2 * random.c -- A strong random number generator
4 * Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005
6 * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
14 * including the disclaimer of warranties.
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
17 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18 * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
19 * products derived from this software without specific prior
22 * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
23 * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
24 * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
25 * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
26 * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
28 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
29 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
30 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
31 * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
32 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
33 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
34 * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
35 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
36 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
37 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
38 * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
43 * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
45 * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
46 * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
47 * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
48 * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
49 * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
50 * predict by an attacker.
55 * Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard
56 * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
57 * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
58 * algorithm. Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
59 * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
60 * applications this is not acceptable. So instead, we must try to
61 * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
62 * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
63 * generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done
64 * from inside the kernel.
66 * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
67 * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
68 * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
69 * outside observer to measure. Randomness from these sources are
70 * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
71 * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
72 * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
73 * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
74 * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
75 * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
76 * the random number generator's internal state.
78 * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
79 * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids
80 * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to
81 * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
82 * about the input of SHA from its output. Even if it is possible to
83 * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
84 * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
85 * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this
86 * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
87 * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
88 * outputs random numbers.
90 * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
91 * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
92 * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
93 * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is
94 * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
95 * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
98 * Exported interfaces ---- output
99 * ===============================
101 * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
102 * be used from within the kernel:
104 * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
106 * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
107 * and place it in the requested buffer.
109 * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
110 * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
111 * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
112 * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
113 * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
114 * contained in the entropy pool.
116 * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
117 * as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are
118 * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
119 * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically
120 * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
122 * Exported interfaces ---- input
123 * ==============================
125 * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
126 * from the devices are:
128 * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
129 * unsigned int value);
130 * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
132 * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
133 * the event type information from the hardware.
135 * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the inter-interrupt timing as random
136 * inputs to the entropy pool. Note that not all interrupts are good
137 * sources of randomness! For example, the timer interrupts is not a
138 * good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is too
139 * regular, and hence predictable to an attacker. Disk interrupts are
140 * a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more
143 * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
144 * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the
145 * first and second order deltas of the event timings.
147 * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
148 * ============================================
150 * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
151 * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
152 * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
153 * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the
154 * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count. In order to
155 * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
156 * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups. To do this, put the
157 * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
160 * echo "Initializing random number generator..."
161 * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
162 * # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
163 * # Load and then save the whole entropy pool
164 * if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
165 * cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
169 * chmod 600 $random_seed
170 * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
172 * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as
173 * the system is shutdown:
175 * # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
176 * # Save the whole entropy pool
177 * echo "Saving random seed..."
178 * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
180 * chmod 600 $random_seed
181 * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
183 * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init
184 * scripts, such code fragments would be found in
185 * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random. On older Linux systems, the correct script
186 * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
188 * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
189 * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
190 * start-up. (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
191 * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up,
192 * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.) Even with
193 * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state
194 * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of
197 * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux
198 * ==============================================
200 * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of
201 * the /dev/mem major number (#1). So if your system does not have
202 * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
203 * by using the commands:
205 * mknod /dev/random c 1 8
206 * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
211 * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
212 * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private
213 * discussions with Phil Karn. Colin Plumb provided a faster random
214 * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
215 * pool, taken from PGPfone. Dale Worley has also contributed many
216 * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
218 * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
219 * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
221 * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
222 * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
223 * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
226 #include <linux/utsname.h>
227 #include <linux/module.h>
228 #include <linux/kernel.h>
229 #include <linux/major.h>
230 #include <linux/string.h>
231 #include <linux/fcntl.h>
232 #include <linux/slab.h>
233 #include <linux/random.h>
234 #include <linux/poll.h>
235 #include <linux/init.h>
236 #include <linux/fs.h>
237 #include <linux/genhd.h>
238 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
239 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
240 #include <linux/percpu.h>
241 #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
243 #include <asm/processor.h>
244 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
249 * Configuration information
251 #define INPUT_POOL_WORDS 128
252 #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS 32
253 #define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
256 * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
257 * /dev/random. Should be enough to do a significant reseed.
259 static int random_read_wakeup_thresh = 64;
262 * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
263 * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
264 * access to /dev/random.
266 static int random_write_wakeup_thresh = 128;
269 * When the input pool goes over trickle_thresh, start dropping most
270 * samples to avoid wasting CPU time and reduce lock contention.
273 static int trickle_thresh __read_mostly = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 28;
275 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, trickle_count);
278 * A pool of size .poolwords is stirred with a primitive polynomial
279 * of degree .poolwords over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are
280 * defined below. They are chosen to be evenly spaced (minimum RMS
281 * distance from evenly spaced; the numbers in the comments are a
282 * scaled squared error sum) except for the last tap, which is 1 to
283 * get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
285 static struct poolinfo {
287 int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
288 } poolinfo_table[] = {
289 /* x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 -- 105 */
290 { 128, 103, 76, 51, 25, 1 },
291 /* x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 -- 15 */
292 { 32, 26, 20, 14, 7, 1 },
294 /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */
295 { 2048, 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 },
297 /* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */
298 { 1024, 817, 615, 412, 204, 1 },
300 /* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */
301 { 1024, 819, 616, 410, 207, 2 },
303 /* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */
304 { 512, 411, 308, 208, 104, 1 },
306 /* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
307 { 512, 409, 307, 206, 102, 2 },
308 /* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
309 { 512, 409, 309, 205, 103, 2 },
311 /* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */
312 { 256, 205, 155, 101, 52, 1 },
314 /* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */
315 { 128, 103, 78, 51, 27, 2 },
317 /* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */
318 { 64, 52, 39, 26, 14, 1 },
322 #define POOLBITS poolwords*32
323 #define POOLBYTES poolwords*4
326 * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
327 * well to make a twisted Generalized Feedback Shift Reigster
329 * (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992. Twisted GFSR generators. ACM
330 * Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation 2(3):179-194.
331 * Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994. Twisted GFSR generators
332 * II. ACM Transactions on Mdeling and Computer Simulation 4:254-266)
334 * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
336 * We have not analyzed the resultant polynomial to prove it primitive;
337 * in fact it almost certainly isn't. Nonetheless, the irreducible factors
338 * of a random large-degree polynomial over GF(2) are more than large enough
339 * that periodicity is not a concern.
341 * The input hash is much less sensitive than the output hash. All
342 * that we want of it is that it be a good non-cryptographic hash;
343 * i.e. it not produce collisions when fed "random" data of the sort
344 * we expect to see. As long as the pool state differs for different
345 * inputs, we have preserved the input entropy and done a good job.
346 * The fact that an intelligent attacker can construct inputs that
347 * will produce controlled alterations to the pool's state is not
348 * important because we don't consider such inputs to contribute any
349 * randomness. The only property we need with respect to them is that
350 * the attacker can't increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state.
351 * Since all additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the
352 * input, you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has
353 * any uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle
354 * that uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would
355 * decrease the uncertainty).
357 * The chosen system lets the state of the pool be (essentially) the input
358 * modulo the generator polymnomial. Now, for random primitive polynomials,
359 * this is a universal class of hash functions, meaning that the chance
360 * of a collision is limited by the attacker's knowledge of the generator
361 * polynomail, so if it is chosen at random, an attacker can never force
362 * a collision. Here, we use a fixed polynomial, but we *can* assume that
363 * ###--> it is unknown to the processes generating the input entropy. <-###
364 * Because of this important property, this is a good, collision-resistant
365 * hash; hash collisions will occur no more often than chance.
369 * Static global variables
371 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
372 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
376 module_param(debug, bool, 0644);
377 #define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do { \
379 printk(KERN_DEBUG "random %04d %04d %04d: " \
381 input_pool.entropy_count,\
382 blocking_pool.entropy_count,\
383 nonblocking_pool.entropy_count,\
386 #define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do {} while (0)
389 /**********************************************************************
391 * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle
392 * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
394 **********************************************************************/
396 struct entropy_store;
397 struct entropy_store {
398 /* read-only data: */
399 struct poolinfo *poolinfo;
403 struct entropy_store *pull;
405 /* read-write data: */
412 static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS];
413 static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
414 static __u32 nonblocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
416 static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
417 .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
420 .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(&input_pool.lock),
421 .pool = input_pool_data
424 static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = {
425 .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],
429 .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(&blocking_pool.lock),
430 .pool = blocking_pool_data
433 static struct entropy_store nonblocking_pool = {
434 .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],
435 .name = "nonblocking",
437 .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(&nonblocking_pool.lock),
438 .pool = nonblocking_pool_data
442 * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
443 * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call
444 * credit_entropy_store if this is appropriate.
446 * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
447 * degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because
448 * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
449 * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
451 static void mix_pool_bytes_extract(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
452 int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
454 static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
455 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
456 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
457 unsigned long i, j, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
459 int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
460 const char *bytes = in;
464 /* Taps are constant, so we can load them without holding r->lock. */
465 tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
466 tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
467 tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
468 tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
469 tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
471 spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
472 input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
475 /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
477 w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate & 31);
478 i = (i - 1) & wordmask;
480 /* XOR in the various taps */
482 w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
483 w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
484 w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
485 w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
486 w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
488 /* Mix the result back in with a twist */
489 r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
492 * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
493 * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
494 * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
495 * input bits across the pool evenly.
497 input_rotate += i ? 7 : 14;
500 r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
504 for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
505 ((__u32 *)out)[j] = r->pool[(i - j) & wordmask];
507 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
510 static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, int bytes)
512 mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, in, bytes, NULL);
516 * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy
518 static void credit_entropy_store(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
522 spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
524 if (r->entropy_count + nbits < 0) {
525 DEBUG_ENT("negative entropy/overflow (%d+%d)\n",
526 r->entropy_count, nbits);
527 r->entropy_count = 0;
528 } else if (r->entropy_count + nbits > r->poolinfo->POOLBITS) {
529 r->entropy_count = r->poolinfo->POOLBITS;
531 r->entropy_count += nbits;
533 DEBUG_ENT("added %d entropy credits to %s\n",
537 /* should we wake readers? */
538 if (r == &input_pool && r->entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
539 wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
541 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
544 /*********************************************************************
546 * Entropy input management
548 *********************************************************************/
550 /* There is one of these per entropy source */
551 struct timer_rand_state {
553 long last_delta, last_delta2;
554 unsigned dont_count_entropy:1;
557 static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state;
558 static struct timer_rand_state *irq_timer_state[NR_IRQS];
561 * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
562 * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
563 * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
565 * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
566 * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for
567 * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
570 static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
577 long delta, delta2, delta3;
580 /* if over the trickle threshold, use only 1 in 4096 samples */
581 if (input_pool.entropy_count > trickle_thresh &&
582 (__get_cpu_var(trickle_count)++ & 0xfff))
585 sample.jiffies = jiffies;
586 sample.cycles = get_cycles();
588 mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &sample, sizeof(sample));
591 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
592 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
593 * in order to make our estimate.
596 if (!state->dont_count_entropy) {
597 delta = sample.jiffies - state->last_time;
598 state->last_time = sample.jiffies;
600 delta2 = delta - state->last_delta;
601 state->last_delta = delta;
603 delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2;
604 state->last_delta2 = delta2;
618 * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
619 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
620 * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits.
622 credit_entropy_store(&input_pool,
623 min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
629 void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
632 static unsigned char last_value;
634 /* ignore autorepeat and the like */
635 if (value == last_value)
638 DEBUG_ENT("input event\n");
640 add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
641 (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
643 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
645 void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
647 if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq] == NULL)
650 DEBUG_ENT("irq event %d\n", irq);
651 add_timer_randomness(irq_timer_state[irq], 0x100 + irq);
655 void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
657 if (!disk || !disk->random)
659 /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
660 DEBUG_ENT("disk event %d:%d\n", disk->major, disk->first_minor);
662 add_timer_randomness(disk->random,
663 0x100 + MKDEV(disk->major, disk->first_minor));
667 #define EXTRACT_SIZE 10
669 /*********************************************************************
671 * Entropy extraction routines
673 *********************************************************************/
675 static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
676 size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
679 * This utility inline function is responsible for transfering entropy
680 * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make
681 * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'.
683 static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
685 __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
687 if (r->pull && r->entropy_count < nbytes * 8 &&
688 r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo->POOLBITS) {
689 /* If we're limited, always leave two wakeup worth's BITS */
690 int rsvd = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_thresh/4;
693 /* pull at least as many as BYTES as wakeup BITS */
694 bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8);
695 /* but never more than the buffer size */
696 bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
698 DEBUG_ENT("going to reseed %s with %d bits "
699 "(%d of %d requested)\n",
700 r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, r->entropy_count);
702 bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
703 random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8, rsvd);
704 mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
705 credit_entropy_store(r, bytes*8);
710 * These functions extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
711 * returns it in a buffer.
713 * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before
714 * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the
715 * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the
716 * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers.
718 * Note: extract_entropy() assumes that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
721 static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
726 BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->POOLBITS);
728 /* Hold lock while accounting */
729 spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
731 DEBUG_ENT("trying to extract %d bits from %s\n",
732 nbytes * 8, r->name);
734 /* Can we pull enough? */
735 if (r->entropy_count / 8 < min + reserved) {
738 /* If limited, never pull more than available */
739 if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= r->entropy_count / 8)
740 nbytes = r->entropy_count/8 - reserved;
742 if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved)
743 r->entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
745 r->entropy_count = reserved;
747 if (r->entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
748 wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
751 DEBUG_ENT("debiting %d entropy credits from %s%s\n",
752 nbytes * 8, r->name, r->limit ? "" : " (unlimited)");
754 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
759 static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
762 __u32 hash[5], workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
765 /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */
767 for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
768 sha_transform(hash, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
771 * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking
772 * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool
773 * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous
774 * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By
775 * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make
776 * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
779 mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, hash, sizeof(hash), extract);
782 * To avoid duplicates, we atomically extract a portion of the
783 * pool while mixing, and hash one final time.
785 sha_transform(hash, extract, workspace);
786 memset(extract, 0, sizeof(extract));
787 memset(workspace, 0, sizeof(workspace));
790 * In case the hash function has some recognizable output
791 * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back
792 * twice as much data as we output.
796 hash[2] ^= rol32(hash[2], 16);
797 memcpy(out, hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
798 memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
801 static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
802 size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
805 __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
807 xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
808 nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
812 i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
819 /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
820 memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
825 static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
829 __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
831 xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
832 nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0);
835 if (need_resched()) {
836 if (signal_pending(current)) {
845 i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
846 if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
856 /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
857 memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
863 * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
864 * number of good random numbers, suitable for seeding TCP sequence
867 void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
869 extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes, 0, 0);
871 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
874 * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
876 * @r: pool to initialize
878 * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system
879 * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared
880 * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool.
882 static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
887 spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
888 r->entropy_count = 0;
889 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
891 now = ktime_get_real();
892 mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
893 mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
896 static int rand_initialize(void)
898 init_std_data(&input_pool);
899 init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
900 init_std_data(&nonblocking_pool);
903 module_init(rand_initialize);
905 void rand_initialize_irq(int irq)
907 struct timer_rand_state *state;
909 if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq])
913 * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
916 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
918 irq_timer_state[irq] = state;
922 void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
924 struct timer_rand_state *state;
927 * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
930 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
932 disk->random = state;
937 random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
939 ssize_t n, retval = 0, count = 0;
946 if (n > SEC_XFER_SIZE)
949 DEBUG_ENT("reading %d bits\n", n*8);
951 n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, n);
953 DEBUG_ENT("read got %d bits (%d still needed)\n",
957 if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
962 DEBUG_ENT("sleeping?\n");
964 wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
965 input_pool.entropy_count >=
966 random_read_wakeup_thresh);
968 DEBUG_ENT("awake\n");
970 if (signal_pending(current)) {
971 retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
985 break; /* This break makes the device work */
986 /* like a named pipe */
990 * If we gave the user some bytes, update the access time.
995 return (count ? count : retval);
999 urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
1001 return extract_entropy_user(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
1005 random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
1009 poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
1010 poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
1012 if (input_pool.entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
1013 mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
1014 if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
1015 mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
1020 write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
1024 const char __user *p = buffer;
1027 bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
1028 if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
1034 mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
1041 static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
1042 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
1045 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1047 ret = write_pool(&blocking_pool, buffer, count);
1050 ret = write_pool(&nonblocking_pool, buffer, count);
1054 inode->i_mtime = current_fs_time(inode->i_sb);
1055 mark_inode_dirty(inode);
1056 return (ssize_t)count;
1059 static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
1061 int size, ent_count;
1062 int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
1067 /* inherently racy, no point locking */
1068 if (put_user(input_pool.entropy_count, p))
1071 case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
1072 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
1074 if (get_user(ent_count, p))
1076 credit_entropy_store(&input_pool, ent_count);
1079 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
1081 if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
1085 if (get_user(size, p++))
1087 retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p,
1091 credit_entropy_store(&input_pool, ent_count);
1095 /* Clear the entropy pool counters. */
1096 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
1105 const struct file_operations random_fops = {
1106 .read = random_read,
1107 .write = random_write,
1108 .poll = random_poll,
1109 .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
1112 const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
1113 .read = urandom_read,
1114 .write = random_write,
1115 .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
1118 /***************************************************************
1119 * Random UUID interface
1121 * Used here for a Boot ID, but can be useful for other kernel
1123 ***************************************************************/
1126 * Generate random UUID
1128 void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16])
1130 get_random_bytes(uuid_out, 16);
1131 /* Set UUID version to 4 --- truely random generation */
1132 uuid_out[6] = (uuid_out[6] & 0x0F) | 0x40;
1133 /* Set the UUID variant to DCE */
1134 uuid_out[8] = (uuid_out[8] & 0x3F) | 0x80;
1136 EXPORT_SYMBOL(generate_random_uuid);
1138 /********************************************************************
1142 ********************************************************************/
1144 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
1146 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
1148 static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;
1149 static int max_read_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
1150 static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
1151 static char sysctl_bootid[16];
1154 * These functions is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
1155 * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
1156 * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
1158 * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, it will be returned
1159 * as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format. If accesses via the
1160 * sysctl system call, it is returned as 16 bytes of binary data.
1162 static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
1163 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
1165 ctl_table fake_table;
1166 unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
1174 generate_random_uuid(uuid);
1176 sprintf(buf, "%02x%02x%02x%02x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x-"
1177 "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
1178 uuid[0], uuid[1], uuid[2], uuid[3],
1179 uuid[4], uuid[5], uuid[6], uuid[7],
1180 uuid[8], uuid[9], uuid[10], uuid[11],
1181 uuid[12], uuid[13], uuid[14], uuid[15]);
1182 fake_table.data = buf;
1183 fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);
1185 return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos);
1188 static int uuid_strategy(ctl_table *table, int __user *name, int nlen,
1189 void __user *oldval, size_t __user *oldlenp,
1190 void __user *newval, size_t newlen)
1192 unsigned char tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
1195 if (!oldval || !oldlenp)
1204 generate_random_uuid(uuid);
1206 if (get_user(len, oldlenp))
1211 if (copy_to_user(oldval, uuid, len) ||
1212 put_user(len, oldlenp))
1218 static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
1219 ctl_table random_table[] = {
1221 .ctl_name = RANDOM_POOLSIZE,
1222 .procname = "poolsize",
1223 .data = &sysctl_poolsize,
1224 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
1226 .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
1229 .ctl_name = RANDOM_ENTROPY_COUNT,
1230 .procname = "entropy_avail",
1231 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
1233 .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
1234 .data = &input_pool.entropy_count,
1237 .ctl_name = RANDOM_READ_THRESH,
1238 .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold",
1239 .data = &random_read_wakeup_thresh,
1240 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
1242 .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
1243 .strategy = &sysctl_intvec,
1244 .extra1 = &min_read_thresh,
1245 .extra2 = &max_read_thresh,
1248 .ctl_name = RANDOM_WRITE_THRESH,
1249 .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold",
1250 .data = &random_write_wakeup_thresh,
1251 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
1253 .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
1254 .strategy = &sysctl_intvec,
1255 .extra1 = &min_write_thresh,
1256 .extra2 = &max_write_thresh,
1259 .ctl_name = RANDOM_BOOT_ID,
1260 .procname = "boot_id",
1261 .data = &sysctl_bootid,
1264 .proc_handler = &proc_do_uuid,
1265 .strategy = &uuid_strategy,
1268 .ctl_name = RANDOM_UUID,
1272 .proc_handler = &proc_do_uuid,
1273 .strategy = &uuid_strategy,
1277 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
1279 /********************************************************************
1281 * Random funtions for networking
1283 ********************************************************************/
1286 * TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number
1287 * generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed
1288 * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
1289 * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints. This defeats
1290 * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
1291 * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
1293 * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
1294 * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
1295 * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
1298 /* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
1299 #define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
1300 #define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
1301 #define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
1304 * The generic round function. The application is so specific that
1305 * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
1306 * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
1307 * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
1309 #define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s) \
1310 (a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
1312 #define K2 013240474631UL
1313 #define K3 015666365641UL
1315 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
1317 static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform(__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
1319 __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
1322 ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1, 3);
1323 ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1, 7);
1324 ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
1325 ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
1326 ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1, 3);
1327 ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1, 7);
1328 ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
1329 ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
1330 ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1, 3);
1331 ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1, 7);
1332 ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
1333 ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);
1336 ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2, 3);
1337 ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2, 5);
1338 ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2, 9);
1339 ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
1340 ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2, 3);
1341 ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2, 5);
1342 ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2, 9);
1343 ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
1344 ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2, 3);
1345 ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2, 5);
1346 ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2, 9);
1347 ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);
1350 ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3, 3);
1351 ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3, 9);
1352 ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
1353 ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
1354 ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3, 3);
1355 ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3, 9);
1356 ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
1357 ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
1358 ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3, 3);
1359 ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3, 9);
1360 ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
1361 ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
1363 return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
1364 /* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
1376 /* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
1377 #define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
1379 * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
1380 * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
1381 * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
1383 * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
1384 * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
1385 * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
1386 * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
1387 * to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
1388 * clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
1390 * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
1393 * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
1394 * Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
1397 #define COUNT_BITS 8
1398 #define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
1399 #define HASH_BITS 24
1400 #define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
1402 static struct keydata {
1403 __u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
1405 } ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
1407 static unsigned int ip_cnt;
1409 static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work);
1411 static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator);
1415 * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data.
1416 * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced.
1417 * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function
1418 * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy.
1419 * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt.
1420 * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread
1421 * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never
1422 * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant
1423 * ISN is generated, nothing fatal.
1425 static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work)
1427 struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
1429 get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
1430 keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
1433 schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work, REKEY_INTERVAL);
1436 static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
1438 struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
1445 static __init int seqgen_init(void)
1447 rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
1450 late_initcall(seqgen_init);
1452 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
1453 __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
1454 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
1458 struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
1460 /* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
1461 * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
1464 memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
1465 hash[4] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
1466 memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
1468 seq = twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
1469 seq += keyptr->count;
1471 seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
1475 EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
1478 /* The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
1479 * All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>.
1481 __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
1483 struct keydata *keyptr;
1486 keyptr = get_keyptr();
1489 * Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
1490 * The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
1491 * which is then hashed with random data.
1493 hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr;
1494 hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
1495 hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
1496 hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
1498 return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
1503 __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
1504 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
1508 struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
1511 * Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
1512 * (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
1513 * Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
1514 * then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
1516 hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
1517 hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
1518 hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
1519 hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
1521 seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
1522 seq += keyptr->count;
1524 * As close as possible to RFC 793, which
1525 * suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
1526 * Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
1527 * For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
1528 * For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
1529 * we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
1530 * overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
1531 * Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
1533 seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6;
1538 /* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral IPV4 transport port search */
1539 u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
1541 struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
1545 * Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search
1546 * (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data.
1548 hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
1549 hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
1550 hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ keyptr->secret[10];
1551 hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
1553 return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
1556 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
1557 u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
1560 struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
1563 memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
1564 hash[4] = (__force u32)dport;
1565 memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
1567 return twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash);
1571 #if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
1572 /* Similar to secure_tcp_sequence_number but generate a 48 bit value
1573 * bit's 32-47 increase every key exchange
1574 * 0-31 hash(source, dest)
1576 u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
1577 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
1581 struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
1583 hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
1584 hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
1585 hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
1586 hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
1588 seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
1589 seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
1591 seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
1592 seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
1596 EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
1599 #endif /* CONFIG_INET */
1603 * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
1604 * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random
1605 * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
1606 * depleting entropy is too high
1608 unsigned int get_random_int(void)
1611 * Use IP's RNG. It suits our purpose perfectly: it re-keys itself
1612 * every second, from the entropy pool (and thus creates a limited
1613 * drain on it), and uses halfMD4Transform within the second. We
1614 * also mix it with jiffies and the PID:
1616 return secure_ip_id((__force __be32)(current->pid + jiffies));
1620 * randomize_range() returns a start address such that
1622 * [...... <range> .....]
1625 * a <range> with size "len" starting at the return value is inside in the
1626 * area defined by [start, end], but is otherwise randomized.
1629 randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len)
1631 unsigned long range = end - len - start;
1633 if (end <= start + len)
1635 return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start);