len, err = 0;
3806         struct sock *sk;
3807         struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3808         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3809         struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3810         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3811
3812         sk = skb->sk;
3813         if (!sk)
3814                 goto out;
3815
3816         sksec = sk->sk_security;
3817
3818         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3819         ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3820         ad.u.net.family = family;
3821
3822         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0);
3823         if (err)
3824                 goto out;
3825
3826         if (selinux_compat_net)
3827                 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
3828                                                        family, addrp, len);
3829         else
3830                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3831                                    PACKET__SEND, &ad);
3832
3833         if (err)
3834                 goto out;
3835
3836         err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3837 out:
3838         return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3839 }
3840
3841 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3842                                                 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3843                                                 const struct net_device *in,
3844                                                 const struct net_device *out,
3845                                                 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3846 {
3847         return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3848 }
3849
3850 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3851
3852 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3853                                                 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3854                                                 const struct net_device *in,
3855                                                 const struct net_device *out,
3856                                                 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3857 {
3858         return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3859 }
3860
3861 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3862
3863 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3864
3865 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3866 {
3867         int err;
3868
3869         err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3870         if (err)
3871                 return err;
3872
3873         if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3874                 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3875
3876         return err;
3877 }
3878
3879 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
3880 {
3881         int err;
3882         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3883
3884         err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
3885         if (err)
3886                 return err;
3887
3888         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
3889         ad.u.cap = capability;
3890
3891         return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
3892                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
3893 }
3894
3895 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3896                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3897                               u16 sclass)
3898 {
3899         struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3900         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3901
3902         isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3903         if (!isec)
3904                 return -ENOMEM;
3905
3906         isec->sclass = sclass;
3907         isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3908         isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3909         perm->security = isec;
3910
3911         return 0;
3912 }
3913
3914 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3915 {
3916         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3917         perm->security = NULL;
3918         kfree(isec);
3919 }
3920
3921 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3922 {
3923         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3924
3925         msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3926         if (!msec)
3927                 return -ENOMEM;
3928
3929         msec->msg = msg;
3930         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3931         msg->security = msec;
3932
3933         return 0;
3934 }
3935
3936 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3937 {
3938         struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3939
3940         msg->security = NULL;
3941         kfree(msec);
3942 }
3943
3944 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3945                         u32 perms)
3946 {
3947         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3948         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3949         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3950
3951         tsec = current->security;
3952         isec = ipc_perms->security;
3953
3954         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3955         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3956
3957         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3958 }
3959
3960 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3961 {
3962         return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3963 }
3964
3965 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3966 {
3967         msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3968 }
3969
3970 /* message queue security operations */
3971 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3972 {
3973         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3974         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3975         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3976         int rc;
3977
3978         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3979         if (rc)
3980                 return rc;
3981
3982         tsec = current->security;
3983         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3984
3985         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3986         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3987
3988         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3989                           MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
3990         if (rc) {
3991                 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3992                 return rc;
3993         }
3994         return 0;
3995 }
3996
3997 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3998 {
3999         ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4000 }
4001
4002 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4003 {
4004         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4005         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4006         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4007
4008         tsec = current->security;
4009         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4010
4011         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4012         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4013
4014         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4015                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4016 }
4017
4018 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4019 {
4020         int err;
4021         int perms;
4022
4023         switch(cmd) {
4024         case IPC_INFO:
4025         case MSG_INFO:
4026                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4027                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4028         case IPC_STAT:
4029         case MSG_STAT:
4030                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4031                 break;
4032         case IPC_SET:
4033                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4034                 break;
4035         case IPC_RMID:
4036                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4037                 break;
4038         default:
4039                 return 0;
4040         }
4041
4042         err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4043         return err;
4044 }
4045
4046 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4047 {
4048         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4049         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4050         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4051         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4052         int rc;
4053
4054         tsec = current->security;
4055         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4056         msec = msg->security;
4057
4058         /*
4059          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4060          */
4061         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4062                 /*
4063                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
4064                  * message queue this message will be stored in
4065                  */
4066                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4067                                              isec->sid,
4068                                              SECCLASS_MSG,
4069                                              &msec->sid);
4070                 if (rc)
4071                         return rc;
4072         }
4073
4074         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4075         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4076
4077         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4078         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4079                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4080         if (!rc)
4081                 /* Can this process send the message */
4082                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4083                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4084         if (!rc)
4085                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4086                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4087                                   SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4088
4089         return rc;
4090 }
4091
4092 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4093                                     struct task_struct *target,
4094                                     long type, int mode)
4095 {
4096         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4097         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4098         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4099         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4100         int rc;
4101
4102         tsec = target->security;
4103         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4104         msec = msg->security;
4105
4106         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4107         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4108
4109         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4110                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4111         if (!rc)
4112                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4113                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4114         return rc;
4115 }
4116
4117 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4118 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4119 {
4120         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4121         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4122         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4123         int rc;
4124
4125         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4126         if (rc)
4127                 return rc;
4128
4129         tsec = current->security;
4130         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4131
4132         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4133         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4134
4135         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4136                           SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4137         if (rc) {
4138                 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4139                 return rc;
4140         }
4141         return 0;
4142 }
4143
4144 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4145 {
4146         ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4147 }
4148
4149 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4150 {
4151         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4152         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4153         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4154
4155         tsec = current->security;
4156         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4157
4158         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4159         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4160
4161         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4162                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4163 }
4164
4165 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4166 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4167 {
4168         int perms;
4169         int err;
4170
4171         switch(cmd) {
4172         case IPC_INFO:
4173         case SHM_INFO:
4174                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4175                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4176         case IPC_STAT:
4177         case SHM_STAT:
4178                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4179                 break;
4180         case IPC_SET:
4181                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4182                 break;
4183         case SHM_LOCK:
4184         case SHM_UNLOCK:
4185                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
4186                 break;
4187         case IPC_RMID:
4188                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4189                 break;
4190         default:
4191                 return 0;
4192         }
4193
4194         err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4195         return err;
4196 }
4197
4198 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4199                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4200 {
4201         u32 perms;
4202         int rc;
4203
4204         rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4205         if (rc)
4206                 return rc;
4207
4208         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4209                 perms = SHM__READ;
4210         else
4211                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4212
4213         return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4214 }
4215
4216 /* Semaphore security operations */
4217 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4218 {
4219         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4220         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4221         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4222         int rc;
4223
4224         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4225         if (rc)
4226                 return rc;
4227
4228         tsec = current->security;
4229         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4230
4231         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4232         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4233
4234         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4235                           SEM__CREATE, &ad);
4236         if (rc) {
4237                 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4238                 return rc;
4239         }
4240         return 0;
4241 }
4242
4243 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4244 {
4245         ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4246 }
4247
4248 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4249 {
4250         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4251         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4252         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4253
4254         tsec = current->security;
4255         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4256
4257         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4258         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4259
4260         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4261                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4262 }
4263
4264 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4265 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4266 {
4267         int err;
4268         u32 perms;
4269
4270         switch(cmd) {
4271         case IPC_INFO:
4272         case SEM_INFO:
4273                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4274                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4275         case GETPID:
4276         case GETNCNT:
4277         case GETZCNT:
4278                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4279                 break;
4280         case GETVAL:
4281         case GETALL:
4282                 perms = SEM__READ;
4283                 break;
4284         case SETVAL:
4285         case SETALL:
4286                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
4287                 break;
4288         case IPC_RMID:
4289                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4290                 break;
4291         case IPC_SET:
4292                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4293                 break;
4294         case IPC_STAT:
4295         case SEM_STAT:
4296                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4297                 break;
4298         default:
4299                 return 0;
4300         }
4301
4302         err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4303         return err;
4304 }
4305
4306 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4307                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4308 {
4309         u32 perms;
4310
4311         if (alter)
4312                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4313         else
4314                 perms = SEM__READ;
4315
4316         return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4317 }
4318
4319 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4320 {
4321         u32 av = 0;
4322
4323         av = 0;
4324         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
4325                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4326         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
4327                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4328
4329         if (av == 0)
4330                 return 0;
4331
4332         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4333 }
4334
4335 /* module stacking operations */
4336 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4337 {
4338         if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4339                 printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  There is already a secondary security "
4340                        "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4341                 return -EINVAL;
4342         }
4343
4344         secondary_ops = ops;
4345
4346         printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  Registering secondary module %s\n",
4347                __FUNCTION__,
4348                name);
4349
4350         return 0;
4351 }
4352
4353 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4354 {
4355         if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4356                 printk (KERN_INFO "%s:  trying to unregister a security module "
4357                         "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4358                 return -EINVAL;
4359         }
4360
4361         secondary_ops = original_ops;
4362
4363         return 0;
4364 }
4365
4366 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4367 {
4368         if (inode)
4369                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4370 }
4371
4372 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4373                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4374 {
4375         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4376         u32 sid;
4377         int error;
4378
4379         if (current != p) {
4380                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4381                 if (error)
4382                         return error;
4383         }
4384
4385         tsec = p->security;
4386
4387         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4388                 sid = tsec->sid;
4389         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4390                 sid = tsec->osid;
4391         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4392                 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4393         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4394                 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4395         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4396                 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4397         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4398                 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4399         else
4400                 return -EINVAL;
4401
4402         if (!sid)
4403                 return 0;
4404
4405         return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
4406 }
4407
4408 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4409                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4410 {
4411         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4412         u32 sid = 0;
4413         int error;
4414         char *str = value;
4415
4416         if (current != p) {
4417                 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4418                    security attributes. */
4419                 return -EACCES;
4420         }
4421
4422         /*
4423          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4424          * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4425          * above restriction is ever removed.
4426          */
4427         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4428                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4429         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4430                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4431         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4432                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
4433         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4434                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
4435         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4436                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4437         else
4438                 error = -EINVAL;
4439         if (error)
4440                 return error;
4441
4442         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4443         if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4444                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4445                         str[size-1] = 0;
4446                         size--;
4447                 }
4448                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4449                 if (error)
4450                         return error;
4451         }
4452
4453         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4454            performed during the actual operation (execve,
4455            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4456            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4457            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4458            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4459         tsec = p->security;
4460         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4461                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4462         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4463                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4464         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
4465                 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
4466                 if (error)
4467                         return error;
4468                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
4469         } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4470                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
4471         else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4472                 struct av_decision avd;
4473
4474                 if (sid == 0)
4475                         return -EINVAL;
4476
4477                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4478                 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4479                         struct task_struct *g, *t;
4480                         struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4481                         read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4482                         do_each_thread(g, t)
4483                                 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4484                                         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4485                                         return -EPERM;
4486                                 }
4487                         while_each_thread(g, t);
4488                         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4489                 }
4490
4491                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4492                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4493                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4494                 if (error)
4495                         return error;
4496
4497                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4498                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4499                 task_lock(p);
4500                 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4501                         error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4502                                                      SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4503                                                      PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4504                         if (!error)
4505                                 tsec->sid = sid;
4506                         task_unlock(p);
4507                         avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4508                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4509                         if (error)
4510                                 return error;
4511                 } else {
4512                         tsec->sid = sid;
4513                         task_unlock(p);
4514                 }
4515         }
4516         else
4517                 return -EINVAL;
4518
4519         return size;
4520 }
4521
4522 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4523 {
4524         return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
4525 }
4526
4527 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4528 {
4529         if (secdata)
4530                 kfree(secdata);
4531 }
4532
4533 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4534
4535 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4536                              unsigned long flags)
4537 {
4538         struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4539         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4540
4541         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4542         if (!ksec)
4543                 return -ENOMEM;
4544
4545         ksec->obj = k;
4546         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
4547                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4548         else
4549                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4550         k->security = ksec;
4551
4552         return 0;
4553 }
4554
4555 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4556 {
4557         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4558
4559         k->security = NULL;
4560         kfree(ksec);
4561 }
4562
4563 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4564                             struct task_struct *ctx,
4565                             key_perm_t perm)
4566 {
4567         struct key *key;
4568         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4569         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4570
4571         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4572
4573         tsec = ctx->security;
4574         ksec = key->security;
4575
4576         /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
4577            permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
4578            appear to be created. */
4579         if (perm == 0)
4580                 return 0;
4581
4582         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
4583                             SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
4584 }
4585
4586 #endif
4587
4588 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4589         .ptrace =                       selinux_ptrace,
4590         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
4591         .capset_check =                 selinux_capset_check,
4592         .capset_set =                   selinux_capset_set,
4593         .sysctl =                       selinux_sysctl,
4594         .capable =                      selinux_capable,
4595         .quotactl =                     selinux_quotactl,
4596         .quota_on =                     selinux_quota_on,
4597         .syslog =                       selinux_syslog,
4598         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4599
4600         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
4601         .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
4602
4603         .bprm_alloc_security =          selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4604         .bprm_free_security =           selinux_bprm_free_security,
4605         .bprm_apply_creds =             selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4606         .bprm_post_apply_creds =        selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4607         .bprm_set_security =            selinux_bprm_set_security,
4608         .bprm_check_security =          selinux_bprm_check_security,
4609         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4610
4611         .sb_alloc_security =            selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4612         .sb_free_security =             selinux_sb_free_security,
4613         .sb_copy_data =                 selinux_sb_copy_data,
4614         .sb_kern_mount =                selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4615         .sb_statfs =                    selinux_sb_statfs,
4616         .sb_mount =                     selinux_mount,
4617         .sb_umount =                    selinux_umount,
4618
4619         .inode_alloc_security =         selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4620         .inode_free_security =          selinux_inode_free_security,
4621         .inode_init_security =          selinux_inode_init_security,
4622         .inode_create =                 selinux_inode_create,
4623         .inode_link =                   selinux_inode_link,
4624         .inode_unlink =                 selinux_inode_unlink,
4625         .inode_symlink =                selinux_inode_symlink,
4626         .inode_mkdir =                  selinux_inode_mkdir,
4627         .inode_rmdir =                  selinux_inode_rmdir,
4628         .inode_mknod =                  selinux_inode_mknod,
4629         .inode_rename =                 selinux_inode_rename,
4630         .inode_readlink =               selinux_inode_readlink,
4631         .inode_follow_link =            selinux_inode_follow_link,
4632         .inode_permission =             selinux_inode_permission,
4633         .inode_setattr =                selinux_inode_setattr,
4634         .inode_getattr =                selinux_inode_getattr,
4635         .inode_setxattr =               selinux_inode_setxattr,
4636         .inode_post_setxattr =          selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4637         .inode_getxattr =               selinux_inode_getxattr,
4638         .inode_listxattr =              selinux_inode_listxattr,
4639         .inode_removexattr =            selinux_inode_removexattr,
4640         .inode_xattr_getsuffix =        selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4641         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4642         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4643         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4644
4645         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
4646         .file_alloc_security =          selinux_file_alloc_security,
4647         .file_free_security =           selinux_file_free_security,
4648         .file_ioctl =                   selinux_file_ioctl,
4649         .file_mmap =                    selinux_file_mmap,
4650         .file_mprotect =                selinux_file_mprotect,
4651         .file_lock =                    selinux_file_lock,
4652         .file_fcntl =                   selinux_file_fcntl,
4653         .file_set_fowner =              selinux_file_set_fowner,
4654         .file_send_sigiotask =          selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4655         .file_receive =                 selinux_file_receive,
4656
4657         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
4658         .task_alloc_security =          selinux_task_alloc_security,
4659         .task_free_security =           selinux_task_free_security,
4660         .task_setuid =                  selinux_task_setuid,
4661         .task_post_setuid =             selinux_task_post_setuid,
4662         .task_setgid =                  selinux_task_setgid,
4663         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
4664         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
4665         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
4666         .task_getsecid =                selinux_task_getsecid,
4667         .task_setgroups =               selinux_task_setgroups,
4668         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
4669         .task_setioprio =               selinux_task_setioprio,
4670         .task_getioprio =               selinux_task_getioprio,
4671         .task_setrlimit =               selinux_task_setrlimit,
4672         .task_setscheduler =            selinux_task_setscheduler,
4673         .task_getscheduler =            selinux_task_getscheduler,
4674         .task_movememory =              selinux_task_movememory,
4675         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
4676         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
4677         .task_prctl =                   selinux_task_prctl,
4678         .task_reparent_to_init =        selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4679         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
4680
4681         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
4682
4683         .msg_msg_alloc_security =       selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4684         .msg_msg_free_security =        selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4685
4686         .msg_queue_alloc_security =     selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4687         .msg_queue_free_security =      selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4688         .msg_queue_associate =          selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4689         .msg_queue_msgctl =             selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4690         .msg_queue_msgsnd =             selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4691         .msg_queue_msgrcv =             selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4692
4693         .shm_alloc_security =           selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4694         .shm_free_security =            selinux_shm_free_security,
4695         .shm_associate =                selinux_shm_associate,
4696         .shm_shmctl =                   selinux_shm_shmctl,
4697         .shm_shmat =                    selinux_shm_shmat,
4698
4699         .sem_alloc_security =           selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4700         .sem_free_security =            selinux_sem_free_security,
4701         .sem_associate =                selinux_sem_associate,
4702         .sem_semctl =                   selinux_sem_semctl,
4703         .sem_semop =                    selinux_sem_semop,
4704
4705         .register_security =            selinux_register_security,
4706         .unregister_security =          selinux_unregister_security,
4707
4708         .d_instantiate =                selinux_d_instantiate,
4709
4710         .getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
4711         .setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
4712
4713         .secid_to_secctx =              selinux_secid_to_secctx,
4714         .release_secctx =               selinux_release_secctx,
4715
4716         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4717         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4718
4719         .socket_create =                selinux_socket_create,
4720         .socket_post_create =           selinux_socket_post_create,
4721         .socket_bind =                  selinux_socket_bind,
4722         .socket_connect =               selinux_socket_connect,
4723         .socket_listen =                selinux_socket_listen,
4724         .socket_accept =                selinux_socket_accept,
4725         .socket_sendmsg =               selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4726         .socket_recvmsg =               selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4727         .socket_getsockname =           selinux_socket_getsockname,
4728         .socket_getpeername =           selinux_socket_getpeername,
4729         .socket_getsockopt =            selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4730         .socket_setsockopt =            selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4731         .socket_shutdown =              selinux_socket_shutdown,
4732         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4733         .socket_getpeersec_stream =     selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4734         .socket_getpeersec_dgram =      selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4735         .sk_alloc_security =            selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4736         .sk_free_security =             selinux_sk_free_security,
4737         .sk_clone_security =            selinux_sk_clone_security,
4738         .sk_getsecid =                  selinux_sk_getsecid,
4739         .sock_graft =                   selinux_sock_graft,
4740         .inet_conn_request =            selinux_inet_conn_request,
4741         .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
4742         .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
4743
4744 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4745         .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4746         .xfrm_policy_clone_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4747         .xfrm_policy_free_security =    selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4748         .xfrm_policy_delete_security =  selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
4749         .xfrm_state_alloc_security =    selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4750         .xfrm_state_free_security =     selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4751         .xfrm_state_delete_security =   selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
4752         .xfrm_policy_lookup =           selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4753         .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =    selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
4754         .xfrm_flow_state_match =        selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match,
4755         .xfrm_decode_session =          selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
4756 #endif
4757
4758 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4759         .key_alloc =                    selinux_key_alloc,
4760         .key_free =                     selinux_key_free,
4761         .key_permission =               selinux_key_permission,
4762 #endif
4763 };
4764
4765 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4766 {
4767         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4768
4769         if (!selinux_enabled) {
4770                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
4771                 return 0;
4772         }
4773
4774         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
4775
4776         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4777         if (task_alloc_security(current))
4778                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4779         tsec = current->security;
4780         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4781
4782         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4783                                             sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4784                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
4785         avc_init();
4786
4787         original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4788         if (!secondary_ops)
4789                 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4790         if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4791                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4792
4793         if (selinux_enforcing) {
4794                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4795         } else {
4796                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
4797         }
4798
4799 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4800         /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
4801         selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
4802                           KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4803         selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
4804                           KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4805 #endif
4806
4807         return 0;
4808 }
4809
4810 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4811 {
4812         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
4813
4814         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4815         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4816         spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4817         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4818 next_sb:
4819         if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4820                 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4821                                 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4822                                            struct superblock_security_struct,
4823                                            list);
4824                 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4825                 sb->s_count++;
4826                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4827                 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4828                 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4829                 if (sb->s_root)
4830                         superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4831                 drop_super(sb);
4832                 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4833                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4834                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4835                 goto next_sb;
4836         }
4837         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4838         spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4839 }
4840
4841 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4842    all processes and objects when they are created. */
4843 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4844
4845 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4846
4847 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4848         .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4849         .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
4850         .pf =           PF_INET,
4851         .hooknum =      NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4852         .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4853 };
4854
4855 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4856
4857 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4858         .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4859         .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
4860         .pf =           PF_INET6,
4861         .hooknum =      NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4862         .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4863 };
4864
4865 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4866
4867 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4868 {
4869         int err = 0;
4870
4871         if (!selinux_enabled)
4872                 goto out;
4873
4874         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4875
4876         err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4877         if (err)
4878                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4879
4880 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4881
4882         err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4883         if (err)
4884                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4885
4886 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4887
4888 out:
4889         return err;
4890 }
4891
4892 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4893
4894 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4895 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4896 {
4897         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4898
4899         nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4900 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4901         nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4902 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4903 }
4904 #endif
4905
4906 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4907
4908 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4909 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4910 #endif
4911
4912 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4913
4914 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4915 int selinux_disable(void)
4916 {
4917         extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4918         static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4919
4920         if (ss_initialized) {
4921                 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4922                 return -EINVAL;
4923         }
4924
4925         if (selinux_disabled) {
4926                 /* Only do this once. */
4927                 return -EINVAL;
4928         }
4929
4930         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
4931
4932         selinux_disabled = 1;
4933         selinux_enabled = 0;
4934
4935         /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4936         security_ops = secondary_ops;
4937
4938         /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4939         selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4940
4941         /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
4942         exit_sel_fs();
4943
4944         return 0;
4945 }
4946 #endif
4947
4948