git.oblomov.eu Git - linux-2.6/blob - security/commoncap.c

   1 /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
   2  *
   3  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   4  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   5  *      the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
   6  *      (at your option) any later version.
   7  *
   8  */
   9
  10 #include <linux/capability.h>
  11 #include <linux/module.h>
  12 #include <linux/init.h>
  13 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  14 #include <linux/security.h>
  15 #include <linux/file.h>
  16 #include <linux/mm.h>
  17 #include <linux/mman.h>
  18 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  19 #include <linux/swap.h>
  20 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
  21 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  22 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  23 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  24 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  25 #include <linux/mount.h>
  26 #include <linux/sched.h>
  27 #include <linux/prctl.h>
  28 #include <linux/securebits.h>
  29
  30 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
  31 {
  32         NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
  33         return 0;
  34 }
  35
  36 int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
  37 {
  38         if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap))
  39                 return -EPERM;
  40         return 0;
  41 }
  42
  43 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
  44
  45 /*
  46  * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
  47  * function.  That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable()
  48  * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable()
  49  * returns 1 for this case.
  50  */
  51 int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
  52 {
  53         /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
  54         if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
  55                 return 0;
  56         return -EPERM;
  57 }
  58
  59 int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
  60 {
  61         if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
  62                 return -EPERM;
  63         return 0;
  64 }
  65
  66 int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
  67 {
  68         /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
  69         if (cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
  70                 return 0;
  71         if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
  72                 return 0;
  73         return -EPERM;
  74 }
  75
  76 int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
  77 {
  78         /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
  79         if (cap_issubset(current->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted))
  80                 return 0;
  81         if (has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
  82                 return 0;
  83         return -EPERM;
  84 }
  85
  86 int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
  87                 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
  88 {
  89         /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
  90         *effective = target->cap_effective;
  91         *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable;
  92         *permitted = target->cap_permitted;
  93         return 0;
  94 }
  95
  96 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
  97
  98 static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *target)
  99 {
 100         /*
 101          * No support for remote process capability manipulation with
 102          * filesystem capability support.
 103          */
 104         return (target != current);
 105 }
 106
 107 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
 108 {
 109         /*
 110          * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited
 111          * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
 112          * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
 113          */
 114         return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0);
 115 }
 116
 117 static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) { return 1; }
 118
 119 #else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 120
 121 static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; }
 122 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; }
 123 static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
 124 {
 125         return !capable(CAP_SETPCAP);
 126 }
 127
 128 #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 129
 130 int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 131                       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 132 {
 133         if (cap_block_setpcap(target)) {
 134                 return -EPERM;
 135         }
 136         if (cap_inh_is_capped()
 137             && !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
 138                              cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
 139                                          current->cap_permitted))) {
 140                 /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
 141                 return -EPERM;
 142         }
 143         if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
 144                            cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
 145                                        current->cap_bset))) {
 146                 /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
 147                 return -EPERM;
 148         }
 149
 150         /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
 151         if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
 152                            cap_combine (target->cap_permitted,
 153                                         current->cap_permitted))) {
 154                 return -EPERM;
 155         }
 156
 157         /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
 158         if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) {
 159                 return -EPERM;
 160         }
 161
 162         return 0;
 163 }
 164
 165 void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 166                      kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 167 {
 168         target->cap_effective = *effective;
 169         target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
 170         target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
 171 }
 172
 173 static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 174 {
 175         cap_clear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted);
 176         bprm->cap_effective = false;
 177 }
 178
 179 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 180
 181 int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 182 {
 183         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 184         int error;
 185
 186         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 187                return 0;
 188
 189         error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
 190         if (error <= 0)
 191                 return 0;
 192         return 1;
 193 }
 194
 195 int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 196 {
 197         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 198
 199         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
 200                return 0;
 201
 202         return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
 203 }
 204
 205 static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps,
 206                                 struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned size)
 207 {
 208         __u32 magic_etc;
 209         unsigned tocopy, i;
 210         int ret;
 211
 212         if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
 213                 return -EINVAL;
 214
 215         magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
 216
 217         switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) {
 218         case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
 219                 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
 220                         return -EINVAL;
 221                 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
 222                 break;
 223         case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
 224                 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
 225                         return -EINVAL;
 226                 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
 227                 break;
 228         default:
 229                 return -EINVAL;
 230         }
 231
 232         if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) {
 233                 bprm->cap_effective = true;
 234         } else {
 235                 bprm->cap_effective = false;
 236         }
 237
 238         ret = 0;
 239
 240         CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
 241                 __u32 value_cpu;
 242
 243                 if (i >= tocopy) {
 244                         /*
 245                          * Legacy capability sets have no upper bits
 246                          */
 247                         bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i] = 0;
 248                         continue;
 249                 }
 250                 /*
 251                  * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
 252                  */
 253                 value_cpu = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
 254                 bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i] =
 255                         (current->cap_bset.cap[i] & value_cpu) |
 256                         (current->cap_inheritable.cap[i] &
 257                                 le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable));
 258                 if (value_cpu & ~bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i]) {
 259                         /*
 260                          * insufficient to execute correctly
 261                          */
 262                         ret = -EPERM;
 263                 }
 264         }
 265
 266         /*
 267          * For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they
 268          * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are
 269          * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.
 270          */
 271         return bprm->cap_effective ? ret : 0;
 272 }
 273
 274 /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
 275 static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 276 {
 277         struct dentry *dentry;
 278         int rc = 0;
 279         struct vfs_cap_data vcaps;
 280         struct inode *inode;
 281
 282         if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) {
 283                 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 284                 return 0;
 285         }
 286
 287         dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
 288         inode = dentry->d_inode;
 289         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 290                 goto out;
 291
 292         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &vcaps,
 293                                    XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
 294         if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 295                 /* no data, that's ok */
 296                 rc = 0;
 297                 goto out;
 298         }
 299         if (rc < 0)
 300                 goto out;
 301
 302         rc = cap_from_disk(&vcaps, bprm, rc);
 303         if (rc == -EINVAL)
 304                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
 305                        __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
 306
 307 out:
 308         dput(dentry);
 309         if (rc)
 310                 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 311
 312         return rc;
 313 }
 314
 315 #else
 316 int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 317 {
 318         return 0;
 319 }
 320
 321 int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 322 {
 323         return 0;
 324 }
 325
 326 static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 327 {
 328         bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
 329         return 0;
 330 }
 331 #endif
 332
 333 int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 334 {
 335         int ret;
 336
 337         ret = get_file_caps(bprm);
 338
 339         if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
 340                 /*
 341                  * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
 342                  * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
 343                  * capability sets for the file.
 344                  *
 345                  * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective
 346                  * bit.
 347                  */
 348                 if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
 349                         /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
 350                         bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_combine(
 351                                 current->cap_bset, current->cap_inheritable
 352                                 );
 353                         bprm->cap_effective = (bprm->e_uid == 0);
 354                         ret = 0;
 355                 }
 356         }
 357
 358         return ret;
 359 }
 360
 361 void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 362 {
 363         if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
 364             !cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
 365                           current->cap_permitted)) {
 366                 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
 367                 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 368
 369                 if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
 370                         if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
 371                                 bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
 372                                 bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
 373                         }
 374                         if (cap_limit_ptraced_target()) {
 375                                 bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_intersect(
 376                                         bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
 377                                         current->cap_permitted);
 378                         }
 379                 }
 380         }
 381
 382         current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
 383         current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
 384
 385         /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
 386          * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
 387          * capability rules */
 388         if (!is_global_init(current)) {
 389                 current->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
 390                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
 391                         current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
 392                 else
 393                         cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
 394         }
 395
 396         /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
 397
 398         current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 399 }
 400
 401 int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 402 {
 403         if (current->uid != 0) {
 404                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
 405                         return 1;
 406                 if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted))
 407                         return 1;
 408         }
 409
 410         return (current->euid != current->uid ||
 411                 current->egid != current->gid);
 412 }
 413
 414 int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 415                        const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 416 {
 417         if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
 418                 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
 419                         return -EPERM;
 420                 return 0;
 421         } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 422                      sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 423             !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 424                 return -EPERM;
 425         return 0;
 426 }
 427
 428 int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 429 {
 430         if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
 431                 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
 432                         return -EPERM;
 433                 return 0;
 434         } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 435                      sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
 436             !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 437                 return -EPERM;
 438         return 0;
 439 }
 440
 441 /* moved from kernel/sys.c. */
 442 /*
 443  * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
 444  * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
 445  *
 446  *  1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
 447  *  {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
 448  *  cleared.
 449  *
 450  *  2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
 451  *  capabilities of the process are cleared.
 452  *
 453  *  3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
 454  *  capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
 455  *
 456  *  fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
 457  *  never happen.
 458  *
 459  *  -astor
 460  *
 461  * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
 462  * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
 463  * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
 464  * effective sets will be retained.
 465  * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
 466  * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
 467  * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
 468  * files..
 469  * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
 470  */
 471 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid,
 472                                         int old_suid)
 473 {
 474         if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
 475             (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
 476             !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
 477                 cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
 478                 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
 479         }
 480         if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
 481                 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
 482         }
 483         if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
 484                 current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
 485         }
 486 }
 487
 488 int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
 489                           int flags)
 490 {
 491         switch (flags) {
 492         case LSM_SETID_RE:
 493         case LSM_SETID_ID:
 494         case LSM_SETID_RES:
 495                 /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */
 496                 if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 497                         cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
 498                 }
 499                 break;
 500         case LSM_SETID_FS:
 501                 {
 502                         uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid;
 503
 504                         /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */
 505
 506                         /*
 507                          * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
 508                          *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
 509                          */
 510
 511                         if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 512                                 if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
 513                                         current->cap_effective =
 514                                                 cap_drop_fs_set(
 515                                                     current->cap_effective);
 516                                 }
 517                                 if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
 518                                         current->cap_effective =
 519                                                 cap_raise_fs_set(
 520                                                     current->cap_effective,
 521                                                     current->cap_permitted);
 522                                 }
 523                         }
 524                         break;
 525                 }
 526         default:
 527                 return -EINVAL;
 528         }
 529
 530         return 0;
 531 }
 532
 533 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 534 /*
 535  * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
 536  * task_setnice, assumes that
 537  *   . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
 538  *   . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
 539  *      then those actions should be allowed
 540  * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
 541  * yet with increased caps.
 542  * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
 543  */
 544 static inline int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
 545 {
 546         if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
 547             !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
 548                 return -EPERM;
 549         return 0;
 550 }
 551
 552 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 553                            struct sched_param *lp)
 554 {
 555         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 556 }
 557
 558 int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 559 {
 560         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 561 }
 562
 563 int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 564 {
 565         return cap_safe_nice(p);
 566 }
 567
 568 /*
 569  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
 570  * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
 571  * no new races - i.e. only another task doing capget() on
 572  * this task could get inconsistent info.  There can be no
 573  * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
 574  */
 575 static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
 576 {
 577         if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
 578                 return -EPERM;
 579         if (!cap_valid(cap))
 580                 return -EINVAL;
 581         cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
 582         return 0;
 583 }
 584
 585 #else
 586 int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 587                            struct sched_param *lp)
 588 {
 589         return 0;
 590 }
 591 int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 592 {
 593         return 0;
 594 }
 595 int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 596 {
 597         return 0;
 598 }
 599 #endif
 600
 601 int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 602                    unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
 603 {
 604         long error = 0;
 605
 606         switch (option) {
 607         case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
 608                 if (!cap_valid(arg2))
 609                         error = -EINVAL;
 610                 else
 611                         error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
 612                 break;
 613 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 614         case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
 615                 error = cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
 616                 break;
 617
 618         /*
 619          * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
 620          * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
 621          * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
 622          * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
 623          *
 624          * Note:
 625          *
 626          *  PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
 627          *      issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
 628          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
 629          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
 630          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
 631          *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
 632          *
 633          * will ensure that the current process and all of its
 634          * children will be locked into a pure
 635          * capability-based-privilege environment.
 636          */
 637         case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
 638                 if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
 639                      & (current->securebits ^ arg2))                  /*[1]*/
 640                     || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
 641                          & ~arg2))                                    /*[2]*/
 642                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
 643                     || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) {    /*[4]*/
 644                         /*
 645                          * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
 646                          * [2] no unlocking of locks
 647                          * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
 648                          * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
 649                          *     the "sendmail capabilities bug")
 650                          */
 651                         error = -EPERM;  /* cannot change a locked bit */
 652                 } else {
 653                         current->securebits = arg2;
 654                 }
 655                 break;
 656         case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
 657                 error = current->securebits;
 658                 break;
 659
 660 #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
 661
 662         case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
 663                 if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
 664                         error = 1;
 665                 break;
 666         case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
 667                 if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
 668                         error = -EINVAL;
 669                 else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
 670                         error = -EPERM;
 671                 else if (arg2)
 672                         current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 673                 else
 674                         current->securebits &=
 675                                 ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 676                 break;
 677
 678         default:
 679                 /* No functionality available - continue with default */
 680                 return 0;
 681         }
 682
 683         /* Functionality provided */
 684         *rc_p = error;
 685         return 1;
 686 }
 687
 688 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
 689 {
 690         cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
 691         cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
 692         cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
 693         p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
 694         return;
 695 }
 696
 697 int cap_syslog (int type)
 698 {
 699         if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 700                 return -EPERM;
 701         return 0;
 702 }
 703
 704 int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 705 {
 706         int cap_sys_admin = 0;
 707
 708         if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
 709                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
 710         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 711 }
 712