1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
21 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
23 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
24 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
26 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
27 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
28 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 #include <linux/init.h>
33 #include <asm/atomic.h>
34 #include <asm/types.h>
36 #include <linux/module.h>
37 #include <linux/socket.h>
38 #include <linux/audit.h>
39 #include <linux/personality.h>
40 #include <linux/time.h>
41 #include <asm/unistd.h>
44 1 = put_count checking
45 2 = verbose put_count checking
49 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
50 extern int audit_enabled;
52 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
53 * for saving names from getname(). */
54 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
56 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
57 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
59 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
61 /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
62 a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
63 the syscall filter. */
65 AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
66 * No syscall-specific audit records can
68 AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
69 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
70 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
72 AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
73 * and always fill it in at syscall
74 * entry time. This makes a full
75 * syscall record available if some
76 * other part of the kernel decides it
77 * should be recorded. */
78 AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
79 * always fill it in at syscall entry
80 * time, and always write out the audit
81 * record at syscall exit time. */
84 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
85 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
86 * pointers at syscall exit time).
88 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
99 struct audit_aux_data {
100 struct audit_aux_data *next;
104 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
106 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
107 struct audit_aux_data d;
109 unsigned long qbytes;
115 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
116 struct audit_aux_data d;
118 unsigned long args[0];
121 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
122 struct audit_aux_data d;
128 /* The per-task audit context. */
129 struct audit_context {
130 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
131 enum audit_state state;
132 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
133 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
134 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
135 int major; /* syscall number */
136 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
137 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
138 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
139 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
141 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
142 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
143 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
145 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
147 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
148 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
149 unsigned long personality;
159 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
160 * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
161 * syscall exit time. */
162 static LIST_HEAD(audit_tsklist);
163 static LIST_HEAD(audit_entlist);
164 static LIST_HEAD(audit_extlist);
167 struct list_head list;
169 struct audit_rule rule;
172 extern int audit_pid;
174 /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
175 * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
176 static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
180 if (a->flags != b->flags)
183 if (a->action != b->action)
186 if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
189 for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
190 if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
191 || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
195 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
196 if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
202 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
203 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
204 * audit_netlink_sem. */
205 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
206 struct list_head *list)
208 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_PREPEND) {
209 entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_PREPEND;
210 list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
212 list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
217 static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
219 struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
223 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
224 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
225 * audit_netlink_sem. */
226 static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
227 struct list_head *list)
229 struct audit_entry *e;
231 /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
232 * deletion routine. */
233 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
234 if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
235 list_del_rcu(&e->list);
236 call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
240 return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */
243 /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during
245 static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
249 if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
250 && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
251 && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
253 if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
257 d->action = s->action;
258 d->field_count = s->field_count;
259 for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
260 d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
261 d->values[i] = s->values[i];
263 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
267 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
271 struct audit_entry *entry;
276 /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
277 always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
278 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_tsklist, list)
279 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
280 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
281 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_entlist, list)
282 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
283 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
284 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_extlist, list)
285 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
286 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
287 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
290 if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
292 if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
296 flags = entry->rule.flags;
297 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
298 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_tsklist);
299 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
300 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_entlist);
301 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
302 err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_extlist);
303 audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
304 "auid %u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
307 flags =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags;
308 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
309 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_tsklist);
310 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
311 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_entlist);
312 if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
313 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_extlist);
314 audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
315 "auid %u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
324 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
326 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
327 struct audit_rule *rule,
328 struct audit_context *ctx,
329 enum audit_state *state)
333 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
334 u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
335 u32 value = rule->values[i];
340 result = (tsk->pid == value);
343 result = (tsk->uid == value);
346 result = (tsk->euid == value);
349 result = (tsk->suid == value);
352 result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
355 result = (tsk->gid == value);
358 result = (tsk->egid == value);
361 result = (tsk->sgid == value);
364 result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
367 result = (tsk->personality == value);
371 result = (ctx->arch == value);
375 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
376 result = (ctx->return_code == value);
379 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
380 result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
384 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
385 if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
394 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
395 if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
404 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
405 if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
415 result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
422 result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
426 if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
431 switch (rule->action) {
432 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
433 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
434 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
439 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
440 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
441 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
443 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
445 struct audit_entry *e;
446 enum audit_state state;
449 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) {
450 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
456 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
459 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
460 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
461 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
462 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
464 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
465 struct audit_context *ctx,
466 struct list_head *list)
468 struct audit_entry *e;
469 enum audit_state state;
470 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
471 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
474 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
475 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
476 && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
482 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
485 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
486 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
490 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
492 if (likely(!context))
494 context->return_valid = return_valid;
495 context->return_code = return_code;
497 if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
498 enum audit_state state;
499 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_extlist);
500 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
501 context->auditable = 1;
504 context->pid = tsk->pid;
505 context->uid = tsk->uid;
506 context->gid = tsk->gid;
507 context->euid = tsk->euid;
508 context->suid = tsk->suid;
509 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
510 context->egid = tsk->egid;
511 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
512 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
513 context->personality = tsk->personality;
514 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
518 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
523 if (context->auditable
524 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
525 printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
526 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
527 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
529 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
530 context->name_count, context->put_count,
532 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
533 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
534 context->names[i].name,
535 context->names[i].name);
541 context->put_count = 0;
542 context->ino_count = 0;
545 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
546 if (context->names[i].name)
547 __putname(context->names[i].name);
548 context->name_count = 0;
551 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
553 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
555 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
556 context->aux = aux->next;
561 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
562 enum audit_state state)
564 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
566 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
567 context->state = state;
568 context->loginuid = loginuid;
571 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
573 struct audit_context *context;
575 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
577 audit_zero_context(context, state);
581 /* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
582 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
583 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
585 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
587 struct audit_context *context;
588 enum audit_state state;
590 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
591 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
593 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
594 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
597 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
598 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
602 /* Preserve login uid */
603 context->loginuid = -1;
604 if (current->audit_context)
605 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
607 tsk->audit_context = context;
608 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
612 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
614 struct audit_context *previous;
618 previous = context->previous;
619 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
621 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
622 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
623 context->serial, context->major,
624 context->name_count, count);
626 audit_free_names(context);
627 audit_free_aux(context);
632 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
635 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
637 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
638 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
639 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
641 get_task_comm(name, current);
642 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=%s", name);
647 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
650 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
652 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
653 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
654 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
659 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
662 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
665 struct audit_buffer *ab;
667 ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
669 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
670 audit_log_format(ab, "syscall=%d", context->major);
671 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
672 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
673 audit_log_format(ab, " arch=%x", context->arch);
674 if (context->return_valid)
675 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
676 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
677 context->return_code);
679 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
680 " pid=%d loginuid=%d uid=%d gid=%d"
681 " euid=%d suid=%d fsuid=%d"
682 " egid=%d sgid=%d fsgid=%d",
692 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
693 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
694 audit_log_task_info(ab);
696 while (context->aux) {
697 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
701 ab = audit_log_start(context, aux->type);
703 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
707 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
709 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%d igid=%d mode=%x",
710 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
713 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
715 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
716 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
717 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
718 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
721 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
722 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
724 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
725 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
730 context->aux = aux->next;
734 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
735 ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_PATH);
737 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
738 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
739 if (context->names[i].name) {
740 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
741 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
743 if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
744 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
745 " ouid=%d ogid=%d rdev=%02x:%02x",
746 context->names[i].ino,
747 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
748 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
749 context->names[i].mode,
750 context->names[i].uid,
751 context->names[i].gid,
752 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
753 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
758 /* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
759 * __put_task_struct. */
760 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
762 struct audit_context *context;
765 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
768 if (likely(!context))
771 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
772 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */
773 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid)
774 audit_log_exit(context);
776 audit_free_context(context);
779 /* Compute a serial number for the audit record. Audit records are
780 * written to user-space as soon as they are generated, so a complete
781 * audit record may be written in several pieces. The timestamp of the
782 * record and this serial number are used by the user-space tools to
783 * determine which pieces belong to the same audit record. The
784 * (timestamp,serial) tuple is unique for each syscall and is live from
785 * syscall entry to syscall exit.
787 * Atomic values are only guaranteed to be 24-bit, so we count down.
789 * NOTE: Another possibility is to store the formatted records off the
790 * audit context (for those records that have a context), and emit them
791 * all at syscall exit. However, this could delay the reporting of
792 * significant errors until syscall exit (or never, if the system
794 static inline unsigned int audit_serial(void)
796 static atomic_t serial = ATOMIC_INIT(0xffffff);
800 a = atomic_read(&serial);
801 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&serial))
802 atomic_set(&serial, 0xffffff);
803 b = atomic_read(&serial);
804 } while (b != a - 1);
809 /* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
810 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
811 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
812 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
813 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
814 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
816 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
817 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
818 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
820 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
821 enum audit_state state;
825 /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
826 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
827 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
828 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
829 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
833 * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
835 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
836 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
838 if (context->in_syscall) {
839 struct audit_context *newctx;
841 #if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
842 /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
843 if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
848 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
849 " entering syscall=%d\n",
850 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
852 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
854 newctx->previous = context;
856 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
858 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
859 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
860 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
861 * to abandon auditing. */
862 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
865 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
870 context->arch = arch;
871 context->major = major;
872 context->argv[0] = a1;
873 context->argv[1] = a2;
874 context->argv[2] = a3;
875 context->argv[3] = a4;
877 state = context->state;
878 if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
879 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_entlist);
880 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
883 context->serial = audit_serial();
884 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
885 context->in_syscall = 1;
886 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
889 /* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
890 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
891 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
892 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
893 * free the names stored from getname(). */
894 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
896 struct audit_context *context;
898 get_task_struct(tsk);
900 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
903 /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
904 * called __put_task_struct. */
905 if (likely(!context))
908 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid)
909 audit_log_exit(context);
911 context->in_syscall = 0;
912 context->auditable = 0;
914 if (context->previous) {
915 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
916 context->previous = NULL;
917 audit_free_context(context);
918 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
920 audit_free_names(context);
921 audit_free_aux(context);
922 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
923 tsk->audit_context = context;
925 put_task_struct(tsk);
928 /* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
929 void audit_getname(const char *name)
931 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
933 if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
936 if (!context->in_syscall) {
938 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
939 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
944 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
945 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
946 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
947 ++context->name_count;
950 /* Intercept a putname request. Called from
951 * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
952 * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
954 void audit_putname(const char *name)
956 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
959 if (!context->in_syscall) {
961 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
962 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
963 if (context->name_count) {
965 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
966 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
967 context->names[i].name,
968 context->names[i].name);
975 ++context->put_count;
976 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
977 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
978 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
981 context->serial, context->major,
982 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
990 /* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
991 * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
992 void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
995 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
997 if (!context->in_syscall)
999 if (context->name_count
1000 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1001 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1002 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1003 else if (context->name_count > 1
1004 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1005 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1006 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1008 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1009 * associated name? */
1010 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
1012 idx = context->name_count++;
1013 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1015 ++context->ino_count;
1018 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
1019 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1020 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
1021 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
1022 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
1023 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1026 int audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1027 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1030 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1031 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1032 *serial = ctx->serial;
1039 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1041 if (task->audit_context) {
1042 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1044 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1046 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1047 "old loginuid=%u new loginuid=%u",
1048 task->pid, task->uid,
1049 task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
1052 task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
1057 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1059 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1062 int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1064 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1065 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1067 if (likely(!context))
1070 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
1074 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1079 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1080 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1081 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1085 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1087 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1088 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1090 if (likely(!context))
1093 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1098 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1100 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1101 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1102 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1106 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1108 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1109 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1111 if (likely(!context))
1114 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1119 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1121 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1122 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1123 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1127 void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1129 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1130 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1132 if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->pid == audit_pid)) {
1133 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
1134 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1135 audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
1137 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1139 audit_sig_uid = current->uid;