git.oblomov.eu Git - linux-2.6/blob - security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
   7  *            Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
   8  *            Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
   9  *            James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  10  *
  11  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  13  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  14  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  15  *  Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  16  *                     Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
  17  *
  18  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  19  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  20  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  21  */
  22
  23 #include <linux/module.h>
  24 #include <linux/init.h>
  25 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  26 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  27 #include <linux/errno.h>
  28 #include <linux/sched.h>
  29 #include <linux/security.h>
  30 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  31 #include <linux/capability.h>
  32 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  33 #include <linux/mm.h>
  34 #include <linux/mman.h>
  35 #include <linux/slab.h>
  36 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  37 #include <linux/swap.h>
  38 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  40 #include <linux/file.h>
  41 #include <linux/namei.h>
  42 #include <linux/mount.h>
  43 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
  44 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  45 #include <linux/kd.h>
  46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  48 #include <linux/tty.h>
  49 #include <net/icmp.h>
  50 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
  51 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  52 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
  53 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  54 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  55 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  56 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  57 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  58 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  59 #include <linux/udp.h>
  60 #include <linux/dccp.h>
  61 #include <linux/quota.h>
  62 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  63 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  64 #include <linux/parser.h>
  65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  66 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  68 #include <linux/personality.h>
  69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  70 #include <linux/audit.h>
  71 #include <linux/string.h>
  72 #include <linux/selinux.h>
  73 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  74
  75 #include "avc.h"
  76 #include "objsec.h"
  77 #include "netif.h"
  78 #include "xfrm.h"
  79 #include "netlabel.h"
  80
  81 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
  82 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
  83
  84 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
  85 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
  86 extern int selinux_compat_net;
  87
  88 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
  89 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
  90
  91 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
  92 {
  93         selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
  94         return 1;
  95 }
  96 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
  97 #endif
  98
  99 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 100 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 101
 102 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 103 {
 104         selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
 105         return 1;
 106 }
 107 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 108 #else
 109 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 110 #endif
 111
 112 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
 113 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
 114
 115 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
 116    just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
 117    The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
 118    module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
 119 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
 120
 121 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
 122    before the policy was loaded. */
 123 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 124 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 125
 126 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 127
 128 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
 129    length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
 130 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
 131 {
 132         char *context;
 133         unsigned len;
 134         int rc;
 135
 136         rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
 137         if (rc)
 138                 return rc;
 139
 140         if (!buffer || !size)
 141                 goto getsecurity_exit;
 142
 143         if (size < len) {
 144                 len = -ERANGE;
 145                 goto getsecurity_exit;
 146         }
 147         memcpy(buffer, context, len);
 148
 149 getsecurity_exit:
 150         kfree(context);
 151         return len;
 152 }
 153
 154 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 155
 156 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
 157 {
 158         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 159
 160         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 161         if (!tsec)
 162                 return -ENOMEM;
 163
 164         tsec->task = task;
 165         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 166         task->security = tsec;
 167
 168         return 0;
 169 }
 170
 171 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
 172 {
 173         struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
 174         task->security = NULL;
 175         kfree(tsec);
 176 }
 177
 178 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 179 {
 180         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 181         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 182
 183         isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
 184         if (!isec)
 185                 return -ENOMEM;
 186
 187         mutex_init(&isec->lock);
 188         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 189         isec->inode = inode;
 190         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 191         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
 192         isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
 193         inode->i_security = isec;
 194
 195         return 0;
 196 }
 197
 198 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 199 {
 200         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 201         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 202
 203         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 204         if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
 205                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 206         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 207
 208         inode->i_security = NULL;
 209         kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 210 }
 211
 212 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 213 {
 214         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 215         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 216
 217         fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 218         if (!fsec)
 219                 return -ENOMEM;
 220
 221         fsec->file = file;
 222         fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
 223         fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
 224         file->f_security = fsec;
 225
 226         return 0;
 227 }
 228
 229 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 230 {
 231         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 232         file->f_security = NULL;
 233         kfree(fsec);
 234 }
 235
 236 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 237 {
 238         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 239
 240         sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 241         if (!sbsec)
 242                 return -ENOMEM;
 243
 244         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 245         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
 246         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 247         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 248         sbsec->sb = sb;
 249         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 250         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 251         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 252         sb->s_security = sbsec;
 253
 254         return 0;
 255 }
 256
 257 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 258 {
 259         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 260
 261         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 262         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 263                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
 264         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 265
 266         sb->s_security = NULL;
 267         kfree(sbsec);
 268 }
 269
 270 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 271 {
 272         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 273
 274         ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
 275         if (!ssec)
 276                 return -ENOMEM;
 277
 278         ssec->sk = sk;
 279         ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 280         ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 281         sk->sk_security = ssec;
 282
 283         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
 284
 285         return 0;
 286 }
 287
 288 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 289 {
 290         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
 291
 292         sk->sk_security = NULL;
 293         kfree(ssec);
 294 }
 295
 296 /* The security server must be initialized before
 297    any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
 298 extern int ss_initialized;
 299
 300 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
 301
 302 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
 303         "uses xattr",
 304         "uses transition SIDs",
 305         "uses task SIDs",
 306         "uses genfs_contexts",
 307         "not configured for labeling",
 308         "uses mountpoint labeling",
 309 };
 310
 311 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 312
 313 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
 314 {
 315         return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 316 }
 317
 318 enum {
 319         Opt_context = 1,
 320         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 321         Opt_defcontext = 4,
 322         Opt_rootcontext = 8,
 323 };
 324
 325 static match_table_t tokens = {
 326         {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
 327         {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
 328         {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
 329         {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
 330 };
 331
 332 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 333
 334 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 335                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 336                         struct task_security_struct *tsec)
 337 {
 338         int rc;
 339
 340         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 341                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 342         if (rc)
 343                 return rc;
 344
 345         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 346                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 347         return rc;
 348 }
 349
 350 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 351                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 352                         struct task_security_struct *tsec)
 353 {
 354         int rc;
 355         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 356                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 357         if (rc)
 358                 return rc;
 359
 360         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 361                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 362         return rc;
 363 }
 364
 365 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 366 {
 367         char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
 368         char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
 369         const char *name;
 370         u32 sid;
 371         int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
 372         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 373         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 374
 375         if (!data)
 376                 goto out;
 377
 378         name = sb->s_type->name;
 379
 380         if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
 381
 382                 /* NFS we understand. */
 383                 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
 384                         struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
 385
 386                         if (d->version <  NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
 387                                 goto out;
 388
 389                         if (d->context[0]) {
 390                                 context = d->context;
 391                                 seen |= Opt_context;
 392                         }
 393                 } else
 394                         goto out;
 395
 396         } else {
 397                 /* Standard string-based options. */
 398                 char *p, *options = data;
 399
 400                 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
 401                         int token;
 402                         substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 403
 404                         if (!*p)
 405                                 continue;
 406
 407                         token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
 408
 409                         switch (token) {
 410                         case Opt_context:
 411                                 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
 412                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 413                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 414                                         goto out_free;
 415                                 }
 416                                 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 417                                 if (!context) {
 418                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 419                                         goto out_free;
 420                                 }
 421                                 if (!alloc)
 422                                         alloc = 1;
 423                                 seen |= Opt_context;
 424                                 break;
 425
 426                         case Opt_fscontext:
 427                                 if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
 428                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 429                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 430                                         goto out_free;
 431                                 }
 432                                 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 433                                 if (!fscontext) {
 434                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 435                                         goto out_free;
 436                                 }
 437                                 if (!alloc)
 438                                         alloc = 1;
 439                                 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
 440                                 break;
 441
 442                         case Opt_rootcontext:
 443                                 if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
 444                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 445                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 446                                         goto out_free;
 447                                 }
 448                                 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 449                                 if (!rootcontext) {
 450                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 451                                         goto out_free;
 452                                 }
 453                                 if (!alloc)
 454                                         alloc = 1;
 455                                 seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
 456                                 break;
 457
 458                         case Opt_defcontext:
 459                                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 460                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 461                                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  "
 462                                                "defcontext option is invalid "
 463                                                "for this filesystem type\n");
 464                                         goto out_free;
 465                                 }
 466                                 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
 467                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 468                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 469                                         goto out_free;
 470                                 }
 471                                 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 472                                 if (!defcontext) {
 473                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 474                                         goto out_free;
 475                                 }
 476                                 if (!alloc)
 477                                         alloc = 1;
 478                                 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
 479                                 break;
 480
 481                         default:
 482                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 483                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount "
 484                                        "option\n");
 485                                 goto out_free;
 486
 487                         }
 488                 }
 489         }
 490
 491         if (!seen)
 492                 goto out;
 493
 494         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 495         if (fscontext) {
 496                 rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
 497                 if (rc) {
 498                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 499                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 500                                fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 501                         goto out_free;
 502                 }
 503
 504                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 505                 if (rc)
 506                         goto out_free;
 507
 508                 sbsec->sid = sid;
 509         }
 510
 511         /*
 512          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 513          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 514          * the superblock context if not already set.
 515          */
 516         if (context) {
 517                 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
 518                 if (rc) {
 519                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 520                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 521                                context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 522                         goto out_free;
 523                 }
 524
 525                 if (!fscontext) {
 526                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 527                         if (rc)
 528                                 goto out_free;
 529                         sbsec->sid = sid;
 530                 } else {
 531                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 532                         if (rc)
 533                                 goto out_free;
 534                 }
 535                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 536
 537                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 538         }
 539
 540         if (rootcontext) {
 541                 struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
 542                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 543                 rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
 544                 if (rc) {
 545                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 546                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 547                                rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 548                         goto out_free;
 549                 }
 550
 551                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 552                 if (rc)
 553                         goto out_free;
 554
 555                 isec->sid = sid;
 556                 isec->initialized = 1;
 557         }
 558
 559         if (defcontext) {
 560                 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
 561                 if (rc) {
 562                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 563                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 564                                defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 565                         goto out_free;
 566                 }
 567
 568                 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
 569                         goto out_free;
 570
 571                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 572                 if (rc)
 573                         goto out_free;
 574
 575                 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
 576         }
 577
 578 out_free:
 579         if (alloc) {
 580                 kfree(context);
 581                 kfree(defcontext);
 582                 kfree(fscontext);
 583                 kfree(rootcontext);
 584         }
 585 out:
 586         return rc;
 587 }
 588
 589 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 590 {
 591         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 592         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 593         struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
 594         int rc = 0;
 595
 596         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 597         if (sbsec->initialized)
 598                 goto out;
 599
 600         if (!ss_initialized) {
 601                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 602                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 603                    server is ready to handle calls. */
 604                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 605                 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 606                         list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 607                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 608                 goto out;
 609         }
 610
 611         /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
 612         rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 613         if (rc) {
 614                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 615                        __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 616                 goto out;
 617         }
 618
 619         rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
 620         if (rc)
 621                 goto out;
 622
 623         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 624                 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 625                    error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 626                    the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 627                    the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 628                    assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 629                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 630                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
 631                                "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 632                         rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 633                         goto out;
 634                 }
 635                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 636                 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 637                         if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 638                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 639                                        "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 640                                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 641                         else
 642                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 643                                        "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
 644                                        sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 645                         goto out;
 646                 }
 647         }
 648
 649         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 650                 sbsec->proc = 1;
 651
 652         sbsec->initialized = 1;
 653
 654         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
 655                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
 656                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 657         }
 658         else {
 659                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
 660                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 661                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 662         }
 663
 664         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 665         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
 666
 667         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 668            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 669            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 670            populates itself. */
 671         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 672 next_inode:
 673         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 674                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 675                                 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
 676                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 677                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 678                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 679                 inode = igrab(inode);
 680                 if (inode) {
 681                         if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
 682                                 inode_doinit(inode);
 683                         iput(inode);
 684                 }
 685                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 686                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 687                 goto next_inode;
 688         }
 689         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 690 out:
 691         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 692         return rc;
 693 }
 694
 695 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
 696 {
 697         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 698         case S_IFSOCK:
 699                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
 700         case S_IFLNK:
 701                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
 702         case S_IFREG:
 703                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
 704         case S_IFBLK:
 705                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
 706         case S_IFDIR:
 707                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
 708         case S_IFCHR:
 709                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
 710         case S_IFIFO:
 711                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
 712
 713         }
 714
 715         return SECCLASS_FILE;
 716 }
 717
 718 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
 719 {
 720         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
 721 }
 722
 723 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
 724 {
 725         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
 726 }
 727
 728 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
 729 {
 730         switch (family) {
 731         case PF_UNIX:
 732                 switch (type) {
 733                 case SOCK_STREAM:
 734                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
 735                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
 736                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
 737                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
 738                 }
 739                 break;
 740         case PF_INET:
 741         case PF_INET6:
 742                 switch (type) {
 743                 case SOCK_STREAM:
 744                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
 745                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
 746                         else
 747                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 748                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
 749                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
 750                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
 751                         else
 752                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 753                 case SOCK_DCCP:
 754                         return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
 755                 default:
 756                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 757                 }
 758                 break;
 759         case PF_NETLINK:
 760                 switch (protocol) {
 761                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
 762                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
 763                 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
 764                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
 765                 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
 766                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
 767                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
 768                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
 769                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
 770                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
 771                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
 772                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
 773                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
 774                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
 775                 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
 776                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
 777                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
 778                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
 779                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
 780                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
 781                 default:
 782                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
 783                 }
 784         case PF_PACKET:
 785                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
 786         case PF_KEY:
 787                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
 788         case PF_APPLETALK:
 789                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
 790         }
 791
 792         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
 793 }
 794
 795 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 796 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
 797                                 u16 tclass,
 798                                 u32 *sid)
 799 {
 800         int buflen, rc;
 801         char *buffer, *path, *end;
 802
 803         buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 804         if (!buffer)
 805                 return -ENOMEM;
 806
 807         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
 808         end = buffer+buflen;
 809         *--end = '\0';
 810         buflen--;
 811         path = end-1;
 812         *path = '/';
 813         while (de && de != de->parent) {
 814                 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
 815                 if (buflen < 0)
 816                         break;
 817                 end -= de->namelen;
 818                 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
 819                 *--end = '/';
 820                 path = end;
 821                 de = de->parent;
 822         }
 823         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
 824         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
 825         return rc;
 826 }
 827 #else
 828 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
 829                                 u16 tclass,
 830                                 u32 *sid)
 831 {
 832         return -EINVAL;
 833 }
 834 #endif
 835
 836 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
 837 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
 838 {
 839         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
 840         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 841         u32 sid;
 842         struct dentry *dentry;
 843 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
 844         char *context = NULL;
 845         unsigned len = 0;
 846         int rc = 0;
 847
 848         if (isec->initialized)
 849                 goto out;
 850
 851         mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
 852         if (isec->initialized)
 853                 goto out_unlock;
 854
 855         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 856         if (!sbsec->initialized) {
 857                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 858                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 859                    server is ready to handle calls. */
 860                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 861                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
 862                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
 863                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 864                 goto out_unlock;
 865         }
 866
 867         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
 868         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
 869                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 870                         isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 871                         break;
 872                 }
 873
 874                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
 875                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
 876                 if (opt_dentry) {
 877                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
 878                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
 879                 } else {
 880                         /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
 881                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
 882                 }
 883                 if (!dentry) {
 884                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
 885                                "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
 886                                inode->i_ino);
 887                         goto out_unlock;
 888                 }
 889
 890                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
 891                 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
 892                 if (!context) {
 893                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 894                         dput(dentry);
 895                         goto out_unlock;
 896                 }
 897                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 898                                            context, len);
 899                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
 900                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
 901                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 902                                                    NULL, 0);
 903                         if (rc < 0) {
 904                                 dput(dentry);
 905                                 goto out_unlock;
 906                         }
 907                         kfree(context);
 908                         len = rc;
 909                         context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
 910                         if (!context) {
 911                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 912                                 dput(dentry);
 913                                 goto out_unlock;
 914                         }
 915                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
 916                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 917                                                    context, len);
 918                 }
 919                 dput(dentry);
 920                 if (rc < 0) {
 921                         if (rc != -ENODATA) {
 922                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  getxattr returned "
 923                                        "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
 924                                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 925                                 kfree(context);
 926                                 goto out_unlock;
 927                         }
 928                         /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
 929                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 930                         rc = 0;
 931                 } else {
 932                         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
 933                                                              sbsec->def_sid);
 934                         if (rc) {
 935                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
 936                                        "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
 937                                        __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
 938                                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 939                                 kfree(context);
 940                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
 941                                 rc = 0;
 942                                 break;
 943                         }
 944                 }
 945                 kfree(context);
 946                 isec->sid = sid;
 947                 break;
 948         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
 949                 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
 950                 break;
 951         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
 952                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
 953                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 954
 955                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
 956                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 957                 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
 958                                              sbsec->sid,
 959                                              isec->sclass,
 960                                              &sid);
 961                 if (rc)
 962                         goto out_unlock;
 963                 isec->sid = sid;
 964                 break;
 965         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
 966                 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 967                 break;
 968         default:
 969                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
 970                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 971
 972                 if (sbsec->proc) {
 973                         struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
 974                         if (proci->pde) {
 975                                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 976                                 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
 977                                                           isec->sclass,
 978                                                           &sid);
 979                                 if (rc)
 980                                         goto out_unlock;
 981                                 isec->sid = sid;
 982                         }
 983                 }
 984                 break;
 985         }
 986
 987         isec->initialized = 1;
 988
 989 out_unlock:
 990         mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
 991 out:
 992         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
 993                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 994         return rc;
 995 }
 996
 997 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
 998 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
 999 {
1000         u32 perm = 0;
1001
1002         switch (sig) {
1003         case SIGCHLD:
1004                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1005                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1006                 break;
1007         case SIGKILL:
1008                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1009                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1010                 break;
1011         case SIGSTOP:
1012                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1013                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1014                 break;
1015         default:
1016                 /* All other signals. */
1017                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1018                 break;
1019         }
1020
1021         return perm;
1022 }
1023
1024 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1025    fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1026 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1027                          struct task_struct *tsk2,
1028                          u32 perms)
1029 {
1030         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1031
1032         tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1033         tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1034         return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1035                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1036 }
1037
1038 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1039 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1040                                int cap)
1041 {
1042         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1043         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1044
1045         tsec = tsk->security;
1046
1047         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
1048         ad.tsk = tsk;
1049         ad.u.cap = cap;
1050
1051         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1052                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
1053 }
1054
1055 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1056 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1057                            u32 perms)
1058 {
1059         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1060
1061         tsec = tsk->security;
1062
1063         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1064                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1065 }
1066
1067 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1068    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1069    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1070 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1071                           struct inode *inode,
1072                           u32 perms,
1073                           struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1074 {
1075         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1076         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1077         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1078
1079         if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
1080                 return 0;
1081
1082         tsec = tsk->security;
1083         isec = inode->i_security;
1084
1085         if (!adp) {
1086                 adp = &ad;
1087                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1088                 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1089         }
1090
1091         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1092 }
1093
1094 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1095    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1096    pathname if needed. */
1097 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1098                                   struct vfsmount *mnt,
1099                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1100                                   u32 av)
1101 {
1102         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1103         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1104         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1105         ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1106         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1107         return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1108 }
1109
1110 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1111    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1112    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1113    check a particular permission to the file.
1114    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1115    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1116    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1117    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1118 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1119                                 struct file *file,
1120                                 u32 av)
1121 {
1122         struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1123         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1124         struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
1125         struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
1126         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1127         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1128         int rc;
1129
1130         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1131         ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1132         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1133
1134         if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1135                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1136                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1137                                   FD__USE,
1138                                   &ad);
1139                 if (rc)
1140                         return rc;
1141         }
1142
1143         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1144         if (av)
1145                 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1146
1147         return 0;
1148 }
1149
1150 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1151 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1152                       struct dentry *dentry,
1153                       u16 tclass)
1154 {
1155         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1156         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1157         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1158         u32 newsid;
1159         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1160         int rc;
1161
1162         tsec = current->security;
1163         dsec = dir->i_security;
1164         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1165
1166         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1167         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1168
1169         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1170                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1171                           &ad);
1172         if (rc)
1173                 return rc;
1174
1175         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1176                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1177         } else {
1178                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1179                                              &newsid);
1180                 if (rc)
1181                         return rc;
1182         }
1183
1184         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1185         if (rc)
1186                 return rc;
1187
1188         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1189                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1190                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1191 }
1192
1193 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1194 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1195                           struct task_struct *ctx)
1196 {
1197         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1198
1199         tsec = ctx->security;
1200
1201         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1202 }
1203
1204 #define MAY_LINK   0
1205 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1206 #define MAY_RMDIR  2
1207
1208 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1209 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1210                     struct dentry *dentry,
1211                     int kind)
1212
1213 {
1214         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1215         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1216         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1217         u32 av;
1218         int rc;
1219
1220         tsec = current->security;
1221         dsec = dir->i_security;
1222         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1223
1224         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1225         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1226
1227         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1228         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1229         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1230         if (rc)
1231                 return rc;
1232
1233         switch (kind) {
1234         case MAY_LINK:
1235                 av = FILE__LINK;
1236                 break;
1237         case MAY_UNLINK:
1238                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1239                 break;
1240         case MAY_RMDIR:
1241                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1242                 break;
1243         default:
1244                 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link:  unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1245                 return 0;
1246         }
1247
1248         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1249         return rc;
1250 }
1251
1252 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1253                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1254                              struct inode *new_dir,
1255                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1256 {
1257         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1258         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1259         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1260         u32 av;
1261         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1262         int rc;
1263
1264         tsec = current->security;
1265         old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1266         old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1267         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1268         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1269
1270         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1271
1272         ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1273         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1274                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1275         if (rc)
1276                 return rc;
1277         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1278                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1279         if (rc)
1280                 return rc;
1281         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1282                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1283                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1284                 if (rc)
1285                         return rc;
1286         }
1287
1288         ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1289         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1290         if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1291                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1292         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1293         if (rc)
1294                 return rc;
1295         if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1296                 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1297                 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1298                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1299                                   new_isec->sclass,
1300                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1301                 if (rc)
1302                         return rc;
1303         }
1304
1305         return 0;
1306 }
1307
1308 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1309 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1310                                struct super_block *sb,
1311                                u32 perms,
1312                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1313 {
1314         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1315         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1316
1317         tsec = tsk->security;
1318         sbsec = sb->s_security;
1319         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1320                             perms, ad);
1321 }
1322
1323 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1324 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1325 {
1326         u32 av = 0;
1327
1328         if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1329                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1330                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1331                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1332                         av |= FILE__READ;
1333
1334                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1335                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1336                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1337                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1338
1339         } else {
1340                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1341                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1342                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1343                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1344                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1345                         av |= DIR__READ;
1346         }
1347
1348         return av;
1349 }
1350
1351 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1352 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1353 {
1354         u32 av = 0;
1355
1356         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1357                 av |= FILE__READ;
1358         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1359                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1360                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1361                 else
1362                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1363         }
1364
1365         return av;
1366 }
1367
1368 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1369
1370 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1371 {
1372         struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1373         struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1374         int rc;
1375
1376         rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1377         if (rc)
1378                 return rc;
1379
1380         rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1381         /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1382         if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1383                 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1384         return rc;
1385 }
1386
1387 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1388                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1389 {
1390         int error;
1391
1392         error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1393         if (error)
1394                 return error;
1395
1396         return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1397 }
1398
1399 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1400                                 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1401 {
1402         int error;
1403
1404         error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1405         if (error)
1406                 return error;
1407
1408         return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1409 }
1410
1411 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1412                                kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1413 {
1414         secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1415 }
1416
1417 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1418 {
1419         int rc;
1420
1421         rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1422         if (rc)
1423                 return rc;
1424
1425         return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1426 }
1427
1428 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1429 {
1430         int buflen, rc;
1431         char *buffer, *path, *end;
1432
1433         rc = -ENOMEM;
1434         buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1435         if (!buffer)
1436                 goto out;
1437
1438         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1439         end = buffer+buflen;
1440         *--end = '\0';
1441         buflen--;
1442         path = end-1;
1443         *path = '/';
1444         while (table) {
1445                 const char *name = table->procname;
1446                 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1447                 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1448                 if (buflen < 0)
1449                         goto out_free;
1450                 end -= namelen;
1451                 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1452                 *--end = '/';
1453                 path = end;
1454                 table = table->parent;
1455         }
1456         buflen -= 4;
1457         if (buflen < 0)
1458                 goto out_free;
1459         end -= 4;
1460         memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1461         path = end;
1462         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1463 out_free:
1464         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1465 out:
1466         return rc;
1467 }
1468
1469 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1470 {
1471         int error = 0;
1472         u32 av;
1473         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1474         u32 tsid;
1475         int rc;
1476
1477         rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1478         if (rc)
1479                 return rc;
1480
1481         tsec = current->security;
1482
1483         rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1484                                     SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1485         if (rc) {
1486                 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1487                 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1488         }
1489
1490         /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1491          * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1492         if(op == 001) {
1493                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1494                                      SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1495         } else {
1496                 av = 0;
1497                 if (op & 004)
1498                         av |= FILE__READ;
1499                 if (op & 002)
1500                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1501                 if (av)
1502                         error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1503                                              SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1504         }
1505
1506         return error;
1507 }
1508
1509 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1510 {
1511         int rc = 0;
1512
1513         if (!sb)
1514                 return 0;
1515
1516         switch (cmds) {
1517                 case Q_SYNC:
1518                 case Q_QUOTAON:
1519                 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1520                 case Q_SETINFO:
1521                 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1522                         rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1523                                                  sb,
1524                                                  FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1525                         break;
1526                 case Q_GETFMT:
1527                 case Q_GETINFO:
1528                 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1529                         rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1530                                                  sb,
1531                                                  FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1532                         break;
1533                 default:
1534                         rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1535                         break;
1536         }
1537         return rc;
1538 }
1539
1540 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1541 {
1542         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1543 }
1544
1545 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1546 {
1547         int rc;
1548
1549         rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1550         if (rc)
1551                 return rc;
1552
1553         switch (type) {
1554                 case 3:         /* Read last kernel messages */
1555                 case 10:        /* Return size of the log buffer */
1556                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1557                         break;
1558                 case 6:         /* Disable logging to console */
1559                 case 7:         /* Enable logging to console */
1560                 case 8:         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1561                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1562                         break;
1563                 case 0:         /* Close log */
1564                 case 1:         /* Open log */
1565                 case 2:         /* Read from log */
1566                 case 4:         /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1567                 case 5:         /* Clear ring buffer */
1568                 default:
1569                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1570                         break;
1571         }
1572         return rc;
1573 }
1574
1575 /*
1576  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1577  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1578  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1579  *
1580  * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1581  * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1582  * the capability is granted.
1583  *
1584  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1585  * processes that allocate mappings.
1586  */
1587 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1588 {
1589         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1590         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1591
1592         rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1593         if (rc == 0)
1594                 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1595                                           SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1596                                           CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1597                                           0,
1598                                           NULL);
1599
1600         if (rc == 0)
1601                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1602
1603         return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1604 }
1605
1606 /* binprm security operations */
1607
1608 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1609 {
1610         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1611
1612         bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1613         if (!bsec)
1614                 return -ENOMEM;
1615
1616         bsec->bprm = bprm;
1617         bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1618         bsec->set = 0;
1619
1620         bprm->security = bsec;
1621         return 0;
1622 }
1623
1624 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1625 {
1626         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1627         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1628         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1629         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1630         u32 newsid;
1631         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1632         int rc;
1633
1634         rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1635         if (rc)
1636                 return rc;
1637
1638         bsec = bprm->security;
1639
1640         if (bsec->set)
1641                 return 0;
1642
1643         tsec = current->security;
1644         isec = inode->i_security;
1645
1646         /* Default to the current task SID. */
1647         bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1648
1649         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1650         tsec->create_sid = 0;
1651         tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1652         tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1653
1654         if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1655                 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1656                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1657                 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1658         } else {
1659                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1660                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1661                                              SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1662                 if (rc)
1663                         return rc;
1664         }
1665
1666         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1667         ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_path.mnt;
1668         ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
1669
1670         if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1671                 newsid = tsec->sid;
1672
1673         if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1674                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1675                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1676                 if (rc)
1677                         return rc;
1678         } else {
1679                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1680                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1681                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1682                 if (rc)
1683                         return rc;
1684
1685                 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1686                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1687                 if (rc)
1688                         return rc;
1689
1690                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1691                 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1692
1693                 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1694                 bsec->sid = newsid;
1695         }
1696
1697         bsec->set = 1;
1698         return 0;
1699 }
1700
1701 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1702 {
1703         return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1704 }
1705
1706
1707 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1708 {
1709         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1710         int atsecure = 0;
1711
1712         if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1713                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1714                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
1715                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1716                 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1717                                          SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1718                                          PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1719         }
1720
1721         return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1722 }
1723
1724 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1725 {
1726         kfree(bprm->security);
1727         bprm->security = NULL;
1728 }
1729
1730 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1731 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1732
1733 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1734 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1735 {
1736         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1737         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1738         struct tty_struct *tty;
1739         struct fdtable *fdt;
1740         long j = -1;
1741         int drop_tty = 0;
1742
1743         mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1744         tty = get_current_tty();
1745         if (tty) {
1746                 file_list_lock();
1747                 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1748                 if (file) {
1749                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1750                            Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1751                            than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1752                            file may belong to another process and we are only
1753                            interested in the inode-based check here. */
1754                         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1755                         if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1756                                            FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1757                                 drop_tty = 1;
1758                         }
1759                 }
1760                 file_list_unlock();
1761         }
1762         mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1763         /* Reset controlling tty. */
1764         if (drop_tty)
1765                 no_tty();
1766
1767         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1768
1769         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1770
1771         spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1772         for (;;) {
1773                 unsigned long set, i;
1774                 int fd;
1775
1776                 j++;
1777                 i = j * __NFDBITS;
1778                 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1779                 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
1780                         break;
1781                 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1782                 if (!set)
1783                         continue;
1784                 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1785                 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1786                         if (set & 1) {
1787                                 file = fget(i);
1788                                 if (!file)
1789                                         continue;
1790                                 if (file_has_perm(current,
1791                                                   file,
1792                                                   file_to_av(file))) {
1793                                         sys_close(i);
1794                                         fd = get_unused_fd();
1795                                         if (fd != i) {
1796                                                 if (fd >= 0)
1797                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
1798                                                 fput(file);
1799                                                 continue;
1800                                         }
1801                                         if (devnull) {
1802                                                 get_file(devnull);
1803                                         } else {
1804                                                 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1805                                                 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
1806                                                         devnull = NULL;
1807                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
1808                                                         fput(file);
1809                                                         continue;
1810                                                 }
1811                                         }
1812                                         fd_install(fd, devnull);
1813                                 }
1814                                 fput(file);
1815                         }
1816                 }
1817                 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1818
1819         }
1820         spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1821 }
1822
1823 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1824 {
1825         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1826         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1827         u32 sid;
1828         int rc;
1829
1830         secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1831
1832         tsec = current->security;
1833
1834         bsec = bprm->security;
1835         sid = bsec->sid;
1836
1837         tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1838         bsec->unsafe = 0;
1839         if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1840                 /* Check for shared state.  If not ok, leave SID
1841                    unchanged and kill. */
1842                 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1843                         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1844                                         PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1845                         if (rc) {
1846                                 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1847                                 return;
1848                         }
1849                 }
1850
1851                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1852                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1853                 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1854                         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1855                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1856                                           NULL);
1857                         if (rc) {
1858                                 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1859                                 return;
1860                         }
1861                 }
1862                 tsec->sid = sid;
1863         }
1864 }
1865
1866 /*
1867  * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1868  */
1869 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1870 {
1871         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1872         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1873         struct itimerval itimer;
1874         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1875         int rc, i;
1876
1877         tsec = current->security;
1878         bsec = bprm->security;
1879
1880         if (bsec->unsafe) {
1881                 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1882                 return;
1883         }
1884         if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1885                 return;
1886
1887         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1888         flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1889
1890         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1891            from the old SID.  If not, clear itimers to avoid
1892            subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1893            signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1894           been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1895           will be checked against the new SID. */
1896         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1897                           PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1898         if (rc) {
1899                 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1900                 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1901                         do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1902                 flush_signals(current);
1903                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1904                 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1905                 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
1906                 recalc_sigpending();
1907                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1908         }
1909
1910         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1911            from the old SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to
1912            the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1913            task's soft limit.  Note that the setting of hard limits
1914            (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1915            check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1916            the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1917            than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1918            is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1919            RLIMIT_STACK.*/
1920         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1921                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1922         if (rc) {
1923                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1924                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1925                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1926                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1927                 }
1928                 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1929                         /*
1930                          * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1931                          * to be refigured.
1932                          */
1933                         current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1934                 }
1935         }
1936
1937         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1938            recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1939         wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1940 }
1941
1942 /* superblock security operations */
1943
1944 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1945 {
1946         return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1947 }
1948
1949 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1950 {
1951         superblock_free_security(sb);
1952 }
1953
1954 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1955 {
1956         if (plen > olen)
1957                 return 0;
1958
1959         return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1960 }
1961
1962 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1963 {
1964         return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1965                 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1966                 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1967                 match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
1968 }
1969
1970 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1971 {
1972         if (!*first) {
1973                 **to = ',';
1974                 *to += 1;
1975         } else
1976                 *first = 0;
1977         memcpy(*to, from, len);
1978         *to += len;
1979 }
1980
1981 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
1982                                        int len)
1983 {
1984         int current_size = 0;
1985
1986         if (!*first) {
1987                 **to = '|';
1988                 *to += 1;
1989         }
1990         else
1991                 *first = 0;
1992
1993         while (current_size < len) {
1994                 if (*from != '"') {
1995                         **to = *from;
1996                         *to += 1;
1997                 }
1998                 from += 1;
1999                 current_size += 1;
2000         }
2001 }
2002
2003 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
2004 {
2005         int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2006         char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2007         char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2008         int open_quote = 0;
2009
2010         in_curr = orig;
2011         sec_curr = copy;
2012
2013         /* Binary mount data: just copy */
2014         if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
2015                 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
2016                 goto out;
2017         }
2018
2019         nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2020         if (!nosec) {
2021                 rc = -ENOMEM;
2022                 goto out;
2023         }
2024
2025         nosec_save = nosec;
2026         fnosec = fsec = 1;
2027         in_save = in_end = orig;
2028
2029         do {
2030                 if (*in_end == '"')
2031                         open_quote = !open_quote;
2032                 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2033                                 *in_end == '\0') {
2034                         int len = in_end - in_curr;
2035
2036                         if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2037                                 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2038                         else
2039                                 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2040
2041                         in_curr = in_end + 1;
2042                 }
2043         } while (*in_end++);
2044
2045         strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2046         free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2047 out:
2048         return rc;
2049 }
2050
2051 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2052 {
2053         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2054         int rc;
2055
2056         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2057         if (rc)
2058                 return rc;
2059
2060         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2061         ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
2062         return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2063 }
2064
2065 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2066 {
2067         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2068
2069         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2070         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2071         return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2072 }
2073
2074 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
2075                          struct nameidata *nd,
2076                          char * type,
2077                          unsigned long flags,
2078                          void * data)
2079 {
2080         int rc;
2081
2082         rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
2083         if (rc)
2084                 return rc;
2085
2086         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2087                 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
2088                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2089         else
2090                 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
2091                                        FILE__MOUNTON);
2092 }
2093
2094 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2095 {
2096         int rc;
2097
2098         rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2099         if (rc)
2100                 return rc;
2101
2102         return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2103                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2104 }
2105
2106 /* inode security operations */
2107
2108 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2109 {
2110         return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2111 }
2112
2113 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2114 {
2115         inode_free_security(inode);
2116 }
2117
2118 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2119                                        char **name, void **value,
2120                                        size_t *len)
2121 {
2122         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2123         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2124         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2125         u32 newsid, clen;
2126         int rc;
2127         char *namep = NULL, *context;
2128
2129         tsec = current->security;
2130         dsec = dir->i_security;
2131         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2132
2133         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2134                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2135         } else {
2136                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2137                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2138                                              &newsid);
2139                 if (rc) {
2140                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
2141                                "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2142                                "ino=%ld)\n",
2143                                __FUNCTION__,
2144                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2145                         return rc;
2146                 }
2147         }
2148
2149         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2150         if (sbsec->initialized) {
2151                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2152                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2153                 isec->sid = newsid;
2154                 isec->initialized = 1;
2155         }
2156
2157         if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2158                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2159
2160         if (name) {
2161                 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2162                 if (!namep)
2163                         return -ENOMEM;
2164                 *name = namep;
2165         }
2166
2167         if (value && len) {
2168                 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2169                 if (rc) {
2170                         kfree(namep);
2171                         return rc;
2172                 }
2173                 *value = context;
2174                 *len = clen;
2175         }
2176
2177         return 0;
2178 }
2179
2180 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2181 {
2182         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2183 }
2184
2185 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2186 {
2187         int rc;
2188
2189         rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2190         if (rc)
2191                 return rc;
2192         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2193 }
2194
2195 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2196 {
2197         int rc;
2198
2199         rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2200         if (rc)
2201                 return rc;
2202         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2203 }
2204
2205 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2206 {
2207         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2208 }
2209
2210 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2211 {
2212         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2213 }
2214
2215 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2216 {
2217         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2218 }
2219
2220 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2221 {
2222         int rc;
2223
2224         rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2225         if (rc)
2226                 return rc;
2227
2228         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2229 }
2230
2231 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2232                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2233 {
2234         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2235 }
2236
2237 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2238 {
2239         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2240 }
2241
2242 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2243 {
2244         int rc;
2245
2246         rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2247         if (rc)
2248                 return rc;
2249         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2250 }
2251
2252 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2253                                     struct nameidata *nd)
2254 {
2255         int rc;
2256
2257         rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2258         if (rc)
2259                 return rc;
2260
2261         if (!mask) {
2262                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2263                 return 0;
2264         }
2265
2266         return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2267                                file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2268 }
2269
2270 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2271 {
2272         int rc;
2273
2274         rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2275         if (rc)
2276                 return rc;
2277
2278         if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2279                 return 0;
2280
2281         if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2282                                ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2283                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2284
2285         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2286 }
2287
2288 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2289 {
2290         return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2291 }
2292
2293 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2294 {
2295         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2296         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2297         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2298         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2299         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2300         u32 newsid;
2301         int rc = 0;
2302
2303         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2304                 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2305                              sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2306                     !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2307                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2308                            Restrict to administrator. */
2309                         return -EPERM;
2310                 }
2311
2312                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2313                    ordinary setattr permission. */
2314                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2315         }
2316
2317         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2318         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2319                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2320
2321         if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2322                 return -EPERM;
2323
2324         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2325         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2326
2327         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2328                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2329         if (rc)
2330                 return rc;
2331
2332         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2333         if (rc)
2334                 return rc;
2335
2336         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2337                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2338         if (rc)
2339                 return rc;
2340
2341         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2342                                           isec->sclass);
2343         if (rc)
2344                 return rc;
2345
2346         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2347                             sbsec->sid,
2348                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2349                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2350                             &ad);
2351 }
2352
2353 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2354                                         void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2355 {
2356         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2357         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2358         u32 newsid;
2359         int rc;
2360
2361         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2362                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2363                 return;
2364         }
2365
2366         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2367         if (rc) {
2368                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  unable to obtain SID for context "
2369                        "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2370                 return;
2371         }
2372
2373         isec->sid = newsid;
2374         return;
2375 }
2376
2377 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2378 {
2379         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2380 }
2381
2382 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2383 {
2384         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2385 }
2386
2387 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2388 {
2389         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2390                 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2391                              sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2392                     !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2393                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2394                            Restrict to administrator. */
2395                         return -EPERM;
2396                 }
2397
2398                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2399                    ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2400                    permission for removexattr. */
2401                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2402         }
2403
2404         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2405            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2406         return -EACCES;
2407 }
2408
2409 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2410 {
2411       return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2412 }
2413
2414 /*
2415  * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user.  If the
2416  * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2417  * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2418  *
2419  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2420  */
2421 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2422 {
2423         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2424
2425         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2426                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2427
2428         return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2429 }
2430
2431 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2432                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2433 {
2434         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2435         u32 newsid;
2436         int rc;
2437
2438         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2439                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2440
2441         if (!value || !size)
2442                 return -EACCES;
2443
2444         rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2445         if (rc)
2446                 return rc;
2447
2448         isec->sid = newsid;
2449         return 0;
2450 }
2451
2452 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2453 {
2454         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2455         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2456                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2457         return len;
2458 }
2459
2460 /* file security operations */
2461
2462 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2463 {
2464         int rc;
2465         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2466
2467         if (!mask) {
2468                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2469                 return 0;
2470         }
2471
2472         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2473         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2474                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2475
2476         rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2477                            file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2478         if (rc)
2479                 return rc;
2480
2481         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2482 }
2483
2484 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2485 {
2486         return file_alloc_security(file);
2487 }
2488
2489 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2490 {
2491         file_free_security(file);
2492 }
2493
2494 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2495                               unsigned long arg)
2496 {
2497         int error = 0;
2498
2499         switch (cmd) {
2500                 case FIONREAD:
2501                 /* fall through */
2502                 case FIBMAP:
2503                 /* fall through */
2504                 case FIGETBSZ:
2505                 /* fall through */
2506                 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2507                 /* fall through */
2508                 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2509                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2510                         break;
2511
2512                 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2513                 /* fall through */
2514                 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2515                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2516                         break;
2517
2518                 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2519                 case FIONBIO:
2520                 /* fall through */
2521                 case FIOASYNC:
2522                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2523                         break;
2524
2525                 case KDSKBENT:
2526                 case KDSKBSENT:
2527                         error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2528                         break;
2529
2530                 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2531                  * to the file's ioctl() function.
2532                  */
2533                 default:
2534                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2535
2536         }
2537         return error;
2538 }
2539
2540 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2541 {
2542 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2543         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2544                 /*
2545                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2546                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2547                  * This has an additional check.
2548                  */
2549                 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2550                 if (rc)
2551                         return rc;
2552         }
2553 #endif
2554
2555         if (file) {
2556                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2557                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2558
2559                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2560                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2561                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
2562
2563                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2564                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2565
2566                 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2567         }
2568         return 0;
2569 }
2570
2571 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2572                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2573                              unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2574 {
2575         int rc = 0;
2576         u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct*)(current->security))->sid;
2577
2578         if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2579                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2580                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2581         if (rc || addr_only)
2582                 return rc;
2583
2584         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2585                 prot = reqprot;
2586
2587         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2588                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2589 }
2590
2591 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2592                                  unsigned long reqprot,
2593                                  unsigned long prot)
2594 {
2595         int rc;
2596
2597         rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2598         if (rc)
2599                 return rc;
2600
2601         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2602                 prot = reqprot;
2603
2604 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2605         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2606                 rc = 0;
2607                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2608                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2609                         rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2610                                            PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2611                 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2612                            vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2613                            vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2614                         rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2615                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2616                         /*
2617                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2618                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2619                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2620                          * modified content.  This typically should only
2621                          * occur for text relocations.
2622                          */
2623                         rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2624                                            FILE__EXECMOD);
2625                 }
2626                 if (rc)
2627                         return rc;
2628         }
2629 #endif
2630
2631         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2632 }
2633
2634 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2635 {
2636         return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2637 }
2638
2639 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2640                               unsigned long arg)
2641 {
2642         int err = 0;
2643
2644         switch (cmd) {
2645                 case F_SETFL:
2646                         if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
2647                                 err = -EINVAL;
2648                                 break;
2649                         }
2650
2651                         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2652                                 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2653                                 break;
2654                         }
2655                         /* fall through */
2656                 case F_SETOWN:
2657                 case F_SETSIG:
2658                 case F_GETFL:
2659                 case F_GETOWN:
2660                 case F_GETSIG:
2661                         /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2662                         err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2663                         break;
2664                 case F_GETLK:
2665                 case F_SETLK:
2666                 case F_SETLKW:
2667 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2668                 case F_GETLK64:
2669                 case F_SETLK64:
2670                 case F_SETLKW64:
2671 #endif
2672                         if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
2673                                 err = -EINVAL;
2674                                 break;
2675                         }
2676                         err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2677                         break;
2678         }
2679
2680         return err;
2681 }
2682
2683 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2684 {
2685         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2686         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2687
2688         tsec = current->security;
2689         fsec = file->f_security;
2690         fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2691
2692         return 0;
2693 }
2694
2695 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2696                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2697 {
2698         struct file *file;
2699         u32 perm;
2700         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2701         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2702
2703         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2704         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
2705
2706         tsec = tsk->security;
2707         fsec = file->f_security;
2708
2709         if (!signum)
2710                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2711         else
2712                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2713
2714         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2715                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2716 }
2717
2718 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2719 {
2720         return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2721 }
2722
2723 /* task security operations */
2724
2725 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2726 {
2727         int rc;
2728
2729         rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2730         if (rc)
2731                 return rc;
2732
2733         return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2734 }
2735
2736 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2737 {
2738         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2739         int rc;
2740
2741         tsec1 = current->security;
2742
2743         rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2744         if (rc)
2745                 return rc;
2746         tsec2 = tsk->security;
2747
2748         tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2749         tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2750
2751         /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
2752         tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2753         tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2754         tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
2755         tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
2756
2757         /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2758            This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2759            subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2760         tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2761
2762         return 0;
2763 }
2764
2765 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2766 {
2767         task_free_security(tsk);
2768 }
2769
2770 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2771 {
2772         /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2773            since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2774            identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2775            this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use
2776            of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2777            capable hook. */
2778         return 0;
2779 }
2780
2781 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2782 {
2783         return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2784 }
2785
2786 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2787 {
2788         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2789         return 0;
2790 }
2791
2792 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2793 {
2794         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2795 }
2796
2797 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2798 {
2799         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2800 }
2801
2802 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2803 {
2804         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2805 }
2806
2807 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2808 {
2809         selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
2810 }
2811
2812 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2813 {
2814         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2815         return 0;
2816 }
2817
2818 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2819 {
2820         int rc;
2821
2822         rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2823         if (rc)
2824                 return rc;
2825
2826         return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2827 }
2828
2829 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2830 {
2831         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2832 }
2833
2834 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2835 {
2836         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2837 }
2838
2839 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2840 {
2841         struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2842         int rc;
2843
2844         rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2845         if (rc)
2846                 return rc;
2847
2848         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2849            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2850            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2851            upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2852         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2853                 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2854
2855         return 0;
2856 }
2857
2858 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2859 {
2860         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2861 }
2862
2863 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2864 {
2865         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2866 }
2867
2868 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2869 {
2870         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2871 }
2872
2873 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2874                                 int sig, u32 secid)
2875 {
2876         u32 perm;
2877         int rc;
2878         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2879
2880         rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
2881         if (rc)
2882                 return rc;
2883
2884         if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2885                 return 0;
2886
2887         if (!sig)
2888                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2889         else
2890                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2891         tsec = p->security;
2892         if (secid)
2893                 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2894         else
2895                 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2896         return rc;
2897 }
2898
2899 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2900                               unsigned long arg2,
2901                               unsigned long arg3,
2902                               unsigned long arg4,
2903                               unsigned long arg5)
2904 {
2905         /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2906            any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2907            the state of the current process. */
2908         return 0;
2909 }
2910
2911 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2912 {
2913         u32 perm;
2914
2915         perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2916
2917         return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2918 }
2919
2920 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2921 {
2922         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2923
2924         secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2925
2926         tsec = p->security;
2927         tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2928         tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2929         return;
2930 }
2931
2932 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2933                                   struct inode *inode)
2934 {
2935         struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2936         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2937
2938         isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2939         isec->initialized = 1;
2940         return;
2941 }
2942
2943 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2944 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
2945                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
2946 {
2947         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2948         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2949
2950         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
2951         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2952         if (ih == NULL)
2953                 goto out;
2954
2955         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2956         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2957                 goto out;
2958
2959         ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2960         ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2961         ret = 0;
2962
2963         if (proto)
2964                 *proto = ih->protocol;
2965
2966         switch (ih->protocol) {
2967         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2968                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2969
2970                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2971                         break;
2972
2973                 offset += ihlen;
2974                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2975                 if (th == NULL)
2976                         break;
2977
2978                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2979                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2980                 break;
2981         }
2982
2983         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2984                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2985
2986                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2987                         break;
2988
2989                 offset += ihlen;
2990                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2991                 if (uh == NULL)
2992                         break;
2993
2994                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2995                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2996                 break;
2997         }
2998
2999         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3000                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3001
3002                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3003                         break;
3004
3005                 offset += ihlen;
3006                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3007                 if (dh == NULL)
3008                         break;
3009
3010                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3011                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3012                 break;
3013         }
3014
3015         default:
3016                 break;
3017         }
3018 out:
3019         return ret;
3020 }
3021
3022 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3023
3024 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3025 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3026                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3027 {
3028         u8 nexthdr;
3029         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3030         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3031
3032         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3033         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3034         if (ip6 == NULL)
3035                 goto out;
3036
3037         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3038         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3039         ret = 0;
3040
3041         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3042         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3043         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3044         if (offset < 0)
3045                 goto out;
3046
3047         if (proto)
3048                 *proto = nexthdr;
3049
3050         switch (nexthdr) {
3051         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3052                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3053
3054                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3055                 if (th == NULL)
3056                         break;
3057
3058                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3059                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3060                 break;
3061         }
3062
3063         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3064                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3065
3066                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3067                 if (uh == NULL)
3068                         break;
3069
3070                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3071                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3072                 break;
3073         }
3074
3075         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3076                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3077
3078                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3079                 if (dh == NULL)
3080                         break;
3081
3082                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3083                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3084                 break;
3085         }
3086
3087         /* includes fragments */
3088         default:
3089                 break;
3090         }
3091 out:
3092         return ret;
3093 }
3094
3095 #endif /* IPV6 */
3096
3097 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3098                              char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto)
3099 {
3100         int ret = 0;
3101
3102         switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3103         case PF_INET:
3104                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3105                 if (ret || !addrp)
3106                         break;
3107                 *len = 4;
3108                 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3109                                         &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3110                 break;
3111
3112 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3113         case PF_INET6:
3114                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3115                 if (ret || !addrp)
3116                         break;
3117                 *len = 16;
3118                 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3119                                         &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3120                 break;
3121 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3122         default:
3123                 break;
3124         }
3125
3126         return ret;
3127 }
3128
3129 /**
3130  * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
3131  * @skb: the packet
3132  * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only external labels
3133  * @sid: the packet's SID
3134  *
3135  * Description:
3136  * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
3137  * the external SID for the packet.
3138  *
3139  */
3140 static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
3141                                    u32 base_sid,
3142                                    u32 *sid)
3143 {
3144         u32 xfrm_sid;
3145         u32 nlbl_sid;
3146
3147         selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3148         if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
3149                                          (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
3150                                           base_sid : xfrm_sid),
3151                                          &nlbl_sid) != 0)
3152                 nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
3153
3154         *sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
3155 }
3156
3157 /* socket security operations */
3158 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3159                            u32 perms)
3160 {
3161         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3162         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3163         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3164         int err = 0;
3165
3166         tsec = task->security;
3167         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3168
3169         if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3170                 goto out;
3171
3172         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3173         ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3174         err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3175
3176 out:
3177         return err;
3178 }
3179
3180 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3181                                  int protocol, int kern)
3182 {
3183         int err = 0;
3184         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3185         u32 newsid;
3186
3187         if (kern)
3188                 goto out;
3189
3190         tsec = current->security;
3191         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3192         err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3193                            socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3194                            protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3195
3196 out:
3197         return err;
3198 }
3199
3200 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3201                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
3202 {
3203         int err = 0;
3204         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3205         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3206         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3207         u32 newsid;
3208
3209         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3210
3211         tsec = current->security;
3212         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3213         isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3214         isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3215         isec->initialized = 1;
3216
3217         if (sock->sk) {
3218                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3219                 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3220                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3221         }
3222
3223         return err;
3224 }
3225
3226 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3227    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3228    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3229 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
3230 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
3231
3232 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3233 {
3234         u16 family;
3235         int err;
3236
3237         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3238         if (err)
3239                 goto out;
3240
3241         /*
3242          * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3243          * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3244          * check the first address now.
3245          */
3246         family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3247         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3248                 char *addrp;
3249                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3250                 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3251                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3252                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3253                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3254                 unsigned short snum;
3255                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3256                 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3257
3258                 tsec = current->security;
3259                 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3260
3261                 if (family == PF_INET) {
3262                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3263                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3264                         addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3265                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3266                 } else {
3267                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3268                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3269                         addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3270                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3271                 }
3272
3273                 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3274                            snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3275                         err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3276                                                 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3277                         if (err)
3278                                 goto out;
3279                         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3280                         ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3281                         ad.u.net.family = family;
3282                         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3283                                            isec->sclass,
3284                                            SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3285                         if (err)
3286                                 goto out;
3287                 }
3288
3289                 switch(isec->sclass) {
3290                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3291                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3292                         break;
3293
3294                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3295                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3296                         break;
3297
3298                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3299                         node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3300                         break;
3301
3302                 default:
3303                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3304                         break;
3305                 }
3306
3307                 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3308                 if (err)
3309                         goto out;
3310
3311                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3312                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3313                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3314
3315                 if (family == PF_INET)
3316                         ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3317                 else
3318                         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3319
3320                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3321                                    isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3322                 if (err)
3323                         goto out;
3324         }
3325 out:
3326         return err;
3327 }
3328
3329 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3330 {
3331         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3332         int err;
3333
3334         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3335         if (err)
3336                 return err;
3337
3338         /*
3339          * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3340          */
3341         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3342         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3343             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3344                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3345                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3346                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3347                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3348                 unsigned short snum;
3349                 u32 sid, perm;
3350
3351                 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3352                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3353                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3354                                 return -EINVAL;
3355                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3356                 } else {
3357                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3358                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3359                                 return -EINVAL;
3360                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3361                 }
3362
3363                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3364                                         sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3365                 if (err)
3366                         goto out;
3367
3368                 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3369                        TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3370
3371                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3372                 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3373                 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3374                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3375                 if (err)
3376                         goto out;
3377         }
3378
3379 out:
3380         return err;
3381 }
3382
3383 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3384 {
3385         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3386 }
3387
3388 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3389 {
3390         int err;
3391         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3392         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3393
3394         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3395         if (err)
3396                 return err;
3397
3398         newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3399
3400         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3401         newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3402         newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3403         newisec->initialized = 1;
3404
3405         return 0;
3406 }
3407
3408 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3409                                   int size)
3410 {
3411         int rc;
3412
3413         rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3414         if (rc)
3415                 return rc;
3416
3417         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3418 }
3419
3420 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3421                                   int size, int flags)
3422 {
3423         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3424 }
3425
3426 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3427 {
3428         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3429 }
3430
3431 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3432 {
3433         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3434 }
3435
3436 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3437 {
3438         int err;
3439
3440         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3441         if (err)
3442                 return err;
3443
3444         return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3445 }
3446
3447 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3448                                      int optname)
3449 {
3450         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3451 }
3452
3453 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3454 {
3455         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3456 }
3457
3458 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3459                                               struct socket *other,
3460                                               struct sock *newsk)
3461 {
3462         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3463         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3464         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3465         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3466         int err;
3467
3468         err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3469         if (err)
3470                 return err;
3471
3472         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3473         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3474
3475         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3476         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3477
3478         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3479                            isec->sclass,
3480                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3481         if (err)
3482                 return err;
3483
3484         /* connecting socket */
3485         ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3486         ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3487
3488         /* server child socket */
3489         ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3490         ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3491         err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3492
3493         return err;
3494 }
3495
3496 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3497                                         struct socket *other)
3498 {
3499         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3500         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3501         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3502         int err;
3503
3504         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3505         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3506
3507         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3508         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3509
3510         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3511                            isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3512         if (err)
3513                 return err;
3514
3515         return 0;
3516 }
3517
3518 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3519                 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3520 {
3521         int err = 0;
3522         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3523         struct socket *sock;
3524         u16 sock_class = 0;
3525         u32 sock_sid = 0;
3526
3527         read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3528         sock = sk->sk_socket;
3529         if (sock) {
3530                 struct inode *inode;
3531                 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3532                 if (inode) {
3533                         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3534                         isec = inode->i_security;
3535                         sock_sid = isec->sid;
3536                         sock_class = isec->sclass;
3537                 }
3538         }
3539         read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3540         if (!sock_sid)
3541                 goto out;
3542
3543         if (!skb->dev)
3544                 goto out;
3545
3546         err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3547         if (err)
3548                 goto out;
3549
3550         switch (sock_class) {
3551         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3552                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3553                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3554                 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3555                 break;
3556
3557         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3558                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3559                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3560                 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3561                 break;
3562
3563         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3564                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3565                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3566                 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3567                 break;
3568
3569         default:
3570                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3571                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3572                 break;
3573         }
3574
3575         err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3576         if (err)
3577                 goto out;
3578
3579         err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3580         if (err)
3581                 goto out;
3582
3583         err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3584         if (err)
3585                 goto out;
3586
3587         if (recv_perm) {
3588                 u32 port_sid;
3589
3590                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3591                                         sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3592                                         &port_sid);
3593                 if (err)
3594                         goto out;
3595
3596                 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3597                                    sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3598         }
3599
3600 out:
3601         return err;
3602 }
3603
3604 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3605 {
3606         u16 family;
3607         char *addrp;
3608         int len, err = 0;
3609         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3610         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3611
3612         family = sk->sk_family;
3613         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3614                 goto out;
3615
3616         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3617         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3618                 family = PF_INET;
3619
3620         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3621         ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3622         ad.u.net.family = family;
3623
3624         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
3625         if (err)
3626                 goto out;
3627
3628         if (selinux_compat_net)
3629                 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
3630                                                   addrp, len);
3631         else
3632                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3633                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
3634         if (err)
3635                 goto out;
3636
3637         err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
3638         if (err)
3639                 goto out;
3640
3641         err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3642 out:
3643         return err;
3644 }
3645
3646 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3647                                             int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3648 {
3649         int err = 0;
3650         char *scontext;
3651         u32 scontext_len;
3652         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3653         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3654         u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
3655
3656         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3657
3658         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
3659             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3660                 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3661                 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3662         }
3663         if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3664                 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3665                 goto out;
3666         }
3667
3668         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3669
3670         if (err)
3671                 goto out;
3672
3673         if (scontext_len > len) {
3674                 err = -ERANGE;
3675                 goto out_len;
3676         }
3677
3678         if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3679                 err = -EFAULT;
3680
3681 out_len:
3682         if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3683                 err = -EFAULT;
3684
3685         kfree(scontext);
3686 out:
3687         return err;
3688 }
3689
3690 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3691 {
3692         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3693         int err = 0;
3694
3695         if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3696                 selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
3697         else if (skb)
3698                 selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peer_secid);
3699
3700         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3701                 err = -EINVAL;
3702         *secid = peer_secid;
3703
3704         return err;
3705 }
3706
3707 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3708 {
3709         return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3710 }
3711
3712 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3713 {
3714         sk_free_security(sk);
3715 }
3716
3717 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
3718 {
3719         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
3720         struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
3721
3722         newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
3723         newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3724
3725         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec);
3726 }
3727
3728 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
3729 {
3730         if (!sk)
3731                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3732         else {
3733                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3734
3735                 *secid = sksec->sid;
3736         }
3737 }
3738
3739 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
3740 {
3741         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
3742         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3743
3744         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
3745             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3746                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
3747
3748         selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
3749 }
3750
3751 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3752                                      struct request_sock *req)
3753 {
3754         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3755         int err;
3756         u32 newsid;
3757         u32 peersid;
3758
3759         selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid);
3760         if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
3761                 req->secid = sksec->sid;
3762                 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3763                 return 0;
3764         }
3765
3766         err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
3767         if (err)
3768                 return err;
3769
3770         req->secid = newsid;
3771         req->peer_secid = peersid;
3772         return 0;
3773 }
3774
3775 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
3776                                    const struct request_sock *req)
3777 {
3778         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
3779
3780         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
3781         newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
3782         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
3783            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
3784            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
3785            time it will have been created and available. */
3786
3787         /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
3788          * thread with access to newsksec */
3789         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
3790 }
3791
3792 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
3793                                 struct sk_buff *skb)
3794 {
3795         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3796
3797         selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid);
3798 }
3799
3800 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
3801                                       struct flowi *fl)
3802 {
3803         fl->secid = req->secid;
3804 }
3805
3806 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3807 {
3808         int err = 0;
3809         u32 perm;
3810         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3811         struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3812         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3813
3814         if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3815                 err = -EINVAL;
3816                 goto out;
3817         }
3818         nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
3819
3820         err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3821         if (err) {
3822                 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3823                         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3824                                   "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
3825                                   " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3826                                   nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3827                         if (!selinux_enforcing)
3828                                 err = 0;
3829                 }
3830
3831                 /* Ignore */
3832                 if (err == -ENOENT)
3833                         err = 0;
3834                 goto out;
3835         }
3836
3837         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3838 out:
3839         return err;
3840 }
3841
3842 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3843
3844 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
3845                                             struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3846                                             u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3847 {
3848         int err = 0;
3849         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3850         struct socket *sock;
3851         struct inode *inode;
3852         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3853
3854         sock = sk->sk_socket;
3855         if (!sock)
3856                 goto out;
3857
3858         inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3859         if (!inode)
3860                 goto out;
3861
3862         isec = inode->i_security;
3863
3864         err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3865         if (err)
3866                 goto out;
3867
3868         switch (isec->sclass) {
3869         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3870                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3871                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3872                 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3873                 break;
3874
3875         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3876                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3877                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3878                 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3879                 break;
3880
3881         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3882                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
3883                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
3884                 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3885                 break;
3886
3887         default:
3888                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3889                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3890                 break;
3891         }
3892
3893         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3894         if (err)
3895                 goto out;
3896
3897         err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3898         if (err)
3899                 goto out;
3900
3901         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3902         if (err)
3903                 goto out;
3904
3905         if (send_perm) {
3906                 u32 port_sid;
3907
3908                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3909                                         sk->sk_type,
3910                                         sk->sk_protocol,
3911                                         ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
3912                                         &port_sid);
3913                 if (err)
3914                         goto out;
3915
3916                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3917                                    send_perm, ad);
3918         }
3919 out:
3920         return err;
3921 }
3922
3923 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3924                                               struct sk_buff **pskb,
3925                                               const struct net_device *in,
3926                                               const struct net_device *out,
3927                                               int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3928                                               u16 family)
3929 {
3930         char *addrp;
3931         int len, err = 0;
3932         struct sock *sk;
3933         struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3934         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3935         struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3936         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3937         u8 proto;
3938
3939         sk = skb->sk;
3940         if (!sk)
3941                 goto out;
3942
3943         sksec = sk->sk_security;
3944
3945         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3946         ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3947         ad.u.net.family = family;
3948
3949         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
3950         if (err)
3951                 goto out;
3952
3953         if (selinux_compat_net)
3954                 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
3955                                                        family, addrp, len);
3956         else
3957                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3958                                    PACKET__SEND, &ad);
3959
3960         if (err)
3961                 goto out;
3962
3963         err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto);
3964 out:
3965         return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3966 }
3967
3968 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3969                                                 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3970                                                 const struct net_device *in,
3971                                                 const struct net_device *out,
3972                                                 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3973 {
3974         return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3975 }
3976
3977 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3978
3979 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3980                                                 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3981                                                 const struct net_device *in,
3982                                                 const struct net_device *out,
3983                                                 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3984 {
3985         return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3986 }
3987
3988 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3989
3990 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3991
3992 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3993 {
3994         int err;
3995
3996         err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3997         if (err)
3998                 return err;
3999
4000         if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4001                 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4002
4003         return err;
4004 }
4005
4006 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4007 {
4008         int err;
4009         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4010
4011         err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4012         if (err)
4013                 return err;
4014
4015         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4016         ad.u.cap = capability;
4017
4018         return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4019                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4020 }
4021
4022 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4023                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4024                               u16 sclass)
4025 {
4026         struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4027         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4028
4029         isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4030         if (!isec)
4031                 return -ENOMEM;
4032
4033         isec->sclass = sclass;
4034         isec->ipc_perm = perm;
4035         isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4036         perm->security = isec;
4037
4038         return 0;
4039 }
4040
4041 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4042 {
4043         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4044         perm->security = NULL;
4045         kfree(isec);
4046 }
4047
4048 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4049 {
4050         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4051
4052         msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4053         if (!msec)
4054                 return -ENOMEM;
4055
4056         msec->msg = msg;
4057         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4058         msg->security = msec;
4059
4060         return 0;
4061 }
4062
4063 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4064 {
4065         struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4066
4067         msg->security = NULL;
4068         kfree(msec);
4069 }
4070
4071 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4072                         u32 perms)
4073 {
4074         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4075         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4076         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4077
4078         tsec = current->security;
4079         isec = ipc_perms->security;
4080
4081         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4082         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4083
4084         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4085 }
4086
4087 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4088 {
4089         return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4090 }
4091
4092 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4093 {
4094         msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4095 }
4096
4097 /* message queue security operations */
4098 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4099 {
4100         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4101         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4102         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4103         int rc;
4104
4105         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4106         if (rc)
4107                 return rc;
4108
4109         tsec = current->security;
4110         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4111
4112         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4113         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4114
4115         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4116                           MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4117         if (rc) {
4118                 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4119                 return rc;
4120         }
4121         return 0;
4122 }
4123
4124 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4125 {
4126         ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4127 }
4128
4129 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4130 {
4131         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4132         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4133         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4134
4135         tsec = current->security;
4136         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4137
4138         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4139         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4140
4141         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4142                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4143 }
4144
4145 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4146 {
4147         int err;
4148         int perms;
4149
4150         switch(cmd) {
4151         case IPC_INFO:
4152         case MSG_INFO:
4153                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4154                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4155         case IPC_STAT:
4156         case MSG_STAT:
4157                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4158                 break;
4159         case IPC_SET:
4160                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4161                 break;
4162         case IPC_RMID:
4163                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4164                 break;
4165         default:
4166                 return 0;
4167         }
4168
4169         err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4170         return err;
4171 }
4172
4173 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4174 {
4175         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4176         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4177         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4178         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4179         int rc;
4180
4181         tsec = current->security;
4182         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4183         msec = msg->security;
4184
4185         /*
4186          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4187          */
4188         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4189                 /*
4190                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
4191                  * message queue this message will be stored in
4192                  */
4193                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4194                                              isec->sid,
4195                                              SECCLASS_MSG,
4196                                              &msec->sid);
4197                 if (rc)
4198                         return rc;
4199         }
4200
4201         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4202         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4203
4204         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4205         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4206                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4207         if (!rc)
4208                 /* Can this process send the message */
4209                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4210                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4211         if (!rc)
4212                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4213                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4214                                   SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4215
4216         return rc;
4217 }
4218
4219 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4220                                     struct task_struct *target,
4221                                     long type, int mode)
4222 {
4223         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4224         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4225         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4226         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4227         int rc;
4228
4229         tsec = target->security;
4230         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4231         msec = msg->security;
4232
4233         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4234         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4235
4236         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4237                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4238         if (!rc)
4239                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4240                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4241         return rc;
4242 }
4243
4244 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4245 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4246 {
4247         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4248         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4249         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4250         int rc;
4251
4252         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4253         if (rc)
4254                 return rc;
4255
4256         tsec = current->security;
4257         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4258
4259         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4260         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4261
4262         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4263                           SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4264         if (rc) {
4265                 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4266                 return rc;
4267         }
4268         return 0;
4269 }
4270
4271 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4272 {
4273         ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4274 }
4275
4276 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4277 {
4278         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4279         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4280         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4281
4282         tsec = current->security;
4283         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4284
4285         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4286         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4287
4288         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4289                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4290 }
4291
4292 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4293 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4294 {
4295         int perms;
4296         int err;
4297
4298         switch(cmd) {
4299         case IPC_INFO:
4300         case SHM_INFO:
4301                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4302                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4303         case IPC_STAT:
4304         case SHM_STAT:
4305                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4306                 break;
4307         case IPC_SET:
4308                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4309                 break;
4310         case SHM_LOCK:
4311         case SHM_UNLOCK:
4312                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
4313                 break;
4314         case IPC_RMID:
4315                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4316                 break;
4317         default:
4318                 return 0;
4319         }
4320
4321         err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4322         return err;
4323 }
4324
4325 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4326                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4327 {
4328         u32 perms;
4329         int rc;
4330
4331         rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4332         if (rc)
4333                 return rc;
4334
4335         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4336                 perms = SHM__READ;
4337         else
4338                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4339
4340         return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4341 }
4342
4343 /* Semaphore security operations */
4344 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4345 {
4346         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4347         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4348         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4349         int rc;
4350
4351         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4352         if (rc)
4353                 return rc;
4354
4355         tsec = current->security;
4356         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4357
4358         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4359         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4360
4361         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4362                           SEM__CREATE, &ad);
4363         if (rc) {
4364                 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4365                 return rc;
4366         }
4367         return 0;
4368 }
4369
4370 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4371 {
4372         ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4373 }
4374
4375 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4376 {
4377         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4378         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4379         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4380
4381         tsec = current->security;
4382         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4383
4384         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4385         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4386
4387         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4388                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4389 }
4390
4391 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4392 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4393 {
4394         int err;
4395         u32 perms;
4396
4397         switch(cmd) {
4398         case IPC_INFO:
4399         case SEM_INFO:
4400                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4401                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4402         case GETPID:
4403         case GETNCNT:
4404         case GETZCNT:
4405                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4406                 break;
4407         case GETVAL:
4408         case GETALL:
4409                 perms = SEM__READ;
4410                 break;
4411         case SETVAL:
4412         case SETALL:
4413                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
4414                 break;
4415         case IPC_RMID:
4416                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4417                 break;
4418         case IPC_SET:
4419                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4420                 break;
4421         case IPC_STAT:
4422         case SEM_STAT:
4423                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4424                 break;
4425         default:
4426                 return 0;
4427         }
4428
4429         err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4430         return err;
4431 }
4432
4433 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4434                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4435 {
4436         u32 perms;
4437
4438         if (alter)
4439                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4440         else
4441                 perms = SEM__READ;
4442
4443         return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4444 }
4445
4446 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4447 {
4448         u32 av = 0;
4449
4450         av = 0;
4451         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
4452                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4453         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
4454                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4455
4456         if (av == 0)
4457                 return 0;
4458
4459         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4460 }
4461
4462 /* module stacking operations */
4463 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4464 {
4465         if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4466                 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  There is already a secondary security "
4467                        "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4468                 return -EINVAL;
4469         }
4470
4471         secondary_ops = ops;
4472
4473         printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  Registering secondary module %s\n",
4474                __FUNCTION__,
4475                name);
4476
4477         return 0;
4478 }
4479
4480 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4481 {
4482         if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4483                 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  trying to unregister a security module "
4484                         "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4485                 return -EINVAL;
4486         }
4487
4488         secondary_ops = original_ops;
4489
4490         return 0;
4491 }
4492
4493 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4494 {
4495         if (inode)
4496                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4497 }
4498
4499 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4500                                char *name, char **value)
4501 {
4502         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4503         u32 sid;
4504         int error;
4505         unsigned len;
4506
4507         if (current != p) {
4508                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4509                 if (error)
4510                         return error;
4511         }
4512
4513         tsec = p->security;
4514
4515         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4516                 sid = tsec->sid;
4517         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4518                 sid = tsec->osid;
4519         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4520                 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4521         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4522                 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4523         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4524                 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4525         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4526                 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4527         else
4528                 return -EINVAL;
4529
4530         if (!sid)
4531                 return 0;
4532
4533         error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
4534         if (error)
4535                 return error;
4536         return len;
4537 }
4538
4539 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4540                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4541 {
4542         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4543         u32 sid = 0;
4544         int error;
4545         char *str = value;
4546
4547         if (current != p) {
4548                 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4549                    security attributes. */
4550                 return -EACCES;
4551         }
4552
4553         /*
4554          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4555          * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4556          * above restriction is ever removed.
4557          */
4558         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4559                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4560         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4561                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4562         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4563                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
4564         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4565                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
4566         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4567                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4568         else
4569                 error = -EINVAL;
4570         if (error)
4571                 return error;
4572
4573         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4574         if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4575                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4576                         str[size-1] = 0;
4577                         size--;
4578                 }
4579                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4580                 if (error)
4581                         return error;
4582         }
4583
4584         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4585            performed during the actual operation (execve,
4586            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4587            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4588            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4589            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4590         tsec = p->security;
4591         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4592                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4593         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4594                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4595         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
4596                 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
4597                 if (error)
4598                         return error;
4599                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
4600         } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4601                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
4602         else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4603                 struct av_decision avd;
4604
4605                 if (sid == 0)
4606                         return -EINVAL;
4607
4608                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4609                 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4610                         struct task_struct *g, *t;
4611                         struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4612                         read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4613                         do_each_thread(g, t)
4614                                 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4615                                         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4616                                         return -EPERM;
4617                                 }
4618                         while_each_thread(g, t);
4619                         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4620                 }
4621
4622                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4623                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4624                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4625                 if (error)
4626                         return error;
4627
4628                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4629                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4630                 task_lock(p);
4631                 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4632                         error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4633                                                      SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4634                                                      PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
4635                         if (!error)
4636                                 tsec->sid = sid;
4637                         task_unlock(p);
4638                         avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4639                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4640                         if (error)
4641                                 return error;
4642                 } else {
4643                         tsec->sid = sid;
4644                         task_unlock(p);
4645                 }
4646         }
4647         else
4648                 return -EINVAL;
4649
4650         return size;
4651 }
4652
4653 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4654 {
4655         return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
4656 }
4657
4658 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4659 {
4660         if (secdata)
4661                 kfree(secdata);
4662 }
4663
4664 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4665
4666 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4667                              unsigned long flags)
4668 {
4669         struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4670         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4671
4672         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4673         if (!ksec)
4674                 return -ENOMEM;
4675
4676         ksec->obj = k;
4677         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
4678                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4679         else
4680                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4681         k->security = ksec;
4682
4683         return 0;
4684 }
4685
4686 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4687 {
4688         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4689
4690         k->security = NULL;
4691         kfree(ksec);
4692 }
4693
4694 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4695                             struct task_struct *ctx,
4696                             key_perm_t perm)
4697 {
4698         struct key *key;
4699         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4700         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4701
4702         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4703
4704         tsec = ctx->security;
4705         ksec = key->security;
4706
4707         /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
4708            permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
4709            appear to be created. */
4710         if (perm == 0)
4711                 return 0;
4712
4713         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
4714                             SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
4715 }
4716
4717 #endif
4718
4719 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4720         .ptrace =                       selinux_ptrace,
4721         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
4722         .capset_check =                 selinux_capset_check,
4723         .capset_set =                   selinux_capset_set,
4724         .sysctl =                       selinux_sysctl,
4725         .capable =                      selinux_capable,
4726         .quotactl =                     selinux_quotactl,
4727         .quota_on =                     selinux_quota_on,
4728         .syslog =                       selinux_syslog,
4729         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4730
4731         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
4732         .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
4733
4734         .bprm_alloc_security =          selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4735         .bprm_free_security =           selinux_bprm_free_security,
4736         .bprm_apply_creds =             selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4737         .bprm_post_apply_creds =        selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4738         .bprm_set_security =            selinux_bprm_set_security,
4739         .bprm_check_security =          selinux_bprm_check_security,
4740         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4741
4742         .sb_alloc_security =            selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4743         .sb_free_security =             selinux_sb_free_security,
4744         .sb_copy_data =                 selinux_sb_copy_data,
4745         .sb_kern_mount =                selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4746         .sb_statfs =                    selinux_sb_statfs,
4747         .sb_mount =                     selinux_mount,
4748         .sb_umount =                    selinux_umount,
4749
4750         .inode_alloc_security =         selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4751         .inode_free_security =          selinux_inode_free_security,
4752         .inode_init_security =          selinux_inode_init_security,
4753         .inode_create =                 selinux_inode_create,
4754         .inode_link =                   selinux_inode_link,
4755         .inode_unlink =                 selinux_inode_unlink,
4756         .inode_symlink =                selinux_inode_symlink,
4757         .inode_mkdir =                  selinux_inode_mkdir,
4758         .inode_rmdir =                  selinux_inode_rmdir,
4759         .inode_mknod =                  selinux_inode_mknod,
4760         .inode_rename =                 selinux_inode_rename,
4761         .inode_readlink =               selinux_inode_readlink,
4762         .inode_follow_link =            selinux_inode_follow_link,
4763         .inode_permission =             selinux_inode_permission,
4764         .inode_setattr =                selinux_inode_setattr,
4765         .inode_getattr =                selinux_inode_getattr,
4766         .inode_setxattr =               selinux_inode_setxattr,
4767         .inode_post_setxattr =          selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4768         .inode_getxattr =               selinux_inode_getxattr,
4769         .inode_listxattr =              selinux_inode_listxattr,
4770         .inode_removexattr =            selinux_inode_removexattr,
4771         .inode_xattr_getsuffix =        selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4772         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4773         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4774         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4775
4776         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
4777         .file_alloc_security =          selinux_file_alloc_security,
4778         .file_free_security =           selinux_file_free_security,
4779         .file_ioctl =                   selinux_file_ioctl,
4780         .file_mmap =                    selinux_file_mmap,
4781         .file_mprotect =                selinux_file_mprotect,
4782         .file_lock =                    selinux_file_lock,
4783         .file_fcntl =                   selinux_file_fcntl,
4784         .file_set_fowner =              selinux_file_set_fowner,
4785         .file_send_sigiotask =          selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4786         .file_receive =                 selinux_file_receive,
4787
4788         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
4789         .task_alloc_security =          selinux_task_alloc_security,
4790         .task_free_security =           selinux_task_free_security,
4791         .task_setuid =                  selinux_task_setuid,
4792         .task_post_setuid =             selinux_task_post_setuid,
4793         .task_setgid =                  selinux_task_setgid,
4794         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
4795         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
4796         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
4797         .task_getsecid =                selinux_task_getsecid,
4798         .task_setgroups =               selinux_task_setgroups,
4799         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
4800         .task_setioprio =               selinux_task_setioprio,
4801         .task_getioprio =               selinux_task_getioprio,
4802         .task_setrlimit =               selinux_task_setrlimit,
4803         .task_setscheduler =            selinux_task_setscheduler,
4804         .task_getscheduler =            selinux_task_getscheduler,
4805         .task_movememory =              selinux_task_movememory,
4806         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
4807         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
4808         .task_prctl =                   selinux_task_prctl,
4809         .task_reparent_to_init =        selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4810         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
4811
4812         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
4813
4814         .msg_msg_alloc_security =       selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4815         .msg_msg_free_security =        selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4816
4817         .msg_queue_alloc_security =     selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4818         .msg_queue_free_security =      selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4819         .msg_queue_associate =          selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4820         .msg_queue_msgctl =             selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4821         .msg_queue_msgsnd =             selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4822         .msg_queue_msgrcv =             selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4823
4824         .shm_alloc_security =           selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4825         .shm_free_security =            selinux_shm_free_security,
4826         .shm_associate =                selinux_shm_associate,
4827         .shm_shmctl =                   selinux_shm_shmctl,
4828         .shm_shmat =                    selinux_shm_shmat,
4829
4830         .sem_alloc_security =           selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4831         .sem_free_security =            selinux_sem_free_security,
4832         .sem_associate =                selinux_sem_associate,
4833         .sem_semctl =                   selinux_sem_semctl,
4834         .sem_semop =                    selinux_sem_semop,
4835
4836         .register_security =            selinux_register_security,
4837         .unregister_security =          selinux_unregister_security,
4838
4839         .d_instantiate =                selinux_d_instantiate,
4840
4841         .getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
4842         .setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
4843
4844         .secid_to_secctx =              selinux_secid_to_secctx,
4845         .release_secctx =               selinux_release_secctx,
4846
4847         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4848         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4849
4850         .socket_create =                selinux_socket_create,
4851         .socket_post_create =           selinux_socket_post_create,
4852         .socket_bind =                  selinux_socket_bind,
4853         .socket_connect =               selinux_socket_connect,
4854         .socket_listen =                selinux_socket_listen,
4855         .socket_accept =                selinux_socket_accept,
4856         .socket_sendmsg =               selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4857         .socket_recvmsg =               selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4858         .socket_getsockname =           selinux_socket_getsockname,
4859         .socket_getpeername =           selinux_socket_getpeername,
4860         .socket_getsockopt =            selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4861         .socket_setsockopt =            selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4862         .socket_shutdown =              selinux_socket_shutdown,
4863         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4864         .socket_getpeersec_stream =     selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4865         .socket_getpeersec_dgram =      selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4866         .sk_alloc_security =            selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4867         .sk_free_security =             selinux_sk_free_security,
4868         .sk_clone_security =            selinux_sk_clone_security,
4869         .sk_getsecid =                  selinux_sk_getsecid,
4870         .sock_graft =                   selinux_sock_graft,
4871         .inet_conn_request =            selinux_inet_conn_request,
4872         .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
4873         .inet_conn_established =        selinux_inet_conn_established,
4874         .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
4875
4876 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4877         .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4878         .xfrm_policy_clone_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4879         .xfrm_policy_free_security =    selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4880         .xfrm_policy_delete_security =  selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
4881         .xfrm_state_alloc_security =    selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4882         .xfrm_state_free_security =     selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4883         .xfrm_state_delete_security =   selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
4884         .xfrm_policy_lookup =           selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4885         .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =    selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
4886         .xfrm_decode_session =          selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
4887 #endif
4888
4889 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4890         .key_alloc =                    selinux_key_alloc,
4891         .key_free =                     selinux_key_free,
4892         .key_permission =               selinux_key_permission,
4893 #endif
4894 };
4895
4896 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4897 {
4898         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4899
4900         if (!selinux_enabled) {
4901                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
4902                 return 0;
4903         }
4904
4905         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
4906
4907         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4908         if (task_alloc_security(current))
4909                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4910         tsec = current->security;
4911         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4912
4913         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4914                                             sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4915                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
4916         avc_init();
4917
4918         original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4919         if (!secondary_ops)
4920                 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4921         if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4922                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4923
4924         if (selinux_enforcing) {
4925                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4926         } else {
4927                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
4928         }
4929
4930 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4931         /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
4932         selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
4933                           KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4934         selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
4935                           KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4936 #endif
4937
4938         return 0;
4939 }
4940
4941 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4942 {
4943         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
4944
4945         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4946         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4947         spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4948         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4949 next_sb:
4950         if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4951                 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4952                                 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4953                                            struct superblock_security_struct,
4954                                            list);
4955                 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4956                 sb->s_count++;
4957                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4958                 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4959                 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4960                 if (sb->s_root)
4961                         superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4962                 drop_super(sb);
4963                 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4964                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4965                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4966                 goto next_sb;
4967         }
4968         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4969         spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4970 }
4971
4972 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4973    all processes and objects when they are created. */
4974 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4975
4976 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4977
4978 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4979         .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4980         .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
4981         .pf =           PF_INET,
4982         .hooknum =      NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4983         .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4984 };
4985
4986 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4987
4988 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4989         .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4990         .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
4991         .pf =           PF_INET6,
4992         .hooknum =      NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4993         .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4994 };
4995
4996 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4997
4998 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4999 {
5000         int err = 0;
5001
5002         if (!selinux_enabled)
5003                 goto out;
5004
5005         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5006
5007         err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
5008         if (err)
5009                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5010
5011 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5012
5013         err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
5014         if (err)
5015                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5016
5017 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5018
5019 out:
5020         return err;
5021 }
5022
5023 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5024
5025 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5026 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5027 {
5028         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5029
5030         nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
5031 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5032         nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
5033 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5034 }
5035 #endif
5036
5037 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5038
5039 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5040 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5041 #endif
5042
5043 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5044
5045 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5046 int selinux_disable(void)
5047 {
5048         extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5049         static int selinux_disabled = 0;
5050
5051         if (ss_initialized) {
5052                 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5053                 return -EINVAL;
5054         }
5055
5056         if (selinux_disabled) {
5057                 /* Only do this once. */
5058                 return -EINVAL;
5059         }
5060
5061         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
5062
5063         selinux_disabled = 1;
5064         selinux_enabled = 0;
5065
5066         /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5067         security_ops = secondary_ops;
5068
5069         /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5070         selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5071
5072         /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5073         exit_sel_fs();
5074
5075         return 0;
5076 }
5077 #endif
5078
5079