1 /* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events
3 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
4 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
5 * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 #include <linux/kernel.h>
23 #include <linux/audit.h>
24 #include <linux/kthread.h>
25 #include <linux/mutex.h>
27 #include <linux/namei.h>
28 #include <linux/netlink.h>
29 #include <linux/sched.h>
30 #include <linux/security.h>
37 * Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
38 * data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
39 * contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
40 * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
41 * must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
42 * An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
43 * be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
46 /* Audit filter lists, defined in <linux/audit.h> */
47 struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
48 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
49 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
50 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
51 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
52 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
53 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]),
54 #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6
55 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
58 static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
59 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[0]),
60 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[1]),
61 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[2]),
62 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]),
63 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]),
64 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]),
67 DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
69 static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
72 struct audit_krule *erule = &e->rule;
73 /* some rules don't have associated watches */
75 audit_put_watch(erule->watch);
77 for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++) {
78 struct audit_field *f = &erule->fields[i];
80 security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
83 kfree(erule->filterkey);
87 void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
89 struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
93 /* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */
94 static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count)
96 struct audit_entry *entry;
97 struct audit_field *fields;
99 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
100 if (unlikely(!entry))
103 fields = kzalloc(sizeof(*fields) * field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
104 if (unlikely(!fields)) {
108 entry->rule.fields = fields;
113 /* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
115 char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
119 if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain))
120 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
122 /* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX
123 * defines the longest valid length.
126 return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
128 str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
130 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
132 memcpy(str, *bufp, len);
140 /* Translate an inode field to kernel respresentation. */
141 static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule,
142 struct audit_field *f)
144 if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
145 krule->watch || krule->inode_f || krule->tree ||
146 (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal))
153 static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES];
155 int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list)
157 __u32 *p = kzalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL);
160 while (*list != ~0U) {
161 unsigned n = *list++;
162 if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) {
166 p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n);
168 if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) {
176 int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall)
178 if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32))
180 if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class]))
182 return classes[class][AUDIT_WORD(syscall)] & AUDIT_BIT(syscall);
185 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
186 static inline int audit_match_class_bits(int class, u32 *mask)
190 if (classes[class]) {
191 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
192 if (mask[i] & classes[class][i])
198 static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry)
200 struct audit_field *arch = entry->rule.arch_f;
203 /* When arch is unspecified, we must check both masks on biarch
204 * as syscall number alone is ambiguous. */
205 return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
207 audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
211 switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) {
213 return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
215 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
216 return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
224 /* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
225 static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
228 struct audit_entry *entry;
232 listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
236 case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
237 case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
238 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
239 case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY:
240 case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT:
241 case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK:
245 if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) {
246 printk(KERN_ERR "AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n");
249 if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
251 if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
255 entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count);
259 entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
260 entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
261 entry->rule.action = rule->action;
262 entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
264 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
265 entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
267 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) {
268 int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1;
269 __u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)];
272 if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit)))
274 *p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit);
278 for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++)
279 entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j];
289 static u32 audit_ops[] =
291 [Audit_equal] = AUDIT_EQUAL,
292 [Audit_not_equal] = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL,
293 [Audit_bitmask] = AUDIT_BIT_MASK,
294 [Audit_bittest] = AUDIT_BIT_TEST,
295 [Audit_lt] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN,
296 [Audit_gt] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN,
297 [Audit_le] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
298 [Audit_ge] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
301 static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op)
304 for (n = Audit_equal; n < Audit_bad && audit_ops[n] != op; n++)
310 /* Translate struct audit_rule to kernel's rule respresentation.
311 * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
312 static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
314 struct audit_entry *entry;
318 entry = audit_to_entry_common(rule);
322 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
323 struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
326 n = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
328 /* Support for legacy operators where
329 * AUDIT_NEGATE bit signifies != and otherwise assumes == */
330 if (n & AUDIT_NEGATE)
331 f->op = Audit_not_equal;
335 f->op = audit_to_op(n);
337 entry->rule.vers_ops = (n & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
339 f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
340 f->val = rule->values[i];
343 if (f->op == Audit_bad)
366 /* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
367 if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
375 /* arch is only allowed to be = or != */
377 if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
379 entry->rule.arch_f = f;
386 if ((f->val & ~S_IFMT) > S_IFMT)
390 err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
397 if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
398 entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
404 audit_free_rule(entry);
408 /* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule respresentation. */
409 static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
413 struct audit_entry *entry;
415 size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
419 entry = audit_to_entry_common((struct audit_rule *)data);
424 entry->rule.vers_ops = 2;
425 for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
426 struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
430 f->op = audit_to_op(data->fieldflags[i]);
431 if (f->op == Audit_bad)
434 f->type = data->fields[i];
435 f->val = data->values[i];
462 entry->rule.arch_f = f;
464 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
465 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
466 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
472 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
473 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
474 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
477 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
479 err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
480 (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
481 /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
482 * become valid after a policy reload. */
483 if (err == -EINVAL) {
484 printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM "
485 "\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
495 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
498 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
500 err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f->val, f->op);
507 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
510 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
512 err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op);
518 err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
522 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
524 if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
526 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
529 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
530 entry->rule.filterkey = str;
537 if ((f->val & ~S_IFMT) > S_IFMT)
545 if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
546 entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
552 audit_free_rule(entry);
556 /* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */
557 static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str)
559 size_t len = strlen(str);
561 memcpy(*bufp, str, len);
567 /* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule.
568 * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
569 static struct audit_rule *audit_krule_to_rule(struct audit_krule *krule)
571 struct audit_rule *rule;
574 rule = kzalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
578 rule->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
579 rule->action = krule->action;
580 rule->field_count = krule->field_count;
581 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
582 rule->values[i] = krule->fields[i].val;
583 rule->fields[i] = krule->fields[i].type;
585 if (krule->vers_ops == 1) {
586 if (krule->fields[i].op == Audit_not_equal)
587 rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NEGATE;
589 rule->fields[i] |= audit_ops[krule->fields[i].op];
592 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) rule->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
597 /* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule_data. */
598 static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
600 struct audit_rule_data *data;
604 data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
607 memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
609 data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
610 data->action = krule->action;
611 data->field_count = krule->field_count;
613 for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
614 struct audit_field *f = &krule->fields[i];
616 data->fields[i] = f->type;
617 data->fieldflags[i] = audit_ops[f->op];
619 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
620 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
621 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
627 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
628 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
629 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
630 audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
633 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
634 audit_pack_string(&bufp,
635 audit_watch_path(krule->watch));
638 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
639 audit_pack_string(&bufp,
640 audit_tree_path(krule->tree));
642 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
643 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
644 audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
647 data->values[i] = f->val;
650 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
655 /* Compare two rules in kernel format. Considered success if rules
657 static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
661 if (a->flags != b->flags ||
662 a->listnr != b->listnr ||
663 a->action != b->action ||
664 a->field_count != b->field_count)
667 for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
668 if (a->fields[i].type != b->fields[i].type ||
669 a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op)
672 switch(a->fields[i].type) {
673 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
674 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
675 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
681 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
682 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
683 if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
687 if (strcmp(audit_watch_path(a->watch),
688 audit_watch_path(b->watch)))
692 if (strcmp(audit_tree_path(a->tree),
693 audit_tree_path(b->tree)))
696 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
697 /* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */
698 if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
702 if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
707 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
708 if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
714 /* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
716 static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
717 struct audit_field *sf)
722 /* our own copy of lsm_str */
723 lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
724 if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
726 df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
728 /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
729 ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
730 (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
731 /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
732 * become valid after a policy reload. */
733 if (ret == -EINVAL) {
734 printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
735 "invalid\n", df->lsm_str);
742 /* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
743 * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
744 * will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
745 * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
746 * The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
747 * the initial copy. */
748 struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
749 struct audit_watch *watch)
751 u32 fcount = old->field_count;
752 struct audit_entry *entry;
753 struct audit_krule *new;
757 entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
758 if (unlikely(!entry))
759 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
762 new->vers_ops = old->vers_ops;
763 new->flags = old->flags;
764 new->listnr = old->listnr;
765 new->action = old->action;
766 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
767 new->mask[i] = old->mask[i];
768 new->prio = old->prio;
769 new->buflen = old->buflen;
770 new->inode_f = old->inode_f;
772 new->field_count = old->field_count;
774 * note that we are OK with not refcounting here; audit_match_tree()
775 * never dereferences tree and we can't get false positives there
776 * since we'd have to have rule gone from the list *and* removed
777 * before the chunks found by lookup had been allocated, i.e. before
778 * the beginning of list scan.
780 new->tree = old->tree;
781 memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
783 /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
784 * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
785 for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
786 switch (new->fields[i].type) {
787 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
788 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
789 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
795 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
796 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
797 err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
800 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
801 fk = kstrdup(old->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
808 audit_free_rule(entry);
814 audit_get_watch(watch);
821 /* Find an existing audit rule.
822 * Caller must hold audit_filter_mutex to prevent stale rule data. */
823 static struct audit_entry *audit_find_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
824 struct list_head **p)
826 struct audit_entry *e, *found = NULL;
827 struct list_head *list;
830 if (entry->rule.inode_f) {
831 h = audit_hash_ino(entry->rule.inode_f->val);
832 *p = list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
833 } else if (entry->rule.watch) {
834 /* we don't know the inode number, so must walk entire hash */
835 for (h = 0; h < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; h++) {
836 list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
837 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
838 if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
845 *p = list = &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr];
848 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
849 if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
858 static u64 prio_low = ~0ULL/2;
859 static u64 prio_high = ~0ULL/2 - 1;
861 /* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. */
862 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
864 struct audit_entry *e;
865 struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
866 struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
867 struct list_head *list;
869 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
872 /* If either of these, don't count towards total */
873 if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER ||
874 entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
878 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
879 e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
881 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
883 /* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it on failure */
885 audit_put_tree(tree);
890 /* audit_filter_mutex is dropped and re-taken during this call */
891 err = audit_add_watch(&entry->rule);
893 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
896 /* entry->rule.watch may have changed during audit_add_watch() */
897 watch = entry->rule.watch;
898 h = audit_hash_ino((u32)audit_watch_inode(watch));
899 list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
902 err = audit_add_tree_rule(&entry->rule);
904 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
909 entry->rule.prio = ~0ULL;
910 if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) {
911 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND)
912 entry->rule.prio = ++prio_high;
914 entry->rule.prio = --prio_low;
917 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
918 list_add(&entry->rule.list,
919 &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
920 list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
921 entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
923 list_add_tail(&entry->rule.list,
924 &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
925 list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
927 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
931 if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
934 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
940 audit_put_watch(watch); /* tmp watch, matches initial get */
944 /* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. */
945 static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
947 struct audit_entry *e;
948 struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
949 struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
950 struct list_head *list;
951 LIST_HEAD(inotify_list);
953 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
956 /* If either of these, don't count towards total */
957 if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER ||
958 entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
962 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
963 e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
965 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
971 audit_remove_watch_rule(&e->rule, &inotify_list);
974 audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule);
976 list_del_rcu(&e->list);
977 list_del(&e->rule.list);
978 call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
980 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
984 if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
987 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
989 if (!list_empty(&inotify_list))
990 audit_inotify_unregister(&inotify_list);
994 audit_put_watch(watch); /* match initial get */
996 audit_put_tree(tree); /* that's the temporary one */
1001 /* List rules using struct audit_rule. Exists for backward
1002 * compatibility with userspace. */
1003 static void audit_list(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
1005 struct sk_buff *skb;
1006 struct audit_krule *r;
1009 /* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
1010 * iterator to sync with list writers. */
1011 for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1012 list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1013 struct audit_rule *rule;
1015 rule = audit_krule_to_rule(r);
1016 if (unlikely(!rule))
1018 skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
1019 rule, sizeof(*rule));
1021 skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1025 skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
1027 skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1030 /* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */
1031 static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
1033 struct sk_buff *skb;
1034 struct audit_krule *r;
1037 /* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
1038 * iterator to sync with list writers. */
1039 for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1040 list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1041 struct audit_rule_data *data;
1043 data = audit_krule_to_data(r);
1044 if (unlikely(!data))
1046 skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1,
1047 data, sizeof(*data) + data->buflen);
1049 skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1053 skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
1055 skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1058 /* Log rule additions and removals */
1059 static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid,
1060 char *action, struct audit_krule *rule,
1063 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1068 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
1071 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u", loginuid, sessionid);
1075 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
1076 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
1078 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
1079 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1082 audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
1083 audit_log_string(ab, action);
1084 audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
1085 audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res);
1090 * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type
1091 * @type: audit message type
1092 * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages
1093 * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages
1094 * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
1095 * @data: payload data
1096 * @datasz: size of payload data
1097 * @loginuid: loginuid of sender
1098 * @sessionid: sessionid for netlink audit message
1099 * @sid: SE Linux Security ID of sender
1101 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
1102 size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid)
1104 struct task_struct *tsk;
1105 struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
1107 struct audit_entry *entry;
1111 case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
1112 /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
1113 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
1114 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
1115 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
1116 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
1118 dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL);
1122 skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q);
1124 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1125 if (type == AUDIT_LIST)
1126 audit_list(pid, seq, &dest->q);
1128 audit_list_rules(pid, seq, &dest->q);
1129 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1131 tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list");
1133 skb_queue_purge(&dest->q);
1139 case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
1140 if (type == AUDIT_ADD)
1141 entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
1143 entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
1145 return PTR_ERR(entry);
1147 err = audit_add_rule(entry);
1148 audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "add rule",
1149 &entry->rule, !err);
1152 audit_free_rule(entry);
1155 case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
1156 if (type == AUDIT_DEL)
1157 entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
1159 entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
1161 return PTR_ERR(entry);
1163 err = audit_del_rule(entry);
1164 audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "remove rule",
1165 &entry->rule, !err);
1167 audit_free_rule(entry);
1176 int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right)
1180 return (left == right);
1181 case Audit_not_equal:
1182 return (left != right);
1184 return (left < right);
1186 return (left <= right);
1188 return (left > right);
1190 return (left >= right);
1192 return (left & right);
1194 return ((left & right) == right);
1201 /* Compare given dentry name with last component in given path,
1202 * return of 0 indicates a match. */
1203 int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path,
1209 if (!dname || !path)
1212 dlen = strlen(dname);
1213 plen = strlen(path);
1217 /* disregard trailing slashes */
1218 p = path + plen - 1;
1219 while ((*p == '/') && (p > path))
1222 /* find last path component */
1226 else if (p > path) {
1233 /* return length of path's directory component */
1236 return strncmp(p, dname, dlen);
1239 static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
1240 struct audit_krule *rule,
1241 enum audit_state *state)
1245 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
1246 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
1251 result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, f->op, f->val);
1254 result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, f->op, f->val);
1257 result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, f->op, f->val);
1259 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
1260 result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
1267 switch (rule->action) {
1268 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
1269 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
1274 int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb)
1276 enum audit_state state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
1277 struct audit_entry *e;
1281 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
1282 if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
1283 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1290 return ret; /* Audit by default */
1293 int audit_filter_type(int type)
1295 struct audit_entry *e;
1299 if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE]))
1300 goto unlock_and_return;
1302 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE],
1305 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
1306 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
1307 if (f->type == AUDIT_MSGTYPE) {
1308 result = audit_comparator(type, f->op, f->val);
1314 goto unlock_and_return;
1321 static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
1323 struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
1324 struct audit_entry *nentry;
1325 struct audit_watch *watch;
1326 struct audit_tree *tree;
1329 if (!security_audit_rule_known(r))
1334 nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r, watch);
1335 if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
1336 /* save the first error encountered for the
1338 err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
1339 audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
1341 list_del(&r->rlist);
1342 list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
1346 list_add(&nentry->rule.rlist, audit_watch_rules(watch));
1347 list_del(&r->rlist);
1349 list_replace_init(&r->rlist, &nentry->rule.rlist);
1350 list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
1351 list_replace(&r->list, &nentry->rule.list);
1353 call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
1358 /* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
1359 * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
1360 * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
1361 * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
1363 int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
1365 struct audit_krule *r, *n;
1368 /* audit_filter_mutex synchronizes the writers */
1369 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1371 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1372 list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1373 int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
1378 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);