2 * Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
3 * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
4 * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
5 * Dug Song <dugsong@monkey.org>
7 * RPCSEC_GSS server authentication.
8 * This implements RPCSEC_GSS as defined in rfc2203 (rpcsec_gss) and rfc2078
11 * The RPCSEC_GSS involves three stages:
14 * 3/ context destruction
16 * Context creation is handled largely by upcalls to user-space.
17 * In particular, GSS_Accept_sec_context is handled by an upcall
18 * Data exchange is handled entirely within the kernel
19 * In particular, GSS_GetMIC, GSS_VerifyMIC, GSS_Seal, GSS_Unseal are in-kernel.
20 * Context destruction is handled in-kernel
21 * GSS_Delete_sec_context is in-kernel
23 * Context creation is initiated by a RPCSEC_GSS_INIT request arriving.
24 * The context handle and gss_token are used as a key into the rpcsec_init cache.
25 * The content of this cache includes some of the outputs of GSS_Accept_sec_context,
26 * being major_status, minor_status, context_handle, reply_token.
27 * These are sent back to the client.
28 * Sequence window management is handled by the kernel. The window size if currently
29 * a compile time constant.
31 * When user-space is happy that a context is established, it places an entry
32 * in the rpcsec_context cache. The key for this cache is the context_handle.
33 * The content includes:
34 * uid/gidlist - for determining access rights
36 * mechanism specific information, such as a key
40 #include <linux/types.h>
41 #include <linux/module.h>
42 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
44 #include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
45 #include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
46 #include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
47 #include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
48 #include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
49 #include <linux/sunrpc/cache.h>
52 # define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
55 /* The rpcsec_init cache is used for mapping RPCSEC_GSS_{,CONT_}INIT requests
58 * Key is context handle (\x if empty) and gss_token.
59 * Content is major_status minor_status (integers) context_handle, reply_token.
63 static int netobj_equal(struct xdr_netobj *a, struct xdr_netobj *b)
65 return a->len == b->len && 0 == memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->len);
68 #define RSI_HASHBITS 6
69 #define RSI_HASHMAX (1<<RSI_HASHBITS)
70 #define RSI_HASHMASK (RSI_HASHMAX-1)
74 struct xdr_netobj in_handle, in_token;
75 struct xdr_netobj out_handle, out_token;
76 int major_status, minor_status;
79 static struct cache_head *rsi_table[RSI_HASHMAX];
80 static struct cache_detail rsi_cache;
81 static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old);
82 static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct rsi *item);
84 static void rsi_free(struct rsi *rsii)
86 kfree(rsii->in_handle.data);
87 kfree(rsii->in_token.data);
88 kfree(rsii->out_handle.data);
89 kfree(rsii->out_token.data);
92 static void rsi_put(struct kref *ref)
94 struct rsi *rsii = container_of(ref, struct rsi, h.ref);
99 static inline int rsi_hash(struct rsi *item)
101 return hash_mem(item->in_handle.data, item->in_handle.len, RSI_HASHBITS)
102 ^ hash_mem(item->in_token.data, item->in_token.len, RSI_HASHBITS);
105 static int rsi_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
107 struct rsi *item = container_of(a, struct rsi, h);
108 struct rsi *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsi, h);
109 return netobj_equal(&item->in_handle, &tmp->in_handle)
110 && netobj_equal(&item->in_token, &tmp->in_token);
113 static int dup_to_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, char *src, int len)
116 dst->data = (len ? kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL) : NULL);
118 memcpy(dst->data, src, len);
119 if (len && !dst->data)
124 static inline int dup_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, struct xdr_netobj *src)
126 return dup_to_netobj(dst, src->data, src->len);
129 static void rsi_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
131 struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
132 struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
134 new->out_handle.data = NULL;
135 new->out_handle.len = 0;
136 new->out_token.data = NULL;
137 new->out_token.len = 0;
138 new->in_handle.len = item->in_handle.len;
139 item->in_handle.len = 0;
140 new->in_token.len = item->in_token.len;
141 item->in_token.len = 0;
142 new->in_handle.data = item->in_handle.data;
143 item->in_handle.data = NULL;
144 new->in_token.data = item->in_token.data;
145 item->in_token.data = NULL;
148 static void update_rsi(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
150 struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
151 struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
153 BUG_ON(new->out_handle.data || new->out_token.data);
154 new->out_handle.len = item->out_handle.len;
155 item->out_handle.len = 0;
156 new->out_token.len = item->out_token.len;
157 item->out_token.len = 0;
158 new->out_handle.data = item->out_handle.data;
159 item->out_handle.data = NULL;
160 new->out_token.data = item->out_token.data;
161 item->out_token.data = NULL;
163 new->major_status = item->major_status;
164 new->minor_status = item->minor_status;
167 static struct cache_head *rsi_alloc(void)
169 struct rsi *rsii = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsii), GFP_KERNEL);
176 static void rsi_request(struct cache_detail *cd,
177 struct cache_head *h,
178 char **bpp, int *blen)
180 struct rsi *rsii = container_of(h, struct rsi, h);
182 qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_handle.data, rsii->in_handle.len);
183 qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_token.data, rsii->in_token.len);
188 static int rsi_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
189 char *mesg, int mlen)
191 /* context token expiry major minor context token */
195 struct rsi rsii, *rsip = NULL;
197 int status = -EINVAL;
199 memset(&rsii, 0, sizeof(rsii));
201 len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
205 if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_handle, buf, len))
209 len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
214 if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_token, buf, len))
217 rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsii);
223 expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
229 len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
235 rsii.major_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
238 len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
241 rsii.minor_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
246 len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
250 if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_handle, buf, len))
254 len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
259 if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_token, buf, len))
262 rsii.h.expiry_time = expiry;
263 rsip = rsi_update(&rsii, rsip);
268 cache_put(&rsip->h, &rsi_cache);
274 static struct cache_detail rsi_cache = {
275 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
276 .hash_size = RSI_HASHMAX,
277 .hash_table = rsi_table,
278 .name = "auth.rpcsec.init",
279 .cache_put = rsi_put,
280 .cache_request = rsi_request,
281 .cache_parse = rsi_parse,
284 .update = update_rsi,
288 static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct rsi *item)
290 struct cache_head *ch;
291 int hash = rsi_hash(item);
293 ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup(&rsi_cache, &item->h, hash);
295 return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
300 static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old)
302 struct cache_head *ch;
303 int hash = rsi_hash(new);
305 ch = sunrpc_cache_update(&rsi_cache, &new->h,
308 return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
315 * The rpcsec_context cache is used to store a context that is
316 * used in data exchange.
317 * The key is a context handle. The content is:
318 * uid, gidlist, mechanism, service-set, mech-specific-data
321 #define RSC_HASHBITS 10
322 #define RSC_HASHMAX (1<<RSC_HASHBITS)
323 #define RSC_HASHMASK (RSC_HASHMAX-1)
325 #define GSS_SEQ_WIN 128
327 struct gss_svc_seq_data {
328 /* highest seq number seen so far: */
330 /* for i such that sd_max-GSS_SEQ_WIN < i <= sd_max, the i-th bit of
331 * sd_win is nonzero iff sequence number i has been seen already: */
332 unsigned long sd_win[GSS_SEQ_WIN/BITS_PER_LONG];
338 struct xdr_netobj handle;
339 struct svc_cred cred;
340 struct gss_svc_seq_data seqdata;
341 struct gss_ctx *mechctx;
344 static struct cache_head *rsc_table[RSC_HASHMAX];
345 static struct cache_detail rsc_cache;
346 static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old);
347 static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct rsc *item);
349 static void rsc_free(struct rsc *rsci)
351 kfree(rsci->handle.data);
353 gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx);
354 if (rsci->cred.cr_group_info)
355 put_group_info(rsci->cred.cr_group_info);
358 static void rsc_put(struct kref *ref)
360 struct rsc *rsci = container_of(ref, struct rsc, h.ref);
367 rsc_hash(struct rsc *rsci)
369 return hash_mem(rsci->handle.data, rsci->handle.len, RSC_HASHBITS);
373 rsc_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
375 struct rsc *new = container_of(a, struct rsc, h);
376 struct rsc *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsc, h);
378 return netobj_equal(&new->handle, &tmp->handle);
382 rsc_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
384 struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
385 struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
387 new->handle.len = tmp->handle.len;
389 new->handle.data = tmp->handle.data;
390 tmp->handle.data = NULL;
392 new->cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
396 update_rsc(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
398 struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
399 struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
401 new->mechctx = tmp->mechctx;
403 memset(&new->seqdata, 0, sizeof(new->seqdata));
404 spin_lock_init(&new->seqdata.sd_lock);
405 new->cred = tmp->cred;
406 tmp->cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
409 static struct cache_head *
412 struct rsc *rsci = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsci), GFP_KERNEL);
419 static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
420 char *mesg, int mlen)
422 /* contexthandle expiry [ uid gid N <n gids> mechname ...mechdata... ] */
425 struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL;
427 int status = -EINVAL;
428 struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
430 memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
432 len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
433 if (len < 0) goto out;
435 if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, buf, len))
440 expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
445 rscp = rsc_lookup(&rsci);
449 /* uid, or NEGATIVE */
450 rv = get_int(&mesg, &rsci.cred.cr_uid);
454 set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci.h.flags);
459 if (get_int(&mesg, &rsci.cred.cr_gid))
462 /* number of additional gid's */
463 if (get_int(&mesg, &N))
466 rsci.cred.cr_group_info = groups_alloc(N);
467 if (rsci.cred.cr_group_info == NULL)
472 for (i=0; i<N; i++) {
474 if (get_int(&mesg, &gid))
476 GROUP_AT(rsci.cred.cr_group_info, i) = gid;
480 len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
483 gm = gss_mech_get_by_name(buf);
484 status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
489 /* mech-specific data: */
490 len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
493 status = gss_import_sec_context(buf, len, gm, &rsci.mechctx);
497 rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;
498 rscp = rsc_update(&rsci, rscp);
504 cache_put(&rscp->h, &rsc_cache);
510 static struct cache_detail rsc_cache = {
511 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
512 .hash_size = RSC_HASHMAX,
513 .hash_table = rsc_table,
514 .name = "auth.rpcsec.context",
515 .cache_put = rsc_put,
516 .cache_parse = rsc_parse,
519 .update = update_rsc,
523 static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct rsc *item)
525 struct cache_head *ch;
526 int hash = rsc_hash(item);
528 ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup(&rsc_cache, &item->h, hash);
530 return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
535 static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old)
537 struct cache_head *ch;
538 int hash = rsc_hash(new);
540 ch = sunrpc_cache_update(&rsc_cache, &new->h,
543 return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
550 gss_svc_searchbyctx(struct xdr_netobj *handle)
555 memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
556 if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, handle->data, handle->len))
558 found = rsc_lookup(&rsci);
562 if (cache_check(&rsc_cache, &found->h, NULL))
567 /* Implements sequence number algorithm as specified in RFC 2203. */
569 gss_check_seq_num(struct rsc *rsci, int seq_num)
571 struct gss_svc_seq_data *sd = &rsci->seqdata;
573 spin_lock(&sd->sd_lock);
574 if (seq_num > sd->sd_max) {
575 if (seq_num >= sd->sd_max + GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
576 memset(sd->sd_win,0,sizeof(sd->sd_win));
577 sd->sd_max = seq_num;
578 } else while (sd->sd_max < seq_num) {
580 __clear_bit(sd->sd_max % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
582 __set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
584 } else if (seq_num <= sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
587 /* sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN < seq_num <= sd_max */
588 if (__test_and_set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win))
591 spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
594 spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
598 static inline u32 round_up_to_quad(u32 i)
600 return (i + 3 ) & ~3;
604 svc_safe_getnetobj(struct kvec *argv, struct xdr_netobj *o)
608 if (argv->iov_len < 4)
610 o->len = svc_getnl(argv);
611 l = round_up_to_quad(o->len);
612 if (argv->iov_len < l)
614 o->data = argv->iov_base;
621 svc_safe_putnetobj(struct kvec *resv, struct xdr_netobj *o)
625 if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
627 svc_putnl(resv, o->len);
628 p = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
629 resv->iov_len += round_up_to_quad(o->len);
630 if (resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE)
632 memcpy(p, o->data, o->len);
633 memset(p + o->len, 0, round_up_to_quad(o->len) - o->len);
637 /* Verify the checksum on the header and return SVC_OK on success.
638 * Otherwise, return SVC_DROP (in the case of a bad sequence number)
639 * or return SVC_DENIED and indicate error in authp.
642 gss_verify_header(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci,
643 __be32 *rpcstart, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp)
645 struct gss_ctx *ctx_id = rsci->mechctx;
646 struct xdr_buf rpchdr;
647 struct xdr_netobj checksum;
649 struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
652 /* data to compute the checksum over: */
653 iov.iov_base = rpcstart;
654 iov.iov_len = (u8 *)argv->iov_base - (u8 *)rpcstart;
655 xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &rpchdr);
657 *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
658 if (argv->iov_len < 4)
660 flavor = svc_getnl(argv);
661 if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_GSS)
663 if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &checksum))
666 if (rqstp->rq_deferred) /* skip verification of revisited request */
668 if (gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
669 *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
673 if (gc->gc_seq > MAXSEQ) {
674 dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: discarding request with large sequence number %d\n",
676 *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
679 if (!gss_check_seq_num(rsci, gc->gc_seq)) {
680 dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: discarding request with old sequence number %d\n",
688 gss_write_null_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
692 svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_NULL);
693 p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
694 /* don't really need to check if head->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE ... */
696 if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p))
702 gss_write_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq)
706 struct xdr_buf verf_data;
707 struct xdr_netobj mic;
711 svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_GSS);
712 xdr_seq = htonl(seq);
714 iov.iov_base = &xdr_seq;
715 iov.iov_len = sizeof(xdr_seq);
716 xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_data);
717 p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
718 mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
719 maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &mic);
720 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
722 *p++ = htonl(mic.len);
723 memset((u8 *)p + mic.len, 0, round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len);
724 p += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len);
725 if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p))
731 struct auth_domain h;
735 static struct auth_domain *
736 find_gss_auth_domain(struct gss_ctx *ctx, u32 svc)
740 name = gss_service_to_auth_domain_name(ctx->mech_type, svc);
743 return auth_domain_find(name);
746 static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss;
749 svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name)
751 struct gss_domain *new;
752 struct auth_domain *test;
755 new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
758 kref_init(&new->h.ref);
759 new->h.name = kmalloc(strlen(name) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
762 strcpy(new->h.name, name);
763 new->h.flavour = &svcauthops_gss;
764 new->pseudoflavor = pseudoflavor;
766 test = auth_domain_lookup(name, &new->h);
767 if (test != &new->h) { /* XXX Duplicate registration? */
768 auth_domain_put(&new->h);
769 /* dangling ref-count... */
780 EXPORT_SYMBOL(svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor);
783 read_u32_from_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf, int base, u32 *obj)
788 status = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, base, &raw, sizeof(*obj));
795 /* It would be nice if this bit of code could be shared with the client.
797 * The client shouldn't malloc(), would have to pass in own memory.
798 * The server uses base of head iovec as read pointer, while the
799 * client uses separate pointer. */
801 unwrap_integ_data(struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
804 u32 integ_len, maj_stat;
805 struct xdr_netobj mic;
806 struct xdr_buf integ_buf;
808 integ_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
811 if (integ_len > buf->len)
813 if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &integ_buf, 0, integ_len))
815 /* copy out mic... */
816 if (read_u32_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len, &mic.len))
818 if (mic.len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE)
820 mic.data = kmalloc(mic.len, GFP_KERNEL);
823 if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len + 4, mic.data, mic.len))
825 maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx, &integ_buf, &mic);
826 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
828 if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq)
836 total_buf_len(struct xdr_buf *buf)
838 return buf->head[0].iov_len + buf->page_len + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
842 fix_priv_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, int pad)
844 if (buf->page_len == 0) {
845 /* We need to adjust head and buf->len in tandem in this
846 * case to make svc_defer() work--it finds the original
847 * buffer start using buf->len - buf->head[0].iov_len. */
848 buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad;
853 unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
855 u32 priv_len, maj_stat;
856 int pad, saved_len, remaining_len, offset;
858 rqstp->rq_sendfile_ok = 0;
860 priv_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
861 if (rqstp->rq_deferred) {
862 /* Already decrypted last time through! The sequence number
863 * check at out_seq is unnecessary but harmless: */
866 /* buf->len is the number of bytes from the original start of the
867 * request to the end, where head[0].iov_len is just the bytes
868 * not yet read from the head, so these two values are different: */
869 remaining_len = total_buf_len(buf);
870 if (priv_len > remaining_len)
872 pad = remaining_len - priv_len;
874 fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
876 /* Maybe it would be better to give gss_unwrap a length parameter: */
877 saved_len = buf->len;
879 maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, buf);
880 pad = priv_len - buf->len;
881 buf->len = saved_len;
883 /* The upper layers assume the buffer is aligned on 4-byte boundaries.
884 * In the krb5p case, at least, the data ends up offset, so we need to
886 /* XXX: This is very inefficient. It would be better to either do
887 * this while we encrypt, or maybe in the receive code, if we can peak
888 * ahead and work out the service and mechanism there. */
889 offset = buf->head[0].iov_len % 4;
891 buf->buflen = RPCSVC_MAXPAYLOAD;
892 xdr_shift_buf(buf, offset);
893 fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
895 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
898 if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq)
903 struct gss_svc_data {
904 /* decoded gss client cred: */
905 struct rpc_gss_wire_cred clcred;
906 /* save a pointer to the beginning of the encoded verifier,
907 * for use in encryption/checksumming in svcauth_gss_release: */
913 svcauth_gss_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
915 struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
916 struct rsc *rsci = svcdata->rsci;
917 struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &svcdata->clcred;
919 rqstp->rq_client = find_gss_auth_domain(rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_svc);
920 if (rqstp->rq_client == NULL)
926 gss_write_init_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsi *rsip)
930 if (rsip->major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
931 return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp);
932 rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(&rsip->out_handle);
934 rsip->major_status = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
935 return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp);
937 return gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, GSS_SEQ_WIN);
941 * Accept an rpcsec packet.
942 * If context establishment, punt to user space
943 * If data exchange, verify/decrypt
944 * If context destruction, handle here
945 * In the context establishment and destruction case we encode
946 * response here and return SVC_COMPLETE.
949 svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
951 struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
952 struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
954 struct xdr_netobj tmpobj;
955 struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
956 struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc;
957 struct rsc *rsci = NULL;
958 struct rsi *rsip, rsikey;
960 __be32 *reject_stat = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
963 dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: argv->iov_len = %zd\n",argv->iov_len);
965 *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
967 svcdata = kmalloc(sizeof(*svcdata), GFP_KERNEL);
970 rqstp->rq_auth_data = svcdata;
971 svcdata->verf_start = NULL;
972 svcdata->rsci = NULL;
973 gc = &svcdata->clcred;
975 /* start of rpc packet is 7 u32's back from here:
976 * xid direction rpcversion prog vers proc flavour
978 rpcstart = argv->iov_base;
982 * version(==1), proc(0,1,2,3), seq, service (1,2,3), handle
983 * at least 5 u32s, and is preceeded by length, so that makes 6.
986 if (argv->iov_len < 5 * 4)
988 crlen = svc_getnl(argv);
989 if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_GSS_VERSION)
991 gc->gc_proc = svc_getnl(argv);
992 gc->gc_seq = svc_getnl(argv);
993 gc->gc_svc = svc_getnl(argv);
994 if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &gc->gc_ctx))
996 if (crlen != round_up_to_quad(gc->gc_ctx.len) + 5 * 4)
999 if ((gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) && (rqstp->rq_proc != 0))
1003 * We've successfully parsed the credential. Let's check out the
1004 * verifier. An AUTH_NULL verifier is allowed (and required) for
1005 * INIT and CONTINUE_INIT requests. AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS is required for
1006 * PROC_DATA and PROC_DESTROY.
1008 * AUTH_NULL verifier is 0 (AUTH_NULL), 0 (length).
1009 * AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS verifier is:
1010 * 6 (AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS), length, checksum.
1011 * checksum is calculated over rpcheader from xid up to here.
1013 *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
1014 switch (gc->gc_proc) {
1015 case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT:
1016 case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT:
1017 if (argv->iov_len < 2 * 4)
1019 if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_AUTH_NULL)
1021 if (svc_getnl(argv) != 0)
1024 case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
1025 case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
1026 *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
1027 rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(&gc->gc_ctx);
1030 switch (gss_verify_header(rqstp, rsci, rpcstart, gc, authp)) {
1040 *authp = rpc_autherr_rejectedcred;
1044 /* now act upon the command: */
1045 switch (gc->gc_proc) {
1046 case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT:
1047 case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT:
1048 *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
1049 if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0)
1051 memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey));
1052 if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx))
1054 *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
1055 if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &tmpobj)) {
1056 kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
1059 if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_token, &tmpobj)) {
1060 kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
1064 rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsikey);
1069 switch(cache_check(&rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle)) {
1075 if (gss_write_init_verf(rqstp, rsip))
1077 if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
1079 svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS);
1080 if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_handle))
1082 if (resv->iov_len + 3 * 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
1084 svc_putnl(resv, rsip->major_status);
1085 svc_putnl(resv, rsip->minor_status);
1086 svc_putnl(resv, GSS_SEQ_WIN);
1087 if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_token))
1089 rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
1092 case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
1093 set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci->h.flags);
1094 if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
1096 svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS);
1098 case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
1099 *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
1100 svcdata->verf_start = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
1101 if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
1103 rqstp->rq_cred = rsci->cred;
1104 get_group_info(rsci->cred.cr_group_info);
1105 *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
1106 switch (gc->gc_svc) {
1107 case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
1109 case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
1110 if (unwrap_integ_data(&rqstp->rq_arg,
1111 gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
1113 /* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
1117 case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
1118 if (unwrap_priv_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
1119 gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
1121 /* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
1128 svcdata->rsci = rsci;
1129 cache_get(&rsci->h);
1134 /* Restore write pointer to original value: */
1135 xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, reject_stat);
1145 cache_put(&rsci->h, &rsc_cache);
1150 svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(struct xdr_buf *resbuf, struct gss_svc_data *gsd)
1155 p = gsd->verf_start;
1156 gsd->verf_start = NULL;
1158 /* If the reply stat is nonzero, don't wrap: */
1159 if (*(p-1) != rpc_success)
1161 /* Skip the verifier: */
1163 verf_len = ntohl(*p++);
1164 p += XDR_QUADLEN(verf_len);
1165 /* move accept_stat to right place: */
1166 memcpy(p, p + 2, 4);
1167 /* Also don't wrap if the accept stat is nonzero: */
1168 if (*p != rpc_success) {
1169 resbuf->head[0].iov_len -= 2 * 4;
1177 svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
1179 struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
1180 struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
1181 struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
1182 struct xdr_buf integ_buf;
1183 struct xdr_netobj mic;
1186 int integ_offset, integ_len;
1189 p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd);
1192 integ_offset = (u8 *)(p + 1) - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base;
1193 integ_len = resbuf->len - integ_offset;
1194 BUG_ON(integ_len % 4);
1195 *p++ = htonl(integ_len);
1196 *p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
1197 if (xdr_buf_subsegment(resbuf, &integ_buf, integ_offset,
1200 if (resbuf->page_len == 0
1201 && resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE
1203 BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
1204 /* Use head for everything */
1205 resv = &resbuf->head[0];
1206 } else if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
1207 if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
1209 resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base
1210 + resbuf->head[0].iov_len;
1211 resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
1212 resv = &resbuf->tail[0];
1214 resv = &resbuf->tail[0];
1216 mic.data = (u8 *)resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len + 4;
1217 if (gss_get_mic(gsd->rsci->mechctx, &integ_buf, &mic))
1219 svc_putnl(resv, mic.len);
1220 memset(mic.data + mic.len, 0,
1221 round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len);
1222 resv->iov_len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2;
1223 /* not strictly required: */
1224 resbuf->len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2;
1225 BUG_ON(resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE);
1233 svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
1235 struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
1236 struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
1237 struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
1238 struct page **inpages = NULL;
1243 p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd);
1247 offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base;
1248 *p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
1249 inpages = resbuf->pages;
1250 /* XXX: Would be better to write some xdr helper functions for
1251 * nfs{2,3,4}xdr.c that place the data right, instead of copying: */
1252 if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base) {
1253 BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base >= resbuf->head[0].iov_base
1255 BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base < resbuf->head[0].iov_base);
1256 if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_len + resbuf->head[0].iov_len
1257 + 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
1259 memmove(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE,
1260 resbuf->tail[0].iov_base,
1261 resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
1262 resbuf->tail[0].iov_base += RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
1264 if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
1265 if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + 2*RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
1267 resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base
1268 + resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
1269 resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
1271 if (gss_wrap(gsd->rsci->mechctx, offset, resbuf, inpages))
1273 *len = htonl(resbuf->len - offset);
1274 pad = 3 - ((resbuf->len - offset - 1)&3);
1275 p = (__be32 *)(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
1277 resbuf->tail[0].iov_len += pad;
1283 svcauth_gss_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
1285 struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
1286 struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
1287 struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
1290 if (gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA)
1292 /* Release can be called twice, but we only wrap once. */
1293 if (gsd->verf_start == NULL)
1295 /* normally not set till svc_send, but we need it here: */
1296 /* XXX: what for? Do we mess it up the moment we call svc_putu32
1298 resbuf->len = total_buf_len(resbuf);
1299 switch (gc->gc_svc) {
1300 case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
1302 case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
1303 stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(rqstp);
1307 case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
1308 stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(rqstp);
1319 if (rqstp->rq_client)
1320 auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_client);
1321 rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
1322 if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info)
1323 put_group_info(rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info);
1324 rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
1326 cache_put(&gsd->rsci->h, &rsc_cache);
1333 svcauth_gss_domain_release(struct auth_domain *dom)
1335 struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);
1341 static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss = {
1342 .name = "rpcsec_gss",
1343 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
1344 .flavour = RPC_AUTH_GSS,
1345 .accept = svcauth_gss_accept,
1346 .release = svcauth_gss_release,
1347 .domain_release = svcauth_gss_domain_release,
1348 .set_client = svcauth_gss_set_client,
1354 int rv = svc_auth_register(RPC_AUTH_GSS, &svcauthops_gss);
1356 cache_register(&rsc_cache);
1357 cache_register(&rsi_cache);
1363 gss_svc_shutdown(void)
1365 if (cache_unregister(&rsc_cache))
1366 printk(KERN_ERR "auth_rpcgss: failed to unregister rsc cache\n");
1367 if (cache_unregister(&rsi_cache))
1368 printk(KERN_ERR "auth_rpcgss: failed to unregister rsi cache\n");
1369 svc_auth_unregister(RPC_AUTH_GSS);